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ABSTRACT
INVESTMENT AND TITHING IN THAI VILLAGES:
A BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF RURAL MODERNIZATION
Charles Alan Murray
Submitted to the Department of Political Science
on 10 May 1974 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Political Science
This study analyzes the responses of forty-one Thai villages to moderniza-
tion. The village is the unit of analysis. Behaviors or the physical
outcomes of behaviors are used as the indicators of response. The objective
is to explain why Thai villages vary so widely in the content and quality
of daily life.
The two major constructs of the study are how much the people in a village
have modernized, and how well the village is coping with modernization in
terms of maintaining basic governmental functions.
The first of these constructs is operationally defined as "investment" --
evidence that villagers in a given community are making efforts to improve
their lives by voluntarily risking what they already possess. This is argued
to be a behavioral reflection of two psychological hallmarks of personal
modernity in peasants: an expanding standard of what is attainable, and
acculturation to change as a manageable and generally benificient phenomenon.
The second major construct is operationally defined as "tithing" -- evidence
of voluntary, continuous, and widespread villager behaviors in support of
public goods. Tithing behaviors are argued to reflect the functional capacity
of a village to solve its day-to-day problems of governance.
The data indicate that investment behaviors in these villages are being
caused by broad-band, unchanneled exposure to modernizing influences; e.g.,
infrastructure development and increased physical accessibility to the
outside world. Channeled exposure to modernization (the community develop-
ment approach) did not play an important role. The data also suggest the
likilihood of a curvilinear relationship between unchanneled exposure and
investment.
The relationship between modernization and a village's functional capacity
is complex. It is a .multivariate, multi-stage process that had only begun
in some villages of the sample and was far advanced in others. It is pre-
sented in terms of two competing sets of dynamics.
Unchanneled exposure to modernization and investment combine to produce
three effects inimicable to functional capacity: increased socioeconomic
heterogeneity within the village, increased costs associated with support
of public goods, and increased homogeneity of interests within the leader-
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ship group. The net effect is that at the moment when the village is exper-
iencing greater internal stresses than ever before, it is contemporaneously
less likely than ever before to possess leaders who are able or willing
to cope with those stresses.
In contrast, channeled exposure to modernization (through community develop-
ment inputs and training inputs) was positively associated with the level
of functional capacity. These inputs are argued to have the effect of en-
riching the content of village leadership positions and consequently increas-
ing their competitiveness with the attractions of private investment. The
educational value of the channeled inputs is discounted.
The study concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings
for development strategy. It is argued that both the priorities and the
proper methods for a rural development strategy depend crucially on where
the villages of a society fit along an economic continuum ranging from
scarcity to sufficiency. The greater the sufficiency in the traditional
case, the higher the priority that should be given to noneconomic goals
and the greater the autonomy that can be entrusted to local institutions.
And in general, it is suggested that the village's future as a unit of
self-governance has been widely underestimated. A greater structural
role for the village may be a desirable alternative to reflexive central-
ization of authority during modernization.
Thesis supervisor: Lucian W. Pye
Title: Professor of Political Science, M.I.T.
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INTRODUCTION
A VILLAGE PERSPECTIVE ON MODERNIZATION
This study is an attempt to answer a question that I formed over a
period of six years in villages throughout Thailand.
Its exact expression varied with my preoccupations during those years.
At first, it was the practical question facing a development worker in the
field: why is is so much easier to convince this village to build privies,
than to convince that village? A few years later it had become the more
general problem facing development administrators: why are projects in some
villages so much more successful than projects in other villages? In
another year, it had been rephrased to apply to the insurgency problem: why
should two villages only a few kilometers apart react so differently to
insurgency appeals? And finally, for this study, it is put in terms of
political development: why do villages react so differently to the prob-
lems of modernization, and what is the nature of the difference?
At bottom, all of the various formulations are different approaches
to a common underlying question: why are some villages so much more pleasant
as places to live than other villages?
Strictly speaking, it is still a nearly unresearchable question.
"Quality of life" as a variable in social science is elusive enough even
when applied to problems in one's own culture. When it is applied to an
oriental culture, then to the village subculture within that, the problems
multiply. But even if the study will include no construct explicitly
labelled "quality of life," it was motivated by the notion that villages are
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different, and different in ways which are at the heart of the happiness
and well-being of the approximately three out of four Thai who still live
in villages.
The issue transcends Thai villages or Thai modernization. Most
of our strategies for promoting modernization or coping with its problems
assume that quality of life in traditional villages goes up as villagers
increase their income and have greater accessibility to the institutions
and services of a modern outside world. The main obstacle to achieving
these desirable changes is often taken to be the peasant himself, who is
too conservative, too poor, or perhaps simply too confused to adopt the
innovations which are required.
This study explores an alternative approach: that while economic
modernization may bring with it certain advantages to the individual,
perhaps quite significant ones, it also tends to degrade the quality of
community life on equally significant dimensions -- not in terms of the
loss of quaint local traditions or the loss of some Rousseauist innocence,
but in terms of norms of social, political, and administrative interaction
that would be prized by most Western communities.
In the text, departures from the conventional wisdom will be hedged
with qualifications and constant reference to the specificities and pecul-
iarities of rural Thailand. And such caution is appropriate: the evidence
is indeed restricted to Thailand, and Thailand is in many ways a very
peculiar country. Beyond those considerations, the evidence for the
arguments is often tenuous, even for the Thai case, Samples of fortyone
(as we will be using in this study) rarely lend themselves to conclusive
proof. But the argument is offered here at the outset as a general hypothesis
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about modernizing rural societies: the village has a potential for coping
with the dislocations of modernization which has been largely unrecognized
and which is in danger of being lost altogether.
A. The Village as the Unit of Analysis
The initial premise is undeniable: Thai villages indeed differ,
as any villager will confirm. Some are tranquil; some have a history of
feuds. Some are pious and sober; others have a jug of moonshine under every
porch and card games every night. Some villages are proud of themselves, and
proclaim that they grow the sweetest tamarind or the biggest durian or the
most beautiful women in the country. Other villages are a collection of houses
with only a name for a common bond, and no pride at all.
Some villages are interminably curious. If a stranger strolls through
them, he will be asked at every second house to stop and chat. In another
village just down the road, he can walk for an hour with hardly a greeting.
If he stays for a few days, some villages will prove to be ceremonious in
their treatment of him, others relaxed and unbuttoned, still others suspicious
and aloof.
Some villages are clean, others are dirty. Some are spread out over
several kilometers, each house hidden from its neighbors. In others, the
houses will be crammed together until their porches touch.
Villages are unpredictable. In one village located a few minutes
away from a large town, the visitor still has to explain that the world is
round; in another, hours from anywhere, the headman will let him listen to
a recording of a Mozart quintet, played on a wind-up Victrola.
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But most importantly, some villages seem able to solve their problems
while others cannot. Some villages are victimized by conmen, their daughters
seduced by recruiters from the city's brothels, plagued by police looking for
a rake-off, unable to stop the river from flooding the fields every year --
while other villages ignore the conmen, keep out the recruiters, get the dis-
trict office to rein in the police, and build an earthen dam to hold back the
river. More generally, as we shall attempt to describe in the course of the
study, some villages seem able to ride with the punch of modernization while
others cannot.
All of these are everyday aspects of life, and together they shape the
quality of life in the village. There are limits, of course. An impoverished
village living on the edge of starvation is an unpleasant place to live regard-
less of any other conditions. But given a typical (for Thailand) level of
natural resources, the nature of the village -- its gestalt, if you will --
is a crucial factor in determining whether its inhabitants! daily existence is
generally pleasant or generally unpleasant.
It is perhaps the most commonly overlooked fact of life in developing
countries. But the reasons are not difficult to understand.
Take as an example the administrator of development. If he works
with technical assistance, the only occasion he has to visit villages is when
a project is being planned, implemented, or inspected. Unless he makes a
deliberate effort to break the pattern, he can spend years in the field and
talk to hundreds of villagers and never hear them discussing anything except
topics related to development projects -- because development projects are
what is happening in every village he visits. And when he is not in the
field, he is surrounded by the plans and budgets for thousands of projects
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totalling millions of dollars. It is hardly surprising that he tends to dif-
ferentiate among villages in terms of development projects, and assume that
they shape much of village life. Yet consider: the average village of the
forty-one in this study had been involved in only 3.8 projects of any kind
during the last five years -- and that figure includes shallow-well projects
that were finished in perhaps two days of labor, and agriculture projects that
affected only a few members of the village. It includes the failures, and the
projects with only trivial effects. The aggregate figures in Bangkok.are im-
pressive, but they obscure how small a part development inputs play in the
everyday life of a villager.
A parallel kind of myopia afflicts the administrator of local govern-
ment. When he visits a district office, he sees lines of villagers waiting
to talk to officials. When he gets a report about the quality of local
government, it usually deals with either the horror stories -- the corrupt
official taking the villager's last few baht -- or the paeans -- the kindly
official taking the sick village child to the health center. Particularly
in a country with an insurgency problem, there is a tendency to assume that
villager interactions with officials are a powerful determinant of the vil-
lager's attitude toward the government. Yet again consider: in three vil-
lages for which extensive data on this topic were obtained, only thirty-nine
percent of the heads of household had experienced any contact with a district
official during the year before the interview, save for sitting in an audience
when an official spoke to a village meeting. When it is further remembered
that the heads of household who comprised the sample were by far the most
likely persons to conduct the family's business with the outside world, the
presumptive proportion of village adults who had any contact with a government
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official is smaller yet. And added to that, the year's interactions for
the thirty-nine percent were not extensive. Most often, they consisted of
a single event, taking a morning's time, of entirely prosaic content.1 So
even if occasionally the very abrasive official can cause a lasting grudge or
the very helpful official can cause lasting fond memories,,the chief character-
istics of villager interaction with the government are rarity, brevity, and
uneventfulness -- if by government is meant the career civil servants of the
Royal Thai Government.
It is understandable why development officials and civil administrators
become so preoccupied with their inputs that they overlook how tiny a propor-
tion of the village's life is involved. It is somewhat less obvious why the
village as a unit of analysis has been used so seldom by scholars.
Villagers -- or peasants -- have not been ignored. Their role as a
source of political instability and pressure for reform has been a major topic
since the advent of political development as a distinct branch of political
science. The "revolution of rising expectations," mobilization of new groups
into the political system, the breakdown of strict social hierarchies, the
modernizing effects of mass media -- these and a variety of other topics have
relied upon analyses of villager responses as a major component. 2
Nor has "the village" as archtype been ignored. The participant obser-
vation case study of a single village has been the mainstay of an entire school
of anthropology, whereby the principal features of a culture are induced from
the careful study of a single representative case. 3
But despite the attention given to the individuals who live in villages
and to the archtypical village, the treatment of villages as the unit of analy-
sis has been highly restricted.4 To a surprising degree, the tacit assumption
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of scholarship in political development has been that when you've seen one vil-
lage, you've seen them all. This study works from the opposite point of view.
B. "How Much" and "How WeZZ" in Village Modernization
The unit of analysis is the village. There are two dependent variables
-- the "investment" and "tithing" of the title of the study.
The first, investment, denotes how much modernization has occurred in
the population of a village. To what extent has the outlook of the men and
women in it shifted away from traditional values? In Chapter II, substantial
effort will be devoted to an exploration of what personal modernity means,
particularly for a rural population, and why investment is an appropriate
behavioral measure. Then in Chapter III we will seek to explain what caused
these behaviors in the villages of the sample.
But measuring the degree of modernization alone is a dry exercise. Why,
after all, is modernization worth studying? For anyone who has lived and work-
ed in a modernizing country, a part of the answer must be that an understand-
ing of the process eventually will enable us in some sense to enhance modern-
ization's benefits and lessen its pains. To the extent that this is true,
it is incumbent on an analysis to specify a dependent variable for not only
measuring how much a polity is modernizing, but also how well it is modernizing.
Defining "well" is the problem, and it has no unique solution. For
this study, an evolutionary approach has been adopted. "How well" is not
answered in terms of progress toward the development of liberal democracy,
or Maoist communism, or any other political system which is said to stand at
the end of the development process. The subject is not the political destina-
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tion of traditional villages, but the journey. The terms of the question are:
at any given point in the process, how well is the village governing its
affairs? It is an explicitly conservative, approach; there is no talk of the
need to break eggs in order to make omelets.
This perspective is not only a function of personal predilections,
though they surely play a part. The main factor in taking a relativistic
approach to village governance is the difference between the meaning of modern-
ization for national governments, and its meaning for a village -- the latter
is not the former writ small. Village modernization is a simpler, more
straightforward process, in ways that bear directly on the analysis.
National governments have the freedom and the obligation to set policy
and to allocate resources among priorities. Because of this, it is extremely
difficult to speak of a government "coping with modernization." When a
central government copes with problems raised by modernization, it is in
some part dealing with the consequences of its own policy decisions. It be-
comes nearly impossible to separate out the effects of wisdom (or lack of it)
in the government's policy choices and the competence or incompetence it
brings to administering the problems of modernization which would occur no
matter what policy was pursued.
The same condition does not exist for villages, and in this lies the
feasibility of translating "coping with modernization" into operational terms.
For the village, there is no problem of choice between industrial versus
agricultural development, no options of social reorganization or political
reform. The village exists with whatever human and natural resources it
possesses, the folk wisdom endowed by its culture, and some resources handed
down from the central government. It can only marginally alter these assets;
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for practical purposes over the short run, they are fixed. Moreover,
they are quite limited. By no stretch of the imagination does even the
wealthiest Thai village dispose of enough resources to speak meaningfully
about allocation among priorities. The village has to take modernization
as it comes, reacting to new situations as best it can. The village
cannot plan its rate of change, degree of change, or type of change except
within the narrowest of limits. It thus becomes reasonable to ask of a
village if it is continuing to function in certain basic areas of village
governance -- maintenance of peace and order, sponsorship of a few simple
public goods -- which have a profound effect on the daily life of the
villager. Because of the rough similarity of demands which are likely
to be made on villages within the same culture, it becomes possible to
relate different stages of modernization to different levels of village
functionalism in self-government.
In Chapter IV, this perspective leads to the definition of a "functional
village." The villager behaviors which indicate a village's functional
capacity are labelled "tithing behaviors." Combined into an index, measures
of these behaviors serve as the operational criterion for assessing how
well a village is meeting its elementary responsibilities as a unit of
government. In Chapter V, the relationship between"how much" and "how well"
is explored, along with the role of the Thai government's attempts to channel
the process.
Finally, in the conclusion, the study discusses the implications of the
findings for public policy.
-17-
Notes to the Introduction
1. See Charles A. Murray, Thai Local Administration: Villager Interactions
with Community and Amphoe Government (Bangkok: US-AID), 1968, p. 11,ff.
2. A few of the more useful current studies are Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars
of the fIlentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row), 1969, and Jeffrey
Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press), 1972,
on modern peasant-based revolutio.ns; John D. Powell, Political Mobiliza-
tion of the Venezuelan Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press),
1971, Joel S. Migdal, Peasants in a Shrinking World: The Socio-Economic
Basis of Political Change (Cambridge: Harvard University, unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation), 1973, and F. LaMond Tullis, Lord and Peasant in
Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press), 1970,on peasants as a political force; and Samuel
P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press), 1968,for an overview of the peasant and political
instability.
3. The one-village study is an archtype; the genre should be defined to
include studies of two, three, and four villages which nonetheless
seek to generalize in terms of modal values and behaviors in communities
of that culture. Some of the studies most pertinent to political topics
are Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe,
Ill: The Free Press), 1958, William Hinton, Fanshen: A Documentary of
Revolution in a Chinese Village (New York: Vintage), 1966, Henry Oren-
stein, Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian Village (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), 1965, Marvin L. Rogers, "Politicization
and Political Development in a Rural Malay Community," Asian Survey, 9
(1969), pp. 919-933, A.H. Somjee, "Political Dynamics of a Gujarat
Village," Asian Survey 12 (1972), pp. 602-608, and (about Thailand) Stephen
B. Young, "The Northeastern Thai Village: A Non-Participatory Democracy,"
Asian Survey 8 (1968), pp. 873-886, and Murray, op. cit. A fFew of the
anthropological classics of this school are Robert Redfield, Tepoztlan:
A Mexican Village. A Study of Folk Life (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press), 1930, Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied
(Urbana: Ufiversity of Illinois Press), 1951, G. Morris Carstairs, The
Twice Born: A Study of a Community of High-Case Hindus (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press), 1958, Lawrence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1957, and William R and Charlotte
Viall Wiser, Behind Mud Walls: 1930-1960 (Berkeley: University of Calif.
Press), 1963.
4. "Highly restricted" is the conservative way to put it; presumably there
exist published works using the village as the unit of analysis. I have
been unable to find them.
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CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The field work for this study was carried out under the auspices of
a research contract between the American Institutes for Research (AIR), a
nonprofit research corporation, and the United States Agency for International
Development (US-AID).
The purpose of the project was to develop methodology for assessing
the impact of development programs on Thai villagers, and to make that method-
ology suitable for continuing application by agencies of the Royal Thai
Government (RTG). In practice, this meant the development of criteria for
defining positive impact, the development of cheap and relatively simple ways
of operationalizing those criteria through data, and, finally, the develop-
ment of equally cheap and simple ways of monitering the success of different
development programs in achieving those impact criteria.
Part of that final step was to identify conditions within the village --
they were called "disposing conditions" -- which provide a positive or negative
environment for theachievement of development goals. For example, does a rich
natural resource base mean that villagers will be eager to take advantage of
a new irrigation system; or does their existing prosperity mean that they will
have few incentives to use an additional resource? The field work upon which
this study is based was conducted in order to examine what these disposing
conditions were and how they operated. It was understood from the outset that
-19-
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the data collection procedures would be made compatible with the closely re-
lated objectives of this study, to examine what this writer perceived as
significant variance in the quality of life among Thai villages.1
A. The Sample
The map on the preceding page shows the provinces where the study was
carried out and the districts within them where the villages were located.
The villages included in the study were drawn from two previous samples.
All but four of the villages were drawn from a sample of 129 villages covered
during an earlier survey by the AIR impact assessment project. Those 129
villages had been chosen randomly within three strata: within one kilometer
of an all-weather road, within five kilometers of an all-weather road, more
than five kilometers from an all-weather road. The number of villages selected
from each stratum had been made proportional to the distribution of the overall
village population in the district: if fifty percent of the villages in dis-
trict X were within one kilometer of an all-weather road, fifty percent of the
sample for that district was chosen from among those villages. In all, the
129 villages represented a twenty-five percent sample of the population of
villages in the four districts of that study.
The extra four villages included in the sample for this study, but not
included in the previous AIR study, were communities which this writer had
studied at length in 1968. At that time, two Thai researchers were resident
in each village for a month.2 Because these four villages came from a district
of Nakhon Phanom province (one of the provinces included in the AIR survey),
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and because they also represented a range of levels of accessibility to an
all-weather road, it was considered that they would be compatible with the
rest of the sample. Their addition brought the substantial benefit of allow-
ing a new look at villages examined almost five years earlier -- in two cases,
by one of the same researchers who had participated in the residence research
at that time.
Data were collected from a total of 49 villages that are carried on
the RTG's books as distinct administrative entities. The realities of the
situation led us to collapse this number to the 41 that comprise the base
for virtually all of the analyses. In one instance, five villages were effect-
ively administered by a single headman; in four other instances, pairs of
contiguous villages were treated as one.
No attempt was made to choose the villages which exactly fit the pro-
file of the 129 from the larger sample. But in the event, the subset was a
remarkably faithful reflection of the parent sample. Means of some representa-
tive variables are shown in table 1.1.
TABLE 1.1 Means of representative variables, from
41-village scamples.
Variable 129-Village
Sample
Age, head of household 44.7
No. of rai owned per household* 22.1
% of households selling produce 73.6
% of households using fertilizer 42.2
% of households using insecticide 40.0
No.-of stores-per 100 households 2.4
Nq.. of rice mills per 100 households 1.2
* one rai is equal to approximately .4 acres.
the 129-village and
41-Village
Sample
44.7
22.1
75.7
42.4
41.4
2.5
1.5
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Three of the most important village parameters are not included in the
preceding table. They are: distance from the district town, number of house-
holds, and regional location. Some observations about the representativeness
of the sample on each of these dimensions are worth noting in more detail.
The distance of the 41 villages from their respective district towns
appears to be highly representative of the general population of villages in
North and Northeast Thailand.
The basis for this statement is a map exercise conducted with a randomly
chosen sample of 300 villages in fifteen provinces from those regions. After
deleting those "villages" which turned out to be located within the municipal
boundaries of the district towns (technically, even Bangkok is still comprised
of hamlets; some outlying suburbs are still "villages"), a sample of 272
villages remained. The mean distance of these villages from their district
towns was 17.0 kilometers; the mean distance for the 41-village sample was
16.7 kilometers. The details of the distribution are shown in figure 1.2.
272-village sample
41-village sample
30
Percent of
villages in 20
the sample
0
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40+
Number of kilometers from the district town
FIGURE 1.2 Distance-from-district distribution in the 272-village
and 41-village samples.
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As the figure clearly shows, the shape of the 41-village sample closely con-
formed to the shape of the larger sample.
The villages in the 41-village sample ranged in size from 54 to 575
households. The mean was 145.4 households compared to 123.0 for the 129-
village sample.
The 41-village sample is- probably more unrepresentative on this
parameter than on any other. The very small villages of 20, 30, or 40 house-
holds were not represented at all, and it is probable that the sample for this
study has a disproportionately large number of villages in the 100 to 200
household range. See the comparison of the size distributions in the 41-village
and 129-village samples, as shown in figure 1.3.
129-village sample
41-village sample
40
30 y
Percent of
villages in
the sample 20
10
0 *
0-49 50-99 100-149 150-199 200-249 250-299 300+
Number of households
FIGURE 1.3 Size distribution in the 129-village and 41-village samples.
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The under-representation of the very small village was intentional.
Previous AIR surveys had indicated relatively high correlations between
village size and a number of the variables of interest to this study, even
when the'scoring expressed variables in terms of percent of population or
percent of households.3 It was felt that this reflected the importance of
attaining a "critical mass" in village size more than a direct linear re-
lationship between village size and the responses to modernization that we
shall be examining in this study; and, in fact, village size proved to be
insignificantly correlated with those responses when the sample was truncated
to exclude villages of less than 50 households. This means, however, that
the findings of this study are not to be associated with the roughly fifteen
percent of villages in the provinces of the study which fell into that category.
With the exception just noted, there is no reason to believe that the
41 villages of this sample are systematically unrepresentative of the overall
population of villages in the North and Northeast. On the contrary, the
available evidence suggests that they were exceptionally representative of
the 129-village sample and, insofar as that sample was randomly selected,
representative of the general population.
This is not to claim that the 41 villages are representative of all
Thai villages; the question of regional differences remains. The Central Plain
and the South eachpresents peculiar features that may make some or all of the
findings inapplicable to them. In particular, the much longer exposure of the
villages of the Central Plain to the influences of modernization probably means
that a survey in that region would yield substantially different results. The
differences might indicate simply that the Central Plain villages are the North
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and Northeast villages thirty years from now. But in the absence of data,
the question must remain moot for the time being.
The study does implicitly assume throughout most of the presentation
that the data from the North and Northeast can be treated as though the two
regions are interchangeable. The sample was split almost evenly between
villages from the two regions (51.2% from the Northeast, 48.8% from the North),
and no reference is made to inter-region differences in the analysis.
This procedure would be most suspect if the data from the North included
information from hill tribe villages, which have a cultural heritage clearly
incomparable to that of the lowland Thai. But hill tribe villages were not
included in the survey, and it has been assumed that the cultural differences
among the various ethnic subgroups in North and Northeast villages are not
significant for an analysis of the variables in this study.
Even though that statement might easily pain an anthropologist -- the
ethnic variegation of Thai villages is rich and intricate -- the data give
no indication that inter-regional differences on any of the variables are best
explained by appeals to inherent differences in culture or ethnicity. That is,
it so happens that the North and Northeast are different in their economic
environments as well as in their historical and ethnic environments. Not
surprisingly, then, analyses of variance using regional groupings often yield
significant differences in behaviors related to economic conditions. But
when (as proved to be the case in this study) the relatively few rich villages
in the Northeast behaved similarly to the many rich villages in the North,
and the relatively few poor villages in the North behaved similarly to the
many poor villages in the Northeast; then it seems reasonable to assume that
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the source of the difference in economic-related behaviors is the village's
economic environment, not a regional culture.
B. The Field Research
The Personnel
The field research team was comprised of five people: three Thai
field interviewers seconded to the project from the Agency for Accelerated
Rural Development (ARD), one Thai researcher employed by AIR throughout the
impact assessment project, and the writer, who directed the design and con-
duct of the research on disposing conditions.4
The Field Research Schedule
The data were collected during the period of August 1972 to February
1973 in a series of five field trips. Each of the first four trips collected
data from villages in a single province. The fifth trip was used to re-visit
villages that appeared to pose especially interesting problems of interpreta-
tion and, in a few cases, villages for which the initial data collection had
been inadequately conducted.
This was a residence research study, with the field interviewers living
in the village full-time. The length of stay in each village (one interviewer
per village) was approximately six days, with some exceptions according to
specific circumstances. The writer rotated among all the villages of the
sample.
Data were collected from three major sources: interviews with village
leaders, structured observation, and interactions with the general village
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population. Data collection procedures for each of these sources are discussed
below.
Interviews with Village Leaders
The first task of the field interviewer was to identify the members of
the leadership group in the village. To do so, he would ask the headman to
name the people who were especially respected by the villagers, whose advice
was sought most often, and who were most active in guiding village affairs.
No effort was made to stay with an absolutely uniform wording of the question.
If the respondent was uncertain about what was included under the heading of
"leader" (phu no), the interviewer was free to respond to his uncertainty.
The rationale for this procedure was the belief that villagers would be more
likely to unrealistically limit their enumeration of leaders (thinking that we
were interested only in officially designated leaders) than to he unrealistically
inclusive. By expanding upon the definition of leader, we saw very little
danger that the respondent would start naming people who would be inappropriate
in terms of our research interests.
When the headman was satisfied that he understood the question, he
would name all those villagers whom he considered to be leaders. Subsequently
all of the people named were interviewed in turn, and asked the same question:
who are the leaders in this village. The process continued until no new names
were forthcoming, and all the people named had been interviewed.
Certain categories of villager were automatically included as respon-
dents, regardless of whether they were nominated as leaders. These categories
included the headman, assistant headmen, kamnan (hamlet chief) when he lived
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ih- the village being studied, village merchants, and the school's headmaster.
But the population of leaders used for data analysis purposes did not include
such persons unless they had been named by villagers as being actual as well
as putative leaders. Specifically, a person was said to be a leader (for
data analysis) if he was nominated lat least twice, or by more than ten percent
of the sample inuthat village, whichever was greater.
Interviewers questioned randomly selected villagers about the leadership
group in order to guard against the possibility of getting only a clique from
the leader self-nomination procedure. For data collection purposes, a person
was interviewed if he was mentioned even once.
The basic leader interview included the following elements:
" elementary biographic data,
" personal economic data about possessions and occupation,
" education and training,
" data on his children, if any,
" leadership functions, problems, satisfactions,
" his evaluations of other leaders, and
" a set of critical incidents about his involvement in
development projects, other administrative and adjudicative
acts (formal or otherwise), transmission of information
or advice, and personal investments in self-improvement.
A complete list of the data points for the leader interview is given
in Appendix B.
Interviews with the headman and kamnan included an additional set of
questions. These covered the frequency of, and examples of, thirteen leader-
ship-related behaviors (see Appendix B). As a matter of course, the interviews
with headmen and kannan were more extended and more detailed than those with
other leaders.
The interviewer was also instructed to obtain the following factual
information about the village, using the most knowledgeable available source
when observation was not feasiblei These categories were included:
e water resources for agriculture,
* water resources for household use,
a soil quality,
* topography,
e local crops and extent of production,
* cottage industries,
* other nonagricultural occupations,
* educational facilities,
* other skills resources (e.g., army veterans with skills),
* stores, rice mills, tractors, and other economic resources,
* police and security forces in the vicinity,
* insurgent activity in the vicinity,
* local religious characteristics,
o local ethnic and inter-family characteristics,
e health facilities in the vicinity, and
* transportation and communications resources.
The basic interview usually took more than one session to complete
thoroughly. The total time per respondent varied widely, depending on both
the extent of the respondent's activities and the interviewer's inclination.
A rough average is about two hours for the sample as a whole, and four to five
hours for the two or three primary leaders in a community.
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In all, 503 full-scale interviews were completed, as shown in table 1.2.
The interview techniques employed were a combination of the focused
interview and the critical incident techniques. 5 Both methods have in common
a conversational, flexible format which is believed to be appropriate to the
interview environment of a Thai village. The critical incident technique in
particular has proved useful in opening up respondents who are apprehensive.
It in effect asks the respondent to recount a story about the "last time"
that he found himself in a specific type of situation -- asked to settle a
dispute or asked to participate in a development project, to take two examples
from the interview forms. Narratives are very much in the Thai village tra-
dition and, properly handled, the critical incident format was a congenial
way for the villager to express himself.
The weakness of the focused interview and critical incident techniques
is a low level of standardization in the raw data. This, however, is crippling
primarily if the analysis entails quantitative attitudinal topics. When the
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TABLE 1. 2 Leader interview sample, by position.
Position Number Percent
Kamnan 10 1.9
Headmen 41 8.2
Assistant headmen or kamnan 85 16.9
Heads of committee 54 10.7
Committee members 228 45.3
Other 85 16.9
TOTAL 503 99.9
data to be quantified are exclusively of factual content, standardization can
more easily be imposed during the data analysis phase of the study. And as an
examination of the variables actually used in the quantitative analysis will
indicate (see table 1.3 and Appendix C), the data points quantified from inter-
view responses were factual and unambiguous.
The Observational Survey
Observational data played a major role in the field study. All of the
observations in all of the villages were carried out by the writer, both in
order to maximize the internal consistency of the scaled items, and to guar-
antee that the observations were just that -- observations rather than second-
hand reports or estimates based on a small sample.
The core of the observation survey was a house-by-house examination of
the village. It was close to complete. Out of the 5,954 houses reported to
be in the sample villages, 5,198 were included -- 87.3% Because observations
taken from this survey play an important role in the analysis, a detailed
description of the data points is appropriate.
Each house was scored on five items: size, expense of materials, con-
dition of the compound, newness of the house, and occupant.
Size of the house was score on a nine-point scale, ranging from a tiny
porchless hut for t1"t to a large, multi-room, large-porch house for "9". Des-
cribing the intermediate scores is exceedingly difficult without getting into
obscure discussions of Thai village architecture. Roughly, an increment of
one point meant an increment of size equivalent to half of a Holiday Inn motel
room, with "5" denoting a house of about two motel rooms in size.
Expense of materials used in building the house was also scored on a
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nine-point scale, with the intervals delimited as follows:
1: leaf walls, thatch roof
2: leaf walls, tin or tile roof; or mat walls, thatch roof
3: mat walls, tin or tile roof
4: some wood used in the walls, tin or tile roof; or solid
wood with thatch roof
5: solid wood, tin or tile roof
6: same as "5", with evidence of skilled carpentry and fittings
7: a cabinet house: skilled carpentry throughout
8: same as "7", plus a substantial expense (e.g., lower walls
made of masonry)
9: an all masonry house
Condition of the compound, like size of the house, was an objective
rating that is nonetheless very difficult to describe verbally. Perhaps the
best way to put it is that a "5" meant a clean, neat compound with no frills
at all; and that the higher and lower numbers work out from both directions
to "1" (given only four houses out of the 5,198), denoting piles of debris
and unrelieved filth, and to "9", denoting the Thai village equivalent of
a compound ready to be photographed by Better Homes and Gardens. It is
crucial to the validity of the measure that the rating not be affected by
adornments that cost money. The smallest shack should be, and was, eligible
for a "9" rating on condition. It was a measure of expenditure of care and
pride, not money.
Newness of the house was limited to judgements about wooden houses.
The age of bamboo mat or leaf houses can be deceptive. The scoring was binary:
"0" for no indication of recent activity; "1" if it appeared that the house
had been built, added to, or given a new coat of stain during the last three
years. In doubtful cases, it was often easiest to ask whomever was sitting
on the front porch.
Occupant of the house was a categorical variable, noting any knowledge
about the occupation of the householder (e.g., by observing an attached rice
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mill) or the occupants (e.g., headman).
It was found, as is usually the case with judgemental rating systems,
that some experience was required before the judgements stabilized. What was
thought to be a "2" in size during the survey of the first Village was being
treated as a "3" by the time the third village was reached. In order to
guard against distortions in the inter-village comparisons, the ratings for
the first four villages were discarded, and those villages were rescored
during a return visit to that province shortly before the field research was
completed. These four villages had included 829 house ratings; in effect,
those ratings were for practice. Although no reliability tests were possible
(in the absence of another trained rater to cover some of the same villages
independently), the generous number of "warm-up" ratings gives some reason
to be confident that a stable internal conception of the meaning of the scale
values was applied throughout the sample. Added to that is the subjective
perception of the rater that, after the first few hundred cases, there was
seldom any hesitation about the ratings to assign a given house.
Several other observational data were collected as well. The condition
of the temple(s) in the village, the school, village streets, and other pub-
lic facilities were all rated. Whenever possible, development inputs reported
by the village leaders were inspected. An inventory was taken of the goods
for sale in the village's stores. And a complete map of the village was made
as a by-product of the house-by-house survey.
Informal Interactions with the Village Population
One of the principal advantages of residence research is the opportunity
it affords for unstructured interviews, observations, and group discussions.
-34-
The researchers were instructed to seek out these targets of opportunity.
The author, who did not conduct the "official" interview with village leaders,
spent many hours in casual interaction with villagers at each site. These
encounters yielded substantial information about factors in the community
such as long-standing feuds among families, stories of competing interests,
networks of friends, spontaneous expressions of opinion about local and RTG
leadership, and a variety of other types of anecdotal data which were useful
both for developing a sense of the social environment of the village, and in
evaluating the significance of the more structured data. The number of these
contacts ran well into the hundreds. No attempt was made to formalize or
count them.
C. Data Analysis
Scoring the Variables
The analysis moves between a discussion of the qualitative aspects of
Thai village life and the quantitative variables that are said to operational-
ize them. Twenty-six of these quantitative variables are used in the analysis,
and they cover a broad spectrum of types. The label of each variable, its
content, and the metric in which it is expressed are shown in table 1.3. For
those variables with scoring procedures that are not intuitively reasonable,
explanations have been provided in Appendix C.
In addition to the twenty-six variables in table 1.3, two indexes are
employed to represent the central constructs of the study, investment and
tithing. The indicators used in the indexes are drawn from the twenty-six;
they are discussed at length in chapters II and IV. The index scores them-
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TABLE 1.3 Sunrnary of the quantitative variables used in the study.
Short Label
CASHCROPS
TRUCKS
MILLS
STORES
NEWJOBS
COOPS
ACCESS
ECOPS
SOCFAC
CDINPUT
TRAINING
NATRES
YARDS
STREETS
WAT
PROJECTS
NOFARM
NEWINC
AGE
EXPO
DISPARITY
POORHOUSE
RICHHOUSE
SLUM
GAP
ELITE
Content
Cultivation of cashcrops, last year
4-wheel vehicles owned by villagers
Rice mills owned by villagers
Village stores owned by villagers
Persons in nonagricultural employment
Membership in agricultural credit co-ops
Accessibility to the outside world
Economic infrastructure near the village
Social infrastructure near the village
Community development assistance from
the RTG during the last five years
Training courses attended by village
leaders
Natural water and soil resources
Upkeep of house compounds
Extent and upkeep of internal village
streets
Upkeep of the village's temple(s)
Village-initiated development projects
during the last five years
Leaders whose main income is from non-
agricultural sources
Leader income derived from non-crop
sources
Age of village leaders
Experience in official positions
Disparity in quality of village housing
Sub-standard village housing
Superior village housing
Evidence of demoralization among the
bottom income group in a village
Magnitude of the economic gap between
Extent to which leaders are drawn from
an economically above average group
Metric
% of households (hh)
# in village per 100hh
# in village per 100hh
# in village per 100hh
# in village per 100hh
ordinal scale*
ordinal scale*
ordinal scale*
# of facilities*
baht
mean no. among leaders
6rdinal scale'
% of houses rated 5 or
more on ordinal scale*
ordinal scale*
6rdinal scale-
no.
% of leaders
mean annual baht
among leaders*
mean years of leaders
mean years of leaders
S.D. of combined size
& expense ratings
% of houses with size,
expense less than 4 on
9-point ordinal scales
% of houses with size,
expense more than 6 on
9-point ordinal scales
% of POORHOUSE houses
rated less than 4 on
the YARDS scale
standardized expres-
sion of differences in
means*
% of leaders with land-
holdings above average
* Explanation of scoring in Appendix C.
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selves are a sum of the standardized scores of the individual indicators.
A standardized score expresses the distance of a given observation from the
mean of the distribution, in standard deviations:
x -m
where z is the standardized score, x is a raw score, m is the mean of the
distribution, and S is the standard deviation of the distribution.
In effect, then, the indexes express the "unusualness" of a village on
the construct rather than its place on an anchored scale. The rationale for
the procedure was that in adding apples and oranges, as these indexes do
(e.g., number of stores plus percentage of households growing cash crops),
standardized scores have the virtue of providing a common metric for the
indicators, and one that is widely familiar. The other main alternative, to
assign arbitrary weights to the different units (e.g., one store is given
the same weight as 20% of households growing cash crops), was intrinsically
less attractive on this count alone.
An additional reason for using standardized scores is that there is
no a priori definition of what comprises "many stores" in a village or
"many cash crop farmers" (to continue with the same examples). Given a
sample of villages that is reasonably representative of a population, and
given that the parent population contains a range from "very few" to "very
many" on the variables of interest, standardized scores provide natural
weights which are informative and appropriate when the intention is to measure
differences among villages rather than to assign them absolute scores.
It remains to be shown that the variables used for the indexes did
exhibit the range that is needed. That evidence is presented when each of
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the indexes is introduced.6
The Use of Path Analysis
Statements of causation are discussed in conjunction with regression
7
analysis and one of its special applications, path analysis. The application
of these techniques is restrained, as befits a sample of forty-one observations
and a subject matter that is very imperfectly operationalized through quanti-
tative statements. This restraint shows up in two respects.
First, the model deals only with one-way causal relationships. The
two-stage least-squares method for estimating reciprocal relations was con-
sidered but has not been used. 8 The mathematical constraint it imposes on a
model (i.e., the identification requirement) was not satisfactorily reconciled
with the even more important requirement that the model's exogenous variables
reflect the realities of rural Thailand. The coefficients that two-stage
least-squares produces, although consistent and unbiased in their mathematical
properties, are nonetheless reflective of fitted values of the causal variables.
This can create misunderstandings when the first stage of the regression has
left substantial variance unexplained and, consequently, substantial error
terms. Most importantly, the crucial relationships in the theoretical model
are either genuinely one-way or, in a few cases, so overwhelmingly one-way from
the theoretical perspective that the feedback loop could be assumed to be of
negligible importance. For all these reasons, the simpler unidirectional
model was judged to be appropriate to this study.
Second, the study does not seek to develop the path model that most
perfectly conforms to the mathematical desiderata of the technique. One of
the principal attractions of the path model is the existence of prediction
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equations for unconnected variables: if X and Y are unrelated causally, the
bivariate correlation between X and Y should equal the sum of the causal paths
that connect the two variables indirectly. More formally, the algebra of path
analysis leads to the basic theorem that
ri ~Pjqrjq
where i and j denote two variables in the system and the index q run8 over all
variables from which paths lead directly to the X.
9
The existence of this test for causally unrelated variables poses this
problem: when the expected result does not occur, does one change the model?
Is the reader to be presented with a model that has gone through numerous
iterations until the prediction equations lead to the minimal disprepencies
with the observations, or is the original theory with only minor modifications
tested through path analysis, and the discrepencies left untreated?
Given a small sample and the inevitable degree of epistemic error
that must characterize the variables we have measured, the latter option
seems much more sensible. This is not to say that the causal chain was
carried full-blown into the data collection, waiting only for the numbers
to be plugged in. On the contrary, there was an interaction between theory
construction and data throughout the process. But the formal application of
the data to the tests of path analysis came late in the game, and only the
most elementary changes were made as a result of those tests.
The general stance we have taken toward path analysis is this: A
theory has been developed on the basis of a wide range of inputs about how
modernization works in rural Thailand. When some of the most important
causal links were tested through path analysis, the theory was supported in
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some respects, not supported in others. Still other aspects of the results
suggest changes and amplifications of the model. These various findings are
all reported. But the correlations and path coefficients from the villages
of the sample are neither so stable nor so representative that they justify
the rejection of links supported by other data (or common sense), or adding
links not consistent with the other data.
The approach to quantitative analysis in this study was that it could
inform and often clarify the overall analysis. It is thought to provide
important evidence in support of the major contentions of the argument. But
the quantitative aspects of the study have not in any way dominated the
qualitative ones. On the contrary, there is a need to treat qualitative
perceptions and quantitative forms of analysis as equal partners, and to
let the strengths of one step in for the weaknesses of the other -- with the
proviso that the decisions on what to quantify, how to quantify it, and what
manipulations to perform on the quantity should flow from an initial qualita-
tive familiarity with the terrain of the research; in this case, the Thai
village.
Notes to Chapter I
1. The resulting report was Village Level Disposing Conditions for
Development Impact (Bangkok: US-AID), 1973, by the author.
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genetics, dating back to Seward Wright's "Correlation and Causation,"
Journal of Agricultural Research, 20 (1921), pp. 557-585. Much of
the impetus for its use in sociology and political science derives from
the interest aroused by the work of Herbert A. Simon and H.M. Blalock,
Jr. (e.g. Simon, "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation,"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 49 (1954), pp. 467-479;
Blalock, "Correlation and Causality: The Multivariate Case," Social
Forces, 39 (1961), pp. 246-251), even though their "causal models" did
not initially use the regression foundations of Wright's technique. A
large literature has developed since the mid 1960's. For the basics
of the technique, see Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Anal-
ysis: Dependence Analysis," American Sociological Review, 30 (1965),
pp. 365-374; Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples,"
American Journal of Sociology, 72 (1966), pp. 1-16; and D.R. Heise,
"Problems in Path Analysis and Causal Inference," in E.F. Borgatta and
George W. Bohrnstedt (eds.) Sociological Methodology 1969 (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass), 1969, pp. 38-73.
The question remains whether regression analysis should be used at all
for a set of variables that include so many measured at the ordinal
level. The decision to do so appears to be justified by a number of
findings about the effects of violating the assumptions of parametric
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statistics. See especially C.H. Boneau, "The Effects of Violations of
Assumptions Underlying the t Test," Psychological Bulletin, 57 (1960),
pp. 49-64; E.F. Borgatta, "My Student, the Purist: A Lament," Sociologi-
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8. For explanations of the two stage least squares technique (or the Thiel-
Basmann method, after its two progenitors) see Ronald J. Wonnacott and
Thomas H. Wonnacott, Econometrics (New York: John Wiley and Sons), 1970,
Chapters 17, 19, and 20; and J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York:
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pp. 219-244. The most elaborate application to date is Douglas A. Hibbs,
jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (New
York: John Wiley and Sons), 1973. See especially Appendix Three for a
(relatively) clear mathematical motivation of the technique.
9. Taken from Duncan, "Sociological Examples," pp. 5-6.
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CHAPTER II
A BEHAVIORAL MEASURE OF PERSONAL MODERNITY: INVESTMENT
The measure of personal modernity is central to this study, as it is
to any effort to understand what happens to a society when men move from a
traditional to a modern outlook. In particular, we intend to explore the
beginnings of the change, the threshold between traditional and modern --
that point beyond which a man can no longer be called traditional, even if
he is not yet modern.
The existence of a qualitative difference between the states of "being
modern" and "being traditional" has been widely recognized even while the
dimensions of the difference have been at issue. In Binder's words, "the
central point [about modernization] is that things are different after some
point in history than they were before."1 Or, as Lerner expressed it, modern-
ization has "some distinctive quality of its own, which explains why modernity
is felt as a consistent whole among people who live by its rules."2 At the
extremes, the difference is so palpable that a definition of its parameters
seems almost unnecessary. The lives of a Bangkok university student and a
peasant youth in an isolated village (to take an illustrative pair) contrast
on such an abundance of dimensions -- in attitudes and assumptions and aspira-
tions as well as physical environment and life-style -- that measuring the
differences might well be easier than measuring the similarities.
And yet the bedrock "distinctive quality" that Lerner cites has proved
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difficult to instrument quantitatively. A number of indexes have been
developed but, as recently as 1972, two specialists in the field reviewed
the existing measures and reached the conclusion that "At best, the concept
of individual modernity may be meaningful as a distinct variable, but the
measurement of modernity has apparently been unsuccessful. At worst, the
notion of individual modernity as a distinct set of orientations may be a
myth." 3
The principal reason for their pessimism was that the indicators used
in the various indexes of modernity had generally been as highly correlated
with indexes of anomie or socioeconomic status as with the other presumptive
indicators of modernity. That is, they failed tests of statistical distinc-
tiveness.
But what of substantive distinctiveness? For if the substance of the
modernity indicators is conceptually different from the substance of the
indicators in the related indexes, then the correlations are not a nuisance,
but a useful source of inferences about the nature of modernization. If, for
example, the central component of personal modernity is said to be empathy
(borrowing from Lerner), then indicators of empathy are "valid" measures of
personal modernity by definition, regardless of their statistical relation-
ships to other constructs.
The indexes of personal modernity cited in the article -- which com-
prise the major efforts in that area of inquiry -- did not have a comparable
theoretical premise to fall back on. Instead, they assumed a global, commonly
understood meaning to the modernity construct. In no case was the presentation
of the indicators preceded by an explicit statement of what personal modernity
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means, and only rarely was it explained why a particular indicator might be
a useful representation of whatever construct was being operationalized.
Radio listening, movie attendance, literacy, purchase of manufactured goods --
indicators such as these apparently were assumed to have a self-evident
rationale for being included in an index of a self-evident construct.
In this study, a different approach to the measurement of personal
modernity will be employed. The main task is taken to be one of defining a
conceptual basis for selecting indicators. In doing so, no attempt will be
made to develop a global definition of modernity in men. As stated at the
outset of the chapter, we will focus on the transitional state, the threshold,
between traditional and modern. Even more specifically, we will focus on the
transitional state as it relates to peasants, not to all classes and occupa-
tions in traditional society.
The question is restri'cted: given two villages, one traditional and
one less traditional, what changes in behavior in the populations of those
villages will allow us to identify which is which? The answer in this study
is based on what appear to be two consistent themes in the literature. The
first is drawn predominantly from the anthropological perspective: although
peasant behavior varies widely in different environments, it is everywhere
characterized by delimited conceptions of what is attainable. The second
theme is taken from the political development perspective: although different
theorists emphasize different specifics, "acculturation to change" is a nearly
universally accepted essential of modernity in outlook.
The question is then asked, what villager behaviors indicate that vil-
lager aspirations are no longer delimited, and that change is seen as manage-
able and potentially beneficial? The proposition that emerges is that
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personal modernity begins for a villager when he first seeks to improve his
life by voluntarily risking what he already possesses -- or, as the title of
the chapter indicates, modernity begins when a villager starts to invest.
A. The Peasant Outlook: Delimited Aspirations
The consensus among the major anthropological theorists on the
definition of the term "peasant"is relatively stable. A peasant is rural,
he is a cultivator, linked to a culture that is premodern but yet a culture
that is larger and more complex that that of the village -- that is, a culture
with what Sjoberg has called "a preindustrial city."5 It is this third cri-
terion -- the link with the outside world -- that is critical for understand-
ing the sources of peasant attitudes and behavior.
There is general agreement that the structural link is generated and
maintained by the existence of surplus production. If the villager has nothing
to trade for goods from the outside, he has no reason for establishing con-
tact with the outside; if he produces no surplus that can be bought or seized,
the outside world has no motive for establishing contact with the villager.
Not surprisingly, emphases differ. A Marxian outlook stresses the
exploitative aspects. Eric Wolf italicizes his contention that being ex-
ploited is part of being a peasant, as a result of "asymmetrical power rela-
tionship&!'which leave the peasant everywhere vulnerable to a charge, or fund
of rent, on the peasant's production: "It is this production of a fund of
rent," Wolf asserts, "which critically distinguishes the peasant from the
primitive cultivator."6 A peasant is by definition (in this view) a sort of
tenant.
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Other scholars grant peasant status to any population of rural cul-
tivators which produces a large enough surplus to maintain a relationship
with the outside world, regardless of whether the surplus is paid in rent or
sold. The one essential restriction on the nature of the surplus is that it
be the leftover from subsistence crops, not an entrepeneurial surplus with
7
which the cultivator can buy the materials for subsistence.
We start then with three criteria for defining a peasant: he must be
rural, a cultivator, linked to a Great Tradition. Given these basic criteria,
we will examine patterns of peasant behavior in two different environments:
first, the scarcity environment that characterizes most peasant societies
(and often tacitly has been assumed to characterize all of theml and then the
special case posed by Thailand and a few other countries, the sufficiency
environment.
Extrapolation I: Coping with Scarcity
In most parts of the world, being a peasant means living on the margins
of subsistence. There is barely enough to go around, the constant threat of
a bad year in which there will not be enough to go around, and a steady drain
on even these limited goods by landlords, the state, or both. And in most
parts of the world, peasants have come to be seen as a stingy, unsociable lot.
The contention here is that the two phenomena are not unrelated.
In a famous and influential analysis, Edward Banfield argued that all
of the otherwise puzzling behaviors of the southern Italian villagers he
observed could be explained by means of a single decision rule, "Maximize the
material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others
will do likewise."8 The moral code that follows from this premise, called by
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Banfield "amoral" familhm," has in one form or another been said to charac-
terize peasant societies in widely scattered corners of the world. Since
1951,when Oscar Lewis argued that Redfield's Tepoztecos were not the happy
folk that Redfield had portrayed, but instead suspicious, envious, and un-
cooperative, anthropologists have been swinging away from the earlier consen-
sus that villagers lived a familial, almost Rousseauean existence.9 Observa-
tions of pervasive distrust and conflict in peasant communities have been
reported from cultures as diverse as those of Greece, India, Egypt, and Latin
America,10 and have been discovered retrospectively upon reexamination of
earlier commentaries about traditional societies.1 1  The overall picture of
the villager that emerges is suggested by this passage about Columbian
peasants:
The motives of any favor done for a person are always
analyzed with suspicion, the idea of disinterested help or
friendship being quite incomprehensible. The smallest gift
is interpreted as probably being but a bait used to estab-
lish a chain of mutual obligations, in which the one who
did the first favor will invariably benefit most and put
the other party in an unfavorable position.1 2
Unattractive as these behavior patterns are, it is suggested that they
are entirely rational in the context of a poverty culture. "Disinterested
help" is a luxury when keeping alive is a full-time job. A prudent man should
be suspicious if he is offered help by a neighbor who can hardly afford to
give it.
The same environmental explanation may be extended to a variety of
peasant behaviors and attitudes relating to economic advancement by other
villagers, social innovations, and interactions with outsiders. And as the
environmental sources of peasant behavior become clearer, the need for a re-
evaluation of the "conservatism" of the peasant becomes evident as well.
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When the subsistence peasant rejects an agricultural innovation or looks sus-
piciously on his neighbor's small successes, he is very likely making a
rational calculation (in the context of his experience) about the risks,
penalties, and rewards which may ensue. When Banfield and others described
distrust, conflict, and amoral familism in human interactions, they were
observing (as they were frequently aware) outcroppings of some broad perception
of the world.
George Foster drew the strands of these findings together via the con-
struct of the "image of the limited good." He states the core meaning of his
construct as follows:
Peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes
-- their total environment -- as one in which all of the
desired things in life ... exist in finite quantity and
are always in short supply, as far as the peasant is con-
cerned. Not only do these and all other "good things"
exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition
there is no way directly within peasant power to increase
the available quantities.13
Foster continues with documentation from a number of cultures to develop the
thesis that "this behavior -- however incompatible with national economic
growth -- is not only highly rational in the context of the cognition that
determines it, but that for the maintenance of peasant society in its classic
form, it is indispensable."14
The image of the limited good has been the subject of a lively debate
in the anthropological journals. 1 5 Certainly it has only limited applicability
to some peasant societies, as will be discussed momentarily. For now, however,
we are not concerned with all peasant societies, but instead with peasant
societies in scarcity environments. For them, the utility of the limited good
construct is great. It synthesizes the common elements in a large and varied
body of data about peasant attitudes in scarcity environments, and provides
a concise statement of the fundamental dimension of tradition that seems to
stand between those peasants and modernity.
Extrapolation II: Living with Sufficiency in Thailand
The behavioral characteristics which led Foster to develop the image
of the limited good -- distrust, conflict, and general interpersonal infight-
ing -- are not good descriptors of Thai peasant behavior. Neither, however,
are the environmental characteristics of most of those societies -- extreme
poverty, overpopulation, a long history of economic exploitation -- good
descriptors of rural Thailand. A parallelism in the environment/behavior
relationships in scarcity and "sufficiency" cultures can be discerned which,
we shall suggest, justifies an extension of the image of the limited good --
slightly altered -- to those fortunate peasants for whom simple survival is
not ordinarily a problem.
Thai villages are not idyllic, but neither do they resemble the social
environments cited by Foster. Even he is led to admit that "In Southeast
Asia -- the data are particularly good for Thailand -- the picture is again
different.... Certainly the suspicion, distrust, criticism, envy, and frequent
physical violence found in peasant groups in India and westward are less
common in Thailand."1 6
Those who have lived in Thai villages often go further in praise of
rural Thailand and state simply that, at least in social terms, Thai villages
are pleasant places to live. 1 7 One way to communicate this fact is to examine
the role of sanuk, roughly translated as "fun," in the hierarchy of villager
values. Its importance is pervasive. As Herbert Phillips points out, "the
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importance of sanuk is that it provides the villagers with a standard of value,
a measure of how much they wish to commit themselves to a particular activity.
... villagers will often take on free of charge a major job (for example,
helping a neighbor build a house) precisely because it is sanuk.... Notice
that in this kind of situation there is no overseer demanding the person's
effort. His labor is freely given and may be freely withdrawn."1 8 The con-
trast with the attitude toward free help in the Columbian village described
earlier could hardly be sharper.
A second way of communicating the difference between Thai villages
and the ones described earlier is by pointing to the extraordinary latitude
in behavior which is not only countenanced but expected in rural Thailand.
it is, wrote John Embree, "the first characteristic of Thai culture to strike
an observer from the West.... The longer one resides in Thailand the more
one is struck by the almost determined lack of regularity, discipline, and
regimentation in Thai life."1 9 The elaborations, exceptions, and objections
to Embree's subsequent discussion of Thailand as a loosely structured social
system have continued for more than two decades. The core observation, how-
ever, that a Thai villager has great social freedom to indulge his preferences,
whims, and even eccentricities if he observes just a few basic and elastic
social norms, remains a widely accepted view of rural life there. 20
These are the kinds of attitudinal and behavioral characteristics in
Thai life which caution against generalizations about amoral familism, distrust,
and suspicion as modal features of peasant personality everywhere. Since it
is indisputable that Thai villagers are peasants in terms of the three criteria
established earlier, the obvious question is why they should behave differently
than those in other peasant cultures.
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The simplest answer is that the Thai peasant can afford to be more
open, less suspicious, more helpful than many of his peasant counterparts
in other cultures, because the environment is so much more helpful, less
demanding, and less exploitative than the environments in those other societies.
As a general rule, the Thai peasant has not been forced to use the
last foot of tillable land nor to save the last grain of rice. Through happy
historical and geographical accident, population pressures have been low.
Free land was plentiful throughout the country, except in the Central Plain,
until the middle of the twentieth century.21 Even today, substantial tracts
of unused land are available in many parts of the country.22 In addition, the
soil is usually sufficiently fertile and the rain sufficiently reliable to
ensure a steady supply of food. For all practical purposes, famine has been
unknown in Thailand, and even periods of widespread food shortages have been
remarkable for their rarity.
The other basic material needs of clothes and shelter have not been
stringent in a country where the temperature drops below sixty perhaps five
days in a year,, and where wood and bamboo were until recently free for the
taking.
Thailand further deviates from the classic peasant environment in its
land tenure system. The tenancy rate has varied among regions and over time,
but it has always been low. In 1930 (the earliest systematic economic survey),
the number of peasants without land varied from 14% in the South to 36% in the
Central Plain.2 3 Overall, a 1949 FAO survey estimated that 80% of Thai peasants
were still working their own land. 2 4
The tenancy figures, low as they have been for a peasant society, still
do not convey the degree of independence enjoyed by the traditional Thai
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peasant. Landlords have tended to be absentee and relatively unconcerned
about squeezing out the highest rent that the market would bear -- often
because they were fellow villagers with a few extra rai to rent, and con-
sequently constrained by custom and friendship from pressing their tenants
too hard.25 Perhaps most influential in maintaining a non-oppressive environ-
ment, a large majority of the villagers in most communities have been inde-
pendent landowners. The most thorough forms of exploitation, such as "com-
pany store" or hacienda systems, have generally been frustrated by the lack
of a local monopoly on land or resources. And finally, a villager who found
himself in a sufficiently unhappy situation has had the ultimate option of
moving to a place where unused land was still available.
The point of this description of the economic environment is that some
goods were not limited in traditional Thailand. This leads to a problem in
trying to extend the image of the limited good to the non-scarcity case.
In one sense, the Thai villager behaves in a fashion parallel to
peasants in scarcity environments. If the essential survival goods are limited,
then villagers exhibit personality traits consistent with the need to fight
for their share. When the essential survival goods are not scarce, those
personality traits are less functional and, in the Thai case, almost disappear.
But a glaring inconsistency remains: in terms of strictly economic
behavior, the traditional Thai peasant behaves as if goods were limited. That
is, he has persistently ignored opportunities to expand his agricultural out-
put (and hence his income) even though he could do so without new technology
and with very little capital. Historically, the available land in Thailand
was filled not by farmers expanding their holdings, but through the needs of
an expanding population.2 6
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Why this exception to the parallelism? Why should the most direct
reflection of the limited-good syndrome (lack of attempts to maximize income)
appear in the traditional Thai case?
The proposition offered here is that the answer again lies in a rational
calculation by the peasant: this time, that the marginal short-term returns
from increased production would not be commensurate with the extra work, given
the villager's value system.
The evidence for the proposition is often surprisingly direct. One
village headman put it explicitly when he was asked what the villagers did
during the dry season. These days, he said, almost everybody had small
vegetable gardens that provided extra income. This was new he continued: "In
the old days, everybody was idle [juu choej choej] during the dry season. We
could get everything we wanted from the forest. But now there are so many
things available to buy in the stores, everybody wants income."
This is at least partially a case of rising consumer demand of the
type familiar throughout the world. The availability of goods tends to create
demands for those goods. To this extent, the attempts to increase income may
be caused simply by greater knowledge about the goods that money can buy. But
in another sense, the nature of the goods to be bought has changed even more.
After all, what could a villager in traditional Thailand buy with extra in-
come? Granted that the very rich lived differently than the poor, the merely
"well-off" villager did not live much more comfortably than his subsistence-
level neighbor. A slightly larger house, a few more pieces of furniture, a
very few store-bought items -- it came to that. Small increments in income
did not substantially change his life-style, and they were not needed to fill
out his requirements for subsistence. Now, a few thousand extra baht of
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income will buy a motorcycle, a few hundred baht will buy a radio, and even
five or six baht will buy a movie ticket at the district town -- all of which
are the kinds of purchases that do significantly alter life-style. Given this
perspective, the same villager who rationally chose not to increase his pro-
duction some years ago can just as rationally choose to increase it now.
A Synthesis: The Delimited Image of Goods
With a slight twist, then, the image of the limited good is not so far
removed from the Thai case after all -- but in Thailand, it is more properly
called a delimited image of goods, to denote that frame of mind which sees
boundaries to the meaning of "enough." For a traditional villager, the bounds
were simple: enough rice for the family to eat, a little surplus to put by
for a bad year and perhaps a little to sell; enough fish to eat with the rice,
friends, an occasional outing. The unofficial motto of Thailand puts it best:
"In the water there are fish; in the fields, rice." It is a statement of what
has been needful.
It is further suggested, though speculatively, that a delimited image
of goods may apply to the whole range of peasant environments, from the most
extreme scarcity to the near abundance of parts of Southeast Asia and Indonesia
in years past. To put it in the form of a hypothetical situation: if extra
land were suddenly made available to a traditional peasant society in a scarcity
environment, it is predicted that utilization of the extra land would tend to
level off once a sufficiency of production was secure.
This kind of speculation is certainly consistent with the experience of
agricultural extension workers in northeastern Thailand (Thailand's best
approximation of a scarcity environment), who have found that in remote, highly
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traditional villages, even successful cash crop innovations tend to be dis-
continued in the year following a good rice harvest. Villagers in such cases
often openly state that the reason for the extra work was to make up a deficit
in the requirements for subsistence, not to acquire a profit.27
Exceptions to the thesis exist, obviously. Every peasant society surely
has its Dick Whittingtons. And to most peasants in all societies must come
occasional fantasies of wealth, or at least thoughts of being something other
than a poor farmer. But in terms of everyday, actionable aspirations, we are
suggesting that it is a modal value of peasants to have clear bounds: to
define success in terms of meeting an attainable standard rather than expand-
ing their standard of what is attainable.
B. The Modern Transition: Acculturation to Change
Unleashing one's standard of the attainable is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for leaving the traditional outlook behind. Malcolm
Quint's description of the idea of progress in an Iraqi village conveys this
limitation very clearly:
Late at night, as a group of us would sit around a dung
fire, sipping tiny glasses of sweet tea, the more vocal of
village elders would go off into long descriptions of the
shining future. They spun dreams.of the day when they would
have their own land to cultivate with tractors; when the
backbreaking labor involved in digging the yearly irrigation
ditches and building temporary dams would be taken over by
a benificient government; when they would have medical
facilities in the village, or at least in the district;
when they would all have radios; and so on.... The ful-
filZment of this drecm is something for which they must be
patient. They know that it will be fulfilled some day in
the natural course of events. They have no doubt of this;
the only question is when.2 8
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These villagers are very far from being modern, despite their new
aspirations. Their stance toward the newly perceived goods of modernity is
entirely passive, almost like that of a New Guinean cargo cult. To be modern,
it is necessary not only to have an expanding standard of the attainable, but
also to be comfortable in manipulating change to attain the new ends.
This criterion of personal modernity is largely embedded in the very
meaning of the word modernization. If nothing else, modernization must
inescapably include change as one of its components, and success at modern-
ization must mean at least partially success at change. The semantic necessity
follows John Barth's description of the relationship between words and literature:
It's in the words that the magic is ... but the magic
words in one story aren't magical in the next. The real
magic is to understand which words work, and when, and
for what; the trick is to learn the trick.2 9
Similarly with the process of modernization: what works for improving
the life of one villager may not work for his neighbor; a crop that would
grow in one village's fields may not be right for the village down the road.
Cribbing from Barth, the magic in development is to learn how change works,
and when, and for what. The specifics -- the type of political system that
emerges, the type of economy, the value system -- have many permutations. The
degree of their "modernity" ultimately lies in the pragmatic test of whether
they work in a modern world, more than in their possession of a set of attri-
butes that have been deemed to be modern through some external criterion.
This approach to modernization has increasingly taken on the appearance
of an as yet informal common point of departure among several major theorists,
as they try to pin down what is essential to the process of personal moderniza-
tion. Frederick Frey for one has discussed his sense that seemingly different
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paradigms of modernization are all getting at the same thing, and concludes
that, at bottom, "the cardinal feature of personal modernity lies in one's
attitude toward change.,30 Daniel Lerner's description of the mobile per-
sonality is in effect a profile of the personal qualities which dispose
toward the absorption of change -- a personality "distinguished by a high
capacity for identification with new aspects of [the] environment." 3 1 Samuel
Huntington paraphrases Lerner when he sets out to identify the psychological
dimension of modernization. 32 David Apter focuses on the modernity of cultures
rather than of men, but the tenor of his argument is familiar when he .
asserts that "to be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences,
choices" -- that is, (among other things) to initiate and manage change. 3 3
Everett Hagen's descriptions of high need achievement, need autonomy, and
need order as they relate to economic development, all are said to center on
the nature of the individual's response to flux, to change. 34 And finally,
Leonard Binderin his thoughtful introduction to the study of crises in politi-
cal development, put the same theme in a philosophical perspective. It is
worth quoting at some length:
For nearly ten generations Western man has been concerned
with understanding and controlling the changing of his
condition and circumstances. That the occurrence of change
should require any special understanding is not immediately
self-evident.... Continuity and stability are ancient de-
siderata whose worth must depend upon the comprehension if
not the experience of change.... What does appear to be
significant even if in no measurable sense, are two char-
acteristics of modern Western man's intuition of the expan-
sion and acceleration of history. The first of these is
awareness of the length of the epoch of change, and the
second is the prevalent, but by no means universal, favor
with which change is anticipated if not experienced. 3 5
In sum, there has been a widespread recognition in the literature that
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acculturation to change is a hallmark, perhaps the hallmark, of modernity in
men. Regardless of the features of a culture which may ease the transition
to modernity, its population must make the same fundamental reorientation that
has been required everywhere by the nature of the transition: the acceptance
of the possibility and the desirability of utilizing change.
C. The Behavioral Measure: Investment
We are now ready to pull together the implications of the image of the
peasant -- delimited aspirations -- and the image of personal modernity --
acculturation to change -- for identifying behavioral indicators that the
villager is moving from a traditional to a modern outlook.
The discussion has suggested that two criteria must be met. First,
the behavior must be one that implies expanding aspirations. Second, the
behavior must be one which exhibits the expectation that change will be
benificient, and that the desired outcomes can be predicted with acceptable
levels of confidence -- which is another way of saying that change is manageable.
Together, these criteria lead to the proposition which prefaced the chapter:
a villager is behaving in an un-traditional, proto-modern fashion when he
voluntarily risks resources in the expectation of a return. Modernization has
begun when the villager starts to invest.
Investment is formally defined as the voluntary risk of energy, money,
or other physical resources in the expectation of a future return in excess of
the expenditure. On the basis of the theoretical considerations which have
been discussed throughout this chapter, it is postulated that the degree of
change from a traditional to a modern outlook in a given village can be
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measured by the Zevel of investment behavior that is taking place among its
inhabitants. 36
The operational expression of the construct is an investment index,
comprised of a village's summed standardized scores on a set of behavioral
indicators of investment, chosen on the basis of four culling rules. 3 7
The first three of the culling rules are as follows:
The behavior must be voluntary. Planting rice in hopes of a harvest is
an investment, but what might best be called a "constrained investment" if the
rice is being planted as the subsistence staple for the family. Unless the
villager chooses to risk his resources, no modernizing content to his behavior
should be inferred.
The behavior must entail risk. Putting money in a guaranteed savings
account is not an investment by our definition. However, it should be noted
that the risk need not involve only money. As stated in the definition, a
risk of time or energy is equally suitable.
The anticipated return must be in the form of a profit, an awkward way
of saying that a purchase is not an investment. When a villager buys a tin of
sardines, or even something as laden with modernizing connotations as a radio,
he is presumed to be making the same informal cost-benefit calculation that he
uses for buying a rattan fish trap. The technological novelty of the item
being purchased does not in itself confer any modernizing significance to the
act of purchase.
Sixteen candidate indicators survived these three criteria. They were:
" use of commercial fertilizer
" use of improved rice seed
" use of insecticide
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" rental of tractors or other mechanized farm equipment
" sale of rice
* cultivation of cash crops
" membership in agricultural credit cooperatives
" double-cropping
" ownership of four-wheel motor vehicles for commerical use
" ownership of a rice mill
" ownership of a store
" full-time employment in non-agricultural occupations
" taking produce to markets outside the village
" sending children to secondary school
" requests and/or petitions of the district office
" letters to the local member of parliament
Some of the sixteen candidates were much less clear-cut than others.
For example, is writing a letter to a member of parliament enough of an expen-
diture of time and energy, and enough of a risk, to qualify as an investment?
Other candidate indicators were indirect. For example, non-agricultural
employment does not in itself represent risk or the expenditure of resources.
But it does reflect investment in terms of earlier decisions to acquire a skill,
to edge away from a subsistence view of economics, and to be prepared to
tolerate the prospect of unemployment.
But beyond these specific objections about the sixteen candidate indica-
tors, the fourth and most difficult culling rule remained:
The sources of epistemic error in the observations must be random. The
first three rules attempted to minimize the epistemic error; that is, minimize
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the gap between the concept of investment and the concrete events that are to
be used to represent it. But errors will remain nonetheless. The fourth
culling rule stipulates that they be random. Suppose, for example, that out
of a hundred observations of rice mill ownership, twenty would not be inter-
preted as examples of investment if we could somehow penetrate into the moti-
vations of the owners. The fourth culling rule asks that the reasons for the
twenty errors be different ones (or, practically speaking, as uinrelated as
possible).
Six of the surviving indicators were dropped on this basis. The use of
commercial fertilizer, improved rice seed, or insecticide often represents no
investment because of government programs that distribute them at very low or
no cost in some of the villages of the sample. The sale of rice can denote
an investment if the villager had deliberately planted more than his family
could eat or store for future consumption; but in many cases it is a purely
traditional behavior in which the sale is the incidental result of a good
harvest. And finally, taking produce to markets outside the village and
sending children to secondary school were eliminated because they were virtually
no-cost behaviors for people living in villages very close to the district town.
Of the ten surviving indicators, two were eliminated for lack of adequate
variance. No village in the sample was growing two crops a year, and the in-
cidence of tractor rental was too idiosyncratic to serve as a variable. Two
more candidates -- requests of the district office and letters to parliament --
were judged to be too peripheral, and to pose too many sources of measurement
error, to be suitable.
The final investment index is thus composed of six indicators, as shown
in table 2.1.
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TABLE ". 1 Indicators used in the investment index (INVESTMENT).
Short Label
CASHCROPS
TRUCKS
MILLS
STORES
NEWJOBS
COOPS
Indicator
Cultivation of cash crops, last year
4-wheel vehicles owned by villagers
Rice mills owned by villagers
Village stores owned by villagers
Persons in non-agricultural employment
Membership in agricultural credit cooperatives
Variance on all six indicators was substantial. The range of that
variance is reported in table 2.2 in terms of the mean, standard deviation,
high score and low score for each indicator.
TABLE 2.2 Variation among the 41 villages on the investment indicators,
Short Label Mean S.D. High Score Low Score
CASHCROPS 62.9% of hh* 33.8 100.0% of hh 0%
TRUCKS 1.6 per 100hh 1.9 8.0 per 100hh 0
MILLS 1.5 per 100hh 1.0 4.8 per 100hh 0
STORES 2.5 per 100hh 1.3 5.3 per 100hh 0
NEWJOBS 5.5% of hh 4.5 17.0% of hh 0%
COOPS**
Notes:
"hh" denotes number of households in the village.
** The distribution was: 7 villages with no group, 4 villages with
an understrength group, and 30 villages with a full-strength group.
-63-
Similarly, the aggregate index scores showed broad variation, matching
our qualitative perceptions of great differences among villages in their
propensity to invest. The distribution of mean scores is shown in figure 2.1
below. Remember that these represent the average standardized score on the
six indicators.3 7
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FIGURE .2.1 Distribution of mean INVESTMENT scores among the 41 villages
The intercorrelations among the items in the investment index, and
the correlation of each item with the other five, are shown in table 2.3.
The reliability of the index is .69, using Cronbach's coefficient alpha. 3 8
The coefficient represents the average correlation between any split-half
subsets of the indicators.
Note in particular the relationship of the index, INVESTMENT, to its
separate indicators. An examination of the relative magnitudes df the part-
whole correlations suggests the hypothesis that the items are ordered by the
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TABLE 2.3 Intercorrelations of the INVESTMENT items and item-index
correlations corrected for part-whole spuriousness
1 2 3 4 5 6 I
1. COOPS --
2. CASHCROPS .20 --
3. STORES .16 .25 --
4. MILLS .20 .33 .45 --
5. TRUCKS -.22 .25 .38 .29 --
6. NEWJOBS -.03 .17 .15 .52 .56 --
I. INVESTMENT .21 .10 .25 .25 .38 .46 --
degree of novelty represented by each. The items which best predict the index
are vehicle ownership (TRUCKS) and nonagricultural employment (NEWJOBS), which
are perhaps the purest expressions of a major degree of investment in new
mechanisms for self-improvement. The least related items are cash crop pro-
duction (CASHCROPS) and credit group membership (COOPS), both of which are
more tentative types of investment, using familiar mechanisms and practices.39
Taken overall, the statistical characteristics of the index are con-
sonant with the theory that led to the choice of indicators. It has been argued
that an underlying syndrome labelled "investment" exists, which has a number of
behavioral outcroppings. The substantial reliability (.69) of the index,
given only six indicators, is consistent with that argument. The variations
in the item correlations with the index follow a pattern that is consistent
with the notion that the substantive content of some indicators is closer to
the definition of the investment construct than are others.
Having noted these characteristics of the indicators, we shall subse-
quently use the index score almost exclusively, in preference to the separate
items.
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k is the number of indicators in the index,
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39. Despite the novelty of the label "credit cooperative," use of credit is
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content to the "cooperative" aspects of the plan (supposedly, to make
all the members of the group responsible if any member fails to repay
a loan). The main novelty in the credit cooperatives has been the notion
that it can be desirable to go into debt.
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CHAPTER III
THE SOURCES OF INVESTMENT
Investment by a villager raised in a traditional environment is a
daring act. To understand how daring, the Western reader need only think
of the uncertainties, the vacillations, the worries that go with his own
investments, and then extrapolate to the villager's situation. When a
villager takes land out of rice production and puts it into a crop that
cannot be eaten if it cannot be sold, he is gambling; even more so when
he buys an inventory of goods for his store, or a rice milling machine, or
a vehicle, on the assumption that he can retrieve his money and earn a
profit through his own efforts. Yet daring though they may be, villager
investments have occurred throughout rural Thailand during the last few
decades. In this chapter we shall first set the increase., in investment
behaviors in the context of the many other contemporaneous changes in the
Thai village environment, then turn to the question of identifying the
main causes of the increase.
A. The Nature of the Changes
Imagine for a moment a typical village twenty kilometers from a dis-
trict town in in Northeast or North Thailand in 1952, as contrasted with
the same village in 1972.
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In 1952, the twenty kilometers from village to district town probably
were cart tracks, impassable from June to November during the rains, and
perhaps a two-day trip during the rest of the year. The district town
itself probably was an outsize village, distinguished mainly by having a
few small shops, a police station, and a government office staffed by the
chief district officer, a few general purpose assistants, and perhaps an
excise officer and a forestry officer.
There were few reasons to visit the district town, but practically no
reason at all for anyone to visit the village. Nor was there much indirect
contact through the media. Many parts of upcountry Thailand in 1952 were
not in range of a radio station and, in any event, the cheap transistor
receiver had yet to make its appearance. A stranger of any sort, in person
or electronic, was a great novelty.
Life in the village was simple and often rough. The villagers drank
from open wells, had never hear of sanitation or hygeine, and very likely
suffered widely from yaws, parasites, and dysentery, not to mention the
occasional cholera epidemic. Malaria was endemic.
The temple was probably the only source of education. Almost surely
no one in the village had been educated beyond elementary school or had
obtained any other special training. The only agricultural practices were
probably the immemorial ones.
And, if we turn to the indicators of investment, it is also safe to
assume that there were no rice mills, stores, vehicles, no credit cooperatives,
and very few nonagricultural skills or non-rice crops.
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By 1972, that same village was almost certainly located on an all-
weather road, and probably on one which carried public transportation
several times a day. The district town had many shops, with substantial
specialization -- several drug stores, a few grocers, clothing shops,
jewelry shops, camera shops, and also stores selling agricultural tools,
fertilizers, vaccines for livestock, motorized pumps, and the rest of the
paraphenalia that accompanies modern agriculture.
The government office now had staff for agriculture in general and
rice in particular; perhaps also staff for livestock, sericulture, or other
newly popular specialities of the region. It had a health center staffed
by a doctor and several nurses. In all but a very few districts of the
North and Northeast, the government office also had a Community Development
(CD) section, with one worker assigned full-time to each hamlet in the
district.
In the village, there was possibly a midwife center, or a nearby
police outpost, or a canal for tapping a major irrigation system, or even
electricity. The village had been visited long since by a doctor. On
his first visit, the doctor had probably performed the miracle of healing
yaws sores in a matter of a few days, with one injection, thereby setting
up vast expectations of medical science. Probably the village had not
seen a case of malaria for several years. Villagers had been exposed in
the schools and through health workers to the mechanics of public sanitation
and infant nutrition. Possibly the village had a water system and privies,
probably at least one closed well, plus UNICEF-provided diet supplements for
its children and AID-provided prophylactics to help prevent more of them.
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Radios and a variety of stations to choose from had been commonplace
for many years by 1972. The village had a government-staffed school that
taught at least four grades and perhaps seven. Typically, some sons and
daughters of villagers had attended a secondary school in the district town
or the province capital. And in a startling number of instances, the
visitor to a village house in 1972 would spot a photograph of the King
handing a diploma to the villager's son, daughter, brother, granddaughter,
nephew, second cousin -- someone of the family. It signified graduation
from at least a technical college and probably from a university.
Village leaders had been sent to training courses, sometimes in
Bangkok, covering a wide range of topics. Probably at least two of the
village's leaders had attended a training course in the administration of the
development funds that were now being allocated annually to the hamlet.
Added to all this had been contact with a bewildering variety of
insurance agents, medicine hawkers, installment-plan sewing machine salesmen,
middle-men buying crops, sound trucks advertising a movie or a fair in the
district town, researchers, touring government officials, foreigners with
Peace Corps or the Air Force, insurgent recruiters, army units looking for
the insurgents, Mobile Development Units, Mobile Information Teams, Mobile
Health Units, and Mobile Vocational Training Units.
Unlike the village in 1952, the village in 1972 probably also showed
substantial scores on the investment indicators. Villagers had opened
shops, bought relatively expensive milling equipment and very expensive
motor vehicles, put land into cash crops, voluntarily gone into debt in
order to finance these ventures -- all of them, behaviors exhibiting aspira-
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tions which could not be inferred from the villager behaviors of 1952. The
problem is: out of the welter of changes in the village's environment,
which ones account for the difference in investment?
B. The Causes of Investment
The various explanations fall under two basic hypotheses, each of
which can point to a number of cultures for evidence.
The first is what we shall call the Tutorial Hypothesis. It argues
that the villager's traditional resistance to change will tend to persist
while modernization proceeds in the towns. He must be induced to adopt
new agricultural practices or to learn new skills, let alone become modern
in his outlook. Or if he does choose to do new things, he will probably
choose the wrong ones, or do the right ones badly.
Emphases differ among the proponents of the Tutorial Hypothesis.
Anthropologists underline the need for care in selecting which changes to
introduce and how to introduce them. "Of what use," writes Margaret Mead,
"to introduce a tractor which made the yield of the grain fields greater,
if in so doing the whole distinguishing fabric of life which had character-
ized a society would be ripped into shreds?" Development administrators
in the field may be concerned with the same question, but they also tend to
ask more directly how to maximize the changes that their own particular
program is supposed to produce.2 Others emphasize the plain difficulty of
the task. Edward C. Banfield devotes a chapter to possible measures for
rescuing Montegrano from its value system, then concludes that, even if the
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most ambitious development efforts were carried out, it would require as
long as three or four generations to make meaningful progress.3 Common to
all forms of the Tutorial Hypothesis, however, is the notion that the
adoption of modern practices is a process which can or must be managed by
some outside agent.
The second hypothesis is that contact with the modern world drives
a response; that undirected, broadband influences irresistably displace the
traditional mentality within a relatively short span of time. The difference
between this and the Tutorial Hypothesis is not so much over the desirability
of managing change, as it is a difference in optimism over the possIbility -f
managing change. Daniel Lerner's portrait of the Turkish village of Balgat,
suddenly exposed to the full blast of modernization from nearby Ankara, is
the classic illustration of how a traditional value system can visibly shift
in a matter of a few years.5 This view of rural modernization -,- we shall
call it the Balgat Hypothesis -- implies that changes in personal orientation
which accompany modernization will occur whether the government promotes or
discourages them.
The Exogenous Resource Variables
We begin the examination of the hypotheses from the unassailable premise
that people become modern by being exposed to modernizing influences. For
purposes of analyzing the villages of this study, these influences have been
grouped under the categories of "channeled exposure" and "unchanneled exposure"
to modernity. The variables in these categories seek to summarize quantita-
tively the kinds of changes in the environment described at the opening of
the chapter.
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Channeled exposure is represented by two variables: community devel-
opment assistance in terms of baht inputs over the last five years (the
variable is labelled CDINPUT in the tables), and training assistance pro-
vided to village leaders or villagers at large (TRAINING).
Unchanneled exposure is represented by three variables. The first
is accessibility to the outside world, measured in terms of how long it
takes a villager to reach the district and province towns, and the extent
of quasi-urban facilities available in those towns (ACCESS). The second is
the existence of social infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of the
village, measured by the availability of facilities such as a health center,
school to the seventh grade (a fourth grade school is considered standard),
a police post, community center, movie theatre (occasionally a village has
what passes for one), or electricity. The variable is labelled SOCFAC --
short for "social facilities." The third variable is the existence of
economic infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of the village. Two types
of economic infrastructure are considered: agricultural, in the form of a
major irrigation system which the village could tap into, or the existence
of a major nearby agricultural project; and nearby employment opportunities.
The variable is labelled ECOPS, for "economic opportunities."
A sixth resource variable is also included. the natural resources
(NATRES) of soil and water near the village. Natural resources are neutral
with regard to modernity.
Details on the scoring of the variables may be found in Appendix C.
For practical purposes, all six of the variables are causally exogenous
to the village's control. The occasional exception is found -- a village
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that persuades the RTG to give it extra development funds, for example. But
in general these six variables are best seen as the givens in a village's
modernization or its efforts to cope with the effects of modernization.
Table 3.1 shows the intercorrelations of the exogenous resource
TABLE 3.1 Intercorrelations of the exogenous resource variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. ACCESS --
2. ECOPS .34 --
3. SOCFAC .07 .21 --
4. CDINPUT .06 .14 .40 --
5. TRAINING .14 .05 -.08 .24 --
6. NATRES .05 .34 .16 -.01 -.34 --
variables. For purposes of causal analysis, the intercorrelations "should"
be zero. As an examination of the matrix in table 3.1 indicates, most of
them are reasonably close to that ideal. Four of them are high enough to
be statistically significant at the .05 level or higher. Economic infra-
structure (ECOPS) is significantly correlated with accessibility (ACCESS)
and with natural resources (NATRES), which reflects the tendency of economic
inputs to go to places with good roads and rich natural resources. The
other two significant correlations -- social infrastructure (SOCFAC) with
CD inputs (CDINPUT) and the negative relationship between training inputs
(TRAINING) and natural resources reflect a variety of influences. Two of
them are the tendency of CD workers to spend their time in villages which
are pleasant to work in (i.e., which have the amenities and resources implied
by the social infrastructure measure), and the concentration of training
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programs in the Northeast, which is also the region with the poorest natural
resources. It is reasonable to conclude that none of the four significant
correlations reflects a direct causal link.
Now that the candidate variables for explaining investment behavior
have been introduced, we shall consider the implications of the data for
the Tutorial and Balgat hypotheses.
The correlations between the exogenous resource variables and INVEST-
MENT are shown in table 3.2 below.
TABLE 3.2 Correlations of INVESTMENT with the exogenous resource
variables.
INVESTMENT
Channeled exposure
CDINPUT .15
TRAINING .11
Unchanneled exposure
ACCESS .38
ECOPS .44
SOCFAC .42
Modern-neutral resources
NATRES .26
Testing the Tutorial Hypothesis
In appraising the separate relationships of the three types of exogen-
ous resources to investment behavior, the first and most obvious finding is
that the channeled exposure variables -- CD inputs and training inputs --
are very weakly related to INVESTMENT. For all practical purposes, they
have no bivariate relationship at all. This is another way of saying that
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smorgasbord of rural development programs to increase villager income had
no discernible relationship with villager behaviors to achieve higher income.
This negative finding is subject to two main questions: Do the
variables provide a fair test of the Tutorial Hypothesis, at least in the
Thai context? Is the statistical relationship an artifact?
The answer to the first question must be that the channeled exposure
variables, CDINPUT and TRAINING, do capture most of the inputs which consti-
tute the Thai governmentt s attempt to guide rural development; moreover,
the research was conducted in provinces where that attempt is receiving
maximum support in both money and manpower.6 The cause/effect relationship
between the channeled exposure variables and INVESTMENT should hold (if the
Tutorial Hypothesis is applicable to this sample) on two counts.
First, CDINPUT and TRAINING include a number of programs that directly
and explicitly seek to induce the behaviors measured in the investment index,
-- notably cash crop farming and membership in agricultural cooperatives. Yet
even with these components of the investment index, the correlations were
near zero. Training inputs were correlated with cash crop farming at .06;
with credit cooperative membership at .05. CD inputs were correlated with
cash crop farming at -.15; with cooperative membership at -.09. These figures
are clearly inconsistent with the expectations of the Tutorial Hypothesis.
Even more to the point, the cause/effect relationship between channeled
exposure and INVESTMENT should hold on indirect grounds. Beyond any first-
order effects, rural development programs presumably intend to elicit
population responses that will serve as multiplier effects on government
7
inputs; and that is exactly what a successful investment accomplishes. The
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indicators used in the investment index signify the kind of self-help
efforts which developing rural economies desperately need. In this sense,
it is entirely reasonable to expect (again assuming the validity of the
Tutorial Hypothesis for Thailand) that the summed effects of channeled
exposure on an overall measure of investment would be substantial, because
of the carry-over impact from a specific CD program or training session to
the villager's general attitude toward change and self-improvement.
For both direct and indirect reasons then, INVESTMENT should have
been correlated with the channeled exposure variables, if indeed Thai villagers
invest because they are guided and prompted to do so by planned programs.
It was not related, and to that extent the Tutorial Hypothesis is inconsistent
with the experience of the villages in the study.
The second question is whether the statistical relationship is an
artifact. Would the introduction of proper controls expose a relationship
between the channeled exposure variables and INVESTMENT?
The rationale for controls is a highly plausible one: if the CD and
training resources are being concentrated on the most isolated and backward
villages (as development policy planners might well choose to do), it is
unreasonable to expect dramatic results. In effect, the RTG development
programs might be bucking the odds by deliberately working in the most
difficult villages.
But plausible though the rationale may be, it does not apply to this
sample of villages. Drawing from the correlations in table 3.1., it appears
clear that CD resources are not being concentrated on isolated villages
(r of CDINPUT with ACCESS = .06), on villages with poor economic opportunities
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(r of CDINPUT with ECOPS = .14), or on villages with little social infra-
structure (on the contrary, r of CDINPUT with SOCFAC = .40). Similarly,
training inputs are not being concentrated on the inaccessible villages
(r of TRAINING with ACCESS = .14), the economically disadvantaged (r of
TRAINING with ECOPS = .05), or those with low social infrastructure levels
(r of TRAINING with SOCFAC = -. 08). Only one relationship, the tendency of
training resources to go to villages with low natural resources (r of TRAIN-
ING with NATRES = -.34), is consistent with the proposition that contextual
variables are concealing the real effects of channeled exposure on invest-
ment behavior. RTG development inputs were not being allocated systematically
to the poorest and most backward villages; nor in fact have the principal
Thai development agencies ever professed to make allocations on that basis. 8
It must be emphasized that these comments about development efforts
and investment behavior refer specifically to attempts to channel and guide
village responses; not to general-purpose development efforts such as road
construction, electrification, or expansion of health and education services.
As we shall discuss shortly, these kinds of changes in the environment (which
were captured in the social infrastructure variable, SOCFAC) are significant
in explaining changes in investment behavior. It should also be noted that
the lack of measurable impact of the channeled inputs on investment does not
mean that they have no impact at all. On the contrary, they appear to have
impact on the village's capacity to cope with modernization, including some
of the problems which investment itself generates. These effects will be
discussed in the following chapters. For the moment, it is simply argued
that a Tutorial justification for Thai rural development programs, based on
the assumption that Thai villagers need to be taught to accept change and to
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use it for their own purposes -- to take on a modern outlook as we have
defined it -- finds no support in the data for this study.
Testing the BaZgat Hypothesis
The Balgat Hypothesis is generally supported by the data. The correla-
tions of INVESTMENT with the unchanneled exposure variables -- social infra-
structure, economic infrastructure, and accessibility -- are all significant
at the .01 level. Equally important, the nature of the independent variables
is such that the Balgat explanation is the easiest to justify. As an example,
consider the .42 correlation between social infrastructure (SOCFAC) and
investment behavior. Why should the existence of health centers, seventh
grade schodbs, movie theatres and electricity be related statistically to
such apparently unrelated behaviors as proportion of villagers growing cash
crops, or ownership of stores and rice mills?
Several explanations come to mind: social facilities are built in
accessible villages, which are also high investment villages; or social
facilitids and investment both occur in villages with high economic opportuni-
ties; or they both occur in villages with high natural resources. But the
correlations of social infrastructure with accessibility, economic infrastruc-
ture, and natural resources are .07, .21, and .16 respectively. None of
those explanations works.
Given their inapplicability, it becomes that much more attractive to
use the hypothesis which flows from the theory of investment as presented
earlier; to hypothesize that social infrastructure pushes investment by
changing the villager's way of looking at the world. The indicators used
for the social and economic infrastructure variables (SOCFAC and ECOPS) are
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in effect fragments of the modern world brought to the village. Access-
ibility (ACCESS) measures the time and trouble it takes the villager to
get to the modern world outside the village. All three unchanneled exposure
variables should be related to investment behavior if we apply the Balgat
model. When it turns out that they are related, we take it as a strong
indication that the model is applicable to rural Thailand.
Speculations on the Nature of the Causal Relationship
The separate correlations of accessibility, economic infrastructure,
and social infrastructure with investment behavior were, as has been noted,
.38, .44, and .42 respectively. In order to examine how these three
variables affect investment in combination, they were entered as the inde-
pendent variables in a regression on INVESTMENT. 9
The results are consistent with an important hypothesis about the
dynamics of personal modernity: that the individual does not become "less
traditional" and "more modern" in even, linear steps as he is exposed to
modernizing influences, but instead lags behind the influences in their
early stages, then accelerates and outstrips the rate of increment in
modernizing influences, once the process has been well started.
To see how these inferences may be drawn from the regression results,
consider first what is implied by the relationship between the values of
INVESTMENT which were predicted by the three unchanneled exposure variables
and the observed values of investment, as shown in the hypothetical plot
in figure 3.1 on the following page.
If the unchanneled exposure variables predicted INVESTMENT perfectly,
all of the villages in the plot would fall along the diagonal. But the
-Th
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to modernizing influences
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.-- izing influences
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FIGURE 3.1 Interpretation of a hypothetical plot of predicted against
observed values of INVESTENT
unchanneled exposure variables do not explain all of the variance; the
linear regression explains instead a little more than one third of the
variance -- 36.5%, to be exact. The results (using standardized regression
coefficients) were as follows:
INVESTMENT = .25 ACCESS + .35 SOCFAC + .28 ECOPS
t statistic = 1.85 2.61 1.99
F = 10.91
R = .604
R2= .365
In other words, the unchanneled exposure variables left enough
unexplained to expect that a plot of the predicted values against the
observed values of INVESTMENT would leave a number of deviant cases of
unusually fast or slow response to modernizing influences, as shown in figure 3.1.
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The results of the actual plot of the observed values of INVESTMENT
against the predicted values from the regression against the unchanneled
exposure variables is shown in figure 3.2. Again, the diagonal is the line
for a perfect fit. Ordinarily, the cases in this type of plot should be
distributed in roughly random fashion along both sides of the diagonal.
Such is clearly not the case with the plot in figure 3.2: high levels
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FIGURE 3.2 Observed against predicted values: INVESTMENT regressed
on ACCESS, SOCEAC, and ECOPS.
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of INVESTMENT tend to be under-predicted by the combination of independent
variables, while low levels of INVESTMENT tend to be over-predicted. This
systematic relationship between the error term and the observed value
stands out very clearly when the residual is plotted against observed values,
as shown in figure 3.3:
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FIGURE 3.3 The error term of INVESTMENT regressed on ACCESS, SOCFAC,
and ECOPS_, plotted against the observed values of INVESTMENT.
The correlation between the dependent variable and the error term in
a regression "should" be trivial. The correlation of the dependent variable
- a7 -
and the error term plotted in figure 3.3 is .78.
The phenomenon is not a product of the relationship between INVESTMENT
and any one of the three unchanneled exposure variables. Plots of INVESTMENT
against ACCESS, SOCFAC, and ECOPS separately revealed no unusual character-
istics in the bivariate relationships. Instead, it appears that the correla-
tion in the error term is produced by the three variables in combination.
Given enough time and experimentation, it is highly probable that a
nonlinear function could be found which would eliminate the correlation in
the error term and at the same time significantly increase the variance
explained by the unchanneled exposure variables.
We may go even further, and specify the family of hyperbolic equation
within which the function would be found. The indicators of INVESTMENT have
both lower and upper bounds -- a village can have no fewer than zero shops,
and there exists some saturation point of shops in proportion to households
beyond which opening a new shop would force the closing of another. So if,
as the plot suggests, INVESTMENT increases exponentially at the middle
range of exposure to modernity, we also know that the curve must eventually
flatten as it approaches asymptotically to some maximum feasible level of
village investment behavior. The expected curve is of the basic shape
with the characteristic equation,
ex - eX
ex+e -X
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But on balance it seemed inappropriate to seek out the function: what
would it prove once it had been found? The linear regression results already
tell us that the function exists; the only advantage of finding the actual
function would be to know the "real" regression weights to be attached to
the three unchanneled exposure variables, and to know the "real" proportion
of the variance in INVESTMENT that they explain. But with only 41 villages
in the sample, it would be unacceptable to use those figures even if they
were obtained. The danger is too great that what looks like a hyperbolic
function is only a peculiarity in a small data set.
Instead, it seems more suitable to limit the discussion of the sig-
nificance of the regression results. Two points are worth making.
First, there is some corroborative statistical evidence that the
growth in investment behaviors is nonlinear. In the larger 129-village
sample that preceded the data collection for this study, retrospective
data on the establishment of village shops were obtained, using a technique
which has proved to be highly reliable.10 The results strongly support
a nonlinear hypothesis, as figure 3.4 shows. Note that the plot has been
corrected for population growth. It should be noted also that the increase
60
No. of new shops 50
per 100 villages 40
per year 30
20
10 , 0,e
0'
52 57 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
Year
FIGURE 3.4 New shops opened per 1001villages per year, corrected for
population growth.
From Robert E. Krug, Some Evaluations of ARD Program Impact in Four Amphoe.
Bangkok: US-AID, 1972, Figure IV.1, p. 59.
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is not attributable to comparable increases in villager income. From 1952
to 1972, GNP per capita rose 144%; during the same period, the percentage
of villages with shops (in the 129-village sample) rose from 18 to 78 --
an increase of 333%1 And the total number of shops was increasing at an
even higher rate, as the data in figure 3.4 indicate. In sum, the data about
one of the six indicators in the investment index, village shops, clearly
support the proposition of nonlinear increases in overall investment behavior.
The second point about the regression results is that they are wholly
consistent with the theoretical model of personal modernity presented in
chapter two. Putting aside the statistical issues for a moment, the relation-
ship between the unchanneled exposure variables and investment behavior in
this sample showed the following pattern: At very low levels of exposure
to modernity, investment behavior tended to be even lower in a relative sense.
Moreover, even at somewhat higher levels of exposure to modern influences,
increases in investment closed the gap with relative level of exposure slowly.
Then at moderately high levels of exposure, a crossover point was reached,
and at high levels of exposure to modernity, investment was increasing
faster than exposure.
The relationship to the model of personal modernity presented earlier
is obvious. It saw men as modernizing not in steady, incremental steps, but
rather as crossing a threshold which involves a basic change in cognitive
orientation. Exposure to modernizing influences is still seen as the cause
of the change in orientation, but the change is (during the early stages)
an internal one. While it is taking place, little should be expected in
terms of behavioral manifestations. Once it has taken place, behavioral
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changes occur out of proportion to further increases in modernizing influences,
until a saturation point is reached.
The correlation between the dependent variable (INVESTMENT) and the
error term is consistent with this interpretation. If the 41 villages of
the sample are seen not as different villages at the same point of calender
time, but as "the Thai village" at effectively different stages in the
history of exposure to modern influences, the resemblance of the plot in
figure 3.3 to an autocorrelation phenomenon in time series analysis makes
very good sense. Investment is a function not only of exposure to modernity
at any given time, but also of the levels of exposure and of investment that
the village has experienced in the past.
It must be stressed again that the above is presented as an inter-
pretation only. An observed pathology in the regression is consistent with
the theoretical outlook on investment. It is in no sense a statistical "test"
of that outlook. Much more time series data than are available are needed
for that.
Whatever the reason for the correlation of INVESTMENT with the error
term, it has the effect of drastically reducing the number of villages
which can be said to be unusually responsive or resistant to the unchanneled
exposure to modernity represented by social infrastructure, economic infra-
structure, and accessibility to the outside world. This is apparent if one
visualizes the plot in figure 3.2 with the hyperbolic function discussed
earlier. Only one village in the upper left-hand quadrant remains so far
from the "normal" line that it warrants examination.
As it happens, the village represented by that dot tends to prove the
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rule that channeled exposure affects investment behavior only under excep-
tional conditions. The village is extremely isolated -- only in the last
three years has it been linked to a main highway. It is also isolated
from other villages -- the nearest one is six kilometers away. In the
context of the village's isolation from general contact with modernizing
influences, the RTG decided three years ago to make it the focus of inten-
sive development support: it was to be one of three model villages in the
district. At about the same time, an army security unit was sent to the
village. Somewhat atypically, the sergeant who headed it has been a help-
ful source of advice about villager problems. Also, the development inputs
have been sensible and well-administered. The village has already completed
a successful husbandry project, a successful poultry project, a cooperative
program for marketing hemp which has raised the price reaching the villager,
and several other community development projects not directly related to
investment behaviors.
In all, the village seems to prove that if a community is isolated
from competing unchanneled modernizing influences, and if the government
pumps in unusually large development resources, and if those resources are
well administered, and there are other favorable circumstances as well,
then it becomes possible to identify a direct link between what we have
called unchanneled exposure and investment behavior. It is not a generally
applicable mode.
Summary
To recapitulate the findings about the causes of investment behavior
in the 41 villages of the sample:
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Two hypotheses about the causes of investment were investigated: the
Tutorial Hypothesis, which stresses the role of agents of change in stimulat-
ing the type of behaviors included in the investment index; and the Balgat
Hypothesis, which sees behaviors like those in the investment index as
following willy-nilly from exposure to modernity in the outside world.
The Tutorial Hypothesis was not supported by the data. Measures of
community development inputs and training inputs were effectively unrelated
to the occurrence of investment behaviors.
The Balgat Hypothesis was generally supported by the data. Access-
ibility to the outside world, economic infrastructure, and social infra-
structure were each significantly related to investment behavior. Together
in a linear regression, they statistically accounted for 36.5% of the
variance in the investment index.
For this sample, the combined effect of the unchanneled exposure var-
iables was such that a pattern of response accounted for a much higher pro-
portion of the variance, in qualitative terms: investment in villages low
on the combined unchanneled exposure variables was systematically over-
predicted; investment in villages high on the combined unchanneled exposure
variables was systematically under-predicted. Once this pattern was taken
into consideration, very few genuinely "deviant" villages remained. The
possibility of a nonlinear relationship between exposure to modernizing
influences and investment behavior is consistent with the pathology in
the regression results, and with the theoretical approach toward personal
modernity.
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Notes to Chapter III
1. Margaret Mead, the introduction, in Mead (ed.), Cultural Patterns
and Technical Change (New York: Mentor), 1958, p. V. The most com-
plete single discussion of what we have called the tutorial approach
to rural development is Conrad M. Arensberg and Arthur H. Niehoff,
Introducing Social Change: A Manual for Americans Overseas (Chi-
cago: Aldine), 1964.
2. The tutorial approach is often assumed to be not only the least
traumatic way of introducing change (from the cultural point of
view), but also the "rapid" means of affecting change. See Arens-
berg and Niehoff, Introducing Social Change, pp. 66-67. Among
development workers, the question of rapidity is uppermost, at
least among development officials in Thailand. In the course of
six years of working with and around both Thai and American rural
development officials, I very frequently heard discussion of how
to improve the efficiency of their work, and often these discussions
took cultural peculiarities into account. But I cannot remember
a single conversation about whether to introduce an innovation,
based on cultural considerations.
3. Banfield, Moral Basis, p. 175. For the arguments for peasant resis-
tance to change in the face of a modernizing external environment,
see Everett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 1969, esp. pp. 19-49, Joseph Lopreato,
"Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society: The Peasant's View,"
Human Organization, 21 (1962), pp. 21-24, and John M. Brewster,
"Traditional Social Structures as Barriers to Change," in Herman
M. Southworth and Bruce F. Johnston (eds.), Agricultural Develop-
ment and Economic Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1967,
pp. 66-68. See also the responses of J. Kennedy ("A Critique")
and Kaplan and Saler ("Anthropological Explanation") to Foster's
argument in "Limited Good" that nAchievement is latent in peasant
societies, needing only opportunity to bring it out. Case studies
of the kinds of problems generated by innovation in peasant cultures
are available in E.H. Spicer (ed.), Human Problems in Technological
Change (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), 1952.
4. In general, political scientists have been less interested than
anthropologists and sociologists in the problems of guiding the
modernization of men, despite the amount of attention that has been
devoted to the differences between traditional and modern outlooks.
The greater interest has been in the fact of personal modernization
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as it affects political forms and institutions. Karl W. Deutsch,
in Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foun-
dations of Nationality (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), 1953, and his
later formulation, "Social Mobilization and Political Development,"
American Political Science Review, 55 (1961), pp. 493-514, exem-
plifies the tendency to assume that environmental and personal
modernity go together naturally, by indiscriminately mixing indica-
tors of exposure and response in his index of social mobilization
(see "Social Mobilization," pp. 495-498). Measures of exposure to
modernity, he implies, are as good as measures of response for
establishing an index of mobilization.
5. Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, Chapter I.
6. Two of the provinces in the study -- Ubol and Nakhon Phanom -- have
been included in the Accelerated Rural Development program since its
inception in 1965. A third, Chiang Rai, was added in 1967, and the
fourth, Petchabun, was added in 1969. Because of their status as
insurgent-active provinces, they have also been included in a wide
variety of special economic and social (e.g., educational and health)
development efforts that have been hoped to have a counterinsurgency
effect.
7. This was John D. Montgomery's initial .-rationale for using investment
as a measure of success in development programs. See Montgomery,
Technology and Civic Life: Making and Implementing Development Decisions
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), in press; and Appendix A of this study.
8. To my knowledge, only one program -- the water resources division
within ARD -- systematically allocated its resources on the basis of
explicit criteria (the "isonaam" index of water availability in a
village) prior to 1974. Instead, a great deal of latitude in alloca-
tion has been left to the heads of the different development agencies
and, below them, to the provincial and district offices. For an
analysis of the allocation process in two districts of Nakhon Phanom,
see Murray, Thai Local Administration, pp. 68-72 and 121-126.
9. See footnote 7, Chapter I, on the use of regression analysis for
ordinal data.
10. The procedure is based on the assumption that a shopkeeper in a vil-
lage will remember how long he has been in business, and how many
* competitors he had when he opened his shop. The strengths of the
procedure are that 1) the assumption itself is highly plausible,
because the facts being sought are so salient to the person's life
history; and 2) the procedure allows for a test of consistency when-
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ever a village had more than one shop (e.g., if respondent A opened
his shop six years ago with two competitors, a respondent B who opened
his shop four years ago should have had three competitors, assuming
no one had gone out of business). The idea was originated by the
author and later implemented by Robert E. Krug for the 129-village
survey. Krug found the results to be strikingly consistent, if two
additional items were added to the protocol: a check whether the
respondent was including his own shop in the count of number of shops,
and a check whether any shops had gone out of business. See Krug,
ARD Program Impact in Four Amphoe, pp. 55-59.
11. GNP figures were taken from the Ddpartment of. Economic and Social
Affairs (UN), Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972, VoZ.
II (New York: United Nations), p.48.
-96-
CHAPTER IV
A BEHAVIORAL MEASURE OF THE FUNCTIONAL VILLAGE: TITHING
In the preceding chapters we have focused on the villager's encounter
with the outside world, and particularly on his encounter with the modern
outside world. Now we turn to an examination of the resources which the
village brings to that encounter. In this chapter we shall describe what is
meant by a well-governed village or, as it is called here, a functional
village. From that discussion will be drawn some observable traces of the
quality of governance in a village. These will be applied to the quantitative
analysis of the next chapter, when we shall proceed to explore the relationship
between modernization and the village's capacity to function effectively.
A. The Nature of a Functional Village
It may be useful to begin with a brief overview of the administrative
arrangements within which a Thai village operates.
The village is at the bottom of five tiers of civil bureaucracy in
Thailand. Immediately above the village is the hamlet, or collection of
villages; next up the ladder is the district, staffed by career civil servants
of the RTG; above that is the province; and at the top is the Bangkok ministry.
Most villages have three local leaders who receive a very small honor-
arium from the RTG and carry an officially recognized title. These three
are the headman, who is elected by vote of the village population, and two
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assistant headmen selected by him. The several headmen in the villages of a
hamlet jointly elect the hamlet chief, called the kamnan.
The terms of office for all of these positions has been open-ended. If
a village is unhappy with its headman, it cannot be rid of him by waiting for
his term to end. It must petition the district officer to hold a new election,
then muster a majority of villagers who are willing to vote for removal. In
cases of flagrant misconduct, the district officer is empowered to remove the
headman by fiat. But unless one of these two courses is taken, the headman
continues to hold his job until he dies, voluntarily resigns, or reaches the
mandatory retirement age of sixty which was imposed in 1972.1
In addition to these paid and uniformed positions (though the uniforms
are worn only for ceremonial occasions), villagers may hold several other
types of quasi-official post.
In all provinces where the Community Development Department is repre-
sented, each village has a Village Development Committee with (usually) seven
members. This committee fills much the same function as the earlier "wat
committee,"' a traditional institution which oversaw the administration of
civil as well as religious activities in the community.
A village may also have a health committee, agricultural committee,
a water association to maintain a communally owned reservoir or dam, a funeral
association to provide a kind of "insurance" for funeral costs, or any number
of other ad hoc institutions organized by the village or by one of the RTG's
development agencies.
Such are the institutional arrangements; obviously, they convey little
information about the meaning of "good government" or "bad government" in a
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village. To do that, we will describe two case histories as examples of the
extremes'. The first represents the acutely nonfunctional village. The
second describes a functional village of the traditional type. Although
the names have been altered,'both cases describe actual villages, not com-
posite portraits.
Case I: The Nonfunctional- Village
The village we shall call Pat Pong is located in the far northeastern
corner of Thailand, only a few kilometers from the Mekong River. It has
136 households, an elementary school with two teachers (both from outside
the village), a small wooden wat (Buddhist temple), no health center and no
electricity. The leadership structure in the village is of a very simple
traditional type: a headman, two assistants, and a Wat committee of indeter-
minate membership because it has never formally been voted upon.
When asked what they expect of village government, villagers generally
mention three areas: maintenance of peace and order in the village, promotion
of the public good, and assistance in dealing with the district office. Pat
Pong is nonfunctional in all three. Because of the simplicity of the system,
the blame is easy to fix: it all falls (at least in the villagers' eyes) on
the headman.
Far from being peaceful and harmonious, Pat Pong has been torn for
years between two factions, one headed by a school teacher and the other by
the headman. A large number of the villagers have joined neither side, and
wish both of the principals in the feud would go away.
Among other manifestations, the continuing feud has led to accusations
that the headman is a communist sympathizer and that the school teacher is
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an embezzler; rocks thrown against houses in the middle of the night; and,
most seriously damaging, reports to police when a member of the other faction
was cutting wood to build a house, or making some moonshine. Both acts are
illegal (although decreasingly punished when only private consumption is in-
volved), and the reports led to arrests and fines.
But beyond the disruptions caused directly by the feud, the village is
plagued by frequent smaller disputes which the headman is unable to resolve.
The research turned up several specific instances, usually involving disputes
over property boundaries or alleged theft or damage of property. The problem
is that, as one informal leader said,
... the headman does not calm down the dispute when he makes
his decision. Usually he cannot even decide, so the vil-
lagers go to see the k.anan.... The kamnan often succeeds
in mediating. Sometimes the kawnan sends the persons back
to the headman, but they will not go because they have no
respect for the headman's decisions.
When villagers talk about going to see the kamnan, it should be remem-
bered that they are referring to a long trip by boat to the kamnan's village.
It is a hard row back upstream, taking the better part of a day. That they
are willing to undertake the trip is indicative of the importance they attach
to getting a resolution of the dispute and the low regard they have for the
headman's judgement.
In the second area of leadership responsibility, promotion of the pub-
lic good, the headman is said to play favorites: "The headman only helps
his relatives, and not the other people who have problems and go to see him,"
one villager said. This is particularly aggravating because "the public good"
clearly includes law enforcement, and one of the headman's relatives is a
chicken thief. From an interview with a village elder:
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The headman lectures us at village meetings to look after
our children. If anyone behaves like a thief he must be
arrested and sent to the police. But when Chan, the head-
man's brother, was twice caught stealing our chickens, the
headman did not do anything when we reported it to him. We
had to call the police ourselves.
When community-wide projects are proposed, the headman is equally
lacking. The clearest example of his incompetence (and an intriguing glimpse
of the potential for community action in Pat Pong) occurred when the villagers
were persuaded by the abbot of the wat in the next village to build a brick
wall around the Pat Pong Wat compound. When a member of the wat committee
broached the subject with the headman, the headman argued against it and -
raised all manner of problems that might cause the project to fail. He
finally gave his consent only after a meeting of the villagers yoted in favor
of it over his strenuous objections. The wall was completed without his help.
"The district officials who visit the village probably think that the work on
the wall construction was done well because of the headman's ability," com-
plained one villager. "In reality, the headman did not pay any attention to
his work, not even to his official duty."
The third and last unfulfilled expectation of leadership involves
village interactions with the district office. Sometimes a villager simply
needs advice on who to see in order to obtain a license or get an identity
card. Sometimes he needs supporting documents from the headman. For some
types of business, or for a person who is particularly ignorant of the pro-
cedures, the headman is expected to accompany the villager to the district
office in person. On yet other occasions, the headman would ordinarily con-
duct all of the business with the district, as a go-between linking the
village and the career RTG bureaucracy. For all of these varieties of trans-
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action, the headman of Pat Pong was inadequate. When a villager in Pat Pong
was asked how he would go about requesting help from the district, he answered
this way:
If I want the government to help in anything, I should
tell the headman so that he could tell the district
official in charge. But this headman is not so good. He
probably would not go to the district if he were asked.
This village is different from other villages, where it is
convenient to get things done as needed. (emphasis added)
Another respondent answering the same question:
The headman is the representative of the village. Whatever
the villagers need, we should tell the headman, so he can
tell the district officials. However, the villagers in
Pat Pong consider that the present headman does not try
to do anything for us.
Not only is the headman inadequate as a representative for making
requests upward through the system; the villagers also reported that he could
not even effectively represent the interests of the district. It was said
that he always tried to command people, that "he always threatens and shouts
at us. Whenever he wants us to do anything, he tries to force us and never
asks us nicely."
Not surprisingly, the villagers' low opinion of the headman had
repercussions for his ability to conduct the village's business, even when
he roused himself to try. From a conversation among village elders:
Mr. Torn said that he felt ashamed at the meetings of the
villagers. He had visited many villages and at meetings
the people paid good attention to what the headman said,
and were as quiet as if they were listening to a priest.
No one argued in the middle of a speech, but waited until
the headman had finished. In Pat Pong, whoever wanted to
talk did so whenever he wanted. No one listened to the
subject of the meeting.... Every time that there was an
argument the headman would get very angry and shout that
the government had appointed him as the leader, and when
the leader talked, the villagers had to listen. But the
villagers would still argue.
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In all three of the basic leadership functions -- mediator of disputes,
leader of community activities, and intermediary with the district office --
the headman of Pat Pong was deficient. But the nonfunctional character of
the village spread beyond that. The spread of the feud to include a number
of families in the village is one example. Perhaps an even better illustra-
tion came out of an informal conversation among men who are considered to be
leaders in the village. One of them, named Sombat, mentioned that a house
had been built across the public pathway leading from his house to the main
road. Another village said that maybe when the soldiers came to visit the
village (a regular occurrence), they would tear down the house. The report
of the conversation continues:
Sombat said, 'I would like the soldiers to come. When
they come, they will tear down any house that is in the
way. It would be good to do that so we will have a path-
way to walk on.'... Then Sombat thought of an idea. His
house was across the pathway from Orn's house, a relative
who had a big kitchen where they all ate their meals.
Sombat said that before the rainy season came he would
extend his porch to Orn's kitchen and so not have to go
out in the water and mud. He said, 'No one could say
that I blocked the pathway because the owner of the other
house ought to be blamed first.'
Nonfunctional is the proper word for it: the villagers of Pat Pong
shared the concepts of "good government" held by villagers elsewhere -- as
in the recognition that -there should be a public pathway that one person should
not be free to block. But the village lacked mechanisms in good working order
for implementing their understanding.
Case II: The Functional Village
The village of Khao Soi is located only 25 kilometers from Pat Pong,
and is in the same district. It has 104 households, an elementary school, one
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recently built wooden wat in the village, and an ancient chedi (wat tower)
about 500 meters across the rice fields. It has no other social facilities.
The leadership structure is again simple: a headman, two assistants,
and a seyen-man village development committee comprised of the same men who
were formerly on the wat committee. We will review the governance of the
village in terms of the same three functional areas applied to Pat Pong.
In the field of village peace and harmony, Khao Soi had none of the
major conflicts that characterized Pat Pong. As far as could be determined,
there were no cliques within the village nor any inter-family feuds. As in
any village, there were quarrels. In the year preceding the research, the
headman could remember four inheritance quarrels, two disputes over land and
buffalo ownership, three cases of seduction, and "several" marital spats
that were brought to the headman for adjudication. None of these cases was
taken any further and no evidence emerged that he was ever bypassed in favor
of another leader. On the contrary, villagers who discussed the subject
unanimously spoke of the headman's good sense in these matters.
In the field of promotion of the public good, the contrast between
Pat Pong and Khao Soi is even sharper. There had not been a crime, even a
chicken theft, during the two years preceding the research. The wat and the
chedi were immaculately maintained. The headman himself led the major
ceremonial occasions and gave the largest contributions. The roads within the
village were well maintained. The village had constructed a reservoir for
irrigation purposes and graded the road into the village from the main highway,
both without assistance -- monetary or supervisory -- from the RTG. Community
funds for maintaining the reservoir were held in a bank under an account held
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jointly by him and two other respected elders. Part of the cost of renting
the equipment to grade the feeder road was paid out of funds raised by selling
gravel from a community-owned pit -- again, an idea originated within the
village. The rest of the cost -was paid by contributions -- with the richest
families in the village and those who would use the road to transport goods
to market assessed more than poor families and those which did not sell goods
outside the village.
And finally, in the field of communication and liaison between village
and district office, contrast the following reports from villagers of Khao
Soi with those from Pat Pong:
When a villager was called to the district office to defend himself
against a charge of trespassing, he said it was the headman who told him
what witnesses he would need and how he could find them.
Another villager had rice worms in his field and did not know how
to get rid of them. He told the headman, who got some medicine for him from
the district agriculture officer.
Two other villagers gave credit to the headman for getting title to
unclaimed land; one because the headman had gone with him to the district
land officer, the other because "the headman told me what to expect."
When the district office decided to build a new school for Khao Soi
on a site which the villagers did not favor, the headman and his assistants
prepared a detailed brief objecting to the decision, which the village then
submitted in the form of a petition.
In short, Khao Soi exhibited a high degree of competence, imagination,
and problem-solving capacity in governing itself. The tasks the village set
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itself were basic ones and the apparatus was not elaborate. But the jobs
generally got done . The village functioned in ways that Pat Pong did not,
and in ways that make a difference in the day-to-day quality of life.
B. The Behavioral Trace: Tithing
The data for the two case histories just presented were not obtained
through a few hours or even a few days of interviewing. They emerged slowly
over a month's residence in each village by two skilled Thai interviewers.
Only four of the 41 villages of the sample received this treatment; the
other 37 were visited for only six days each. From them, enough fragments
were collected to give a general flavor to the social and administrative
environment in the village, but always the uncertainty remained about whether
the full story had been heard.
In addition to the uncertainty was the general methodological considera-
tion that even six days per village is an extremely expensive form of data
collection, if the object is to use the village as the unit of analysis. And
finally there was the substantive consideration: the type of "health" in a
village, or lack of it, that was described in the two case histories is be-
lieved to be a concrete, pervasive, and above all very important dimension
of village life. If so, it should not take two man-months of residence to
track it down.
All of these considerations led to the question: how does the quality
of being a functional village surface in behavior. What do people in cohesive,
problem-solving villages do that people in fragmented, paralyzed villages do
not do? Two constraints were imposed on the possible answers to the question,
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The behaviors must leave an observable physical trace; otherwise, the data
collection problems of interviews over prolonged residence remains. And
the behaviors must be valid for villages at a range of stages of modernization.
Four indicators were eventually selected, and labelled tithing behaviors
to suggest the rationale behind their selection.2 Definitionally, tithing in
a Thai village denotes evidence of voluntary, continous, and widespread vil-
Zager behaviors in support for public goods. The proposition is that the level
of tithing behavior in a village is an indirect measure of the leveZ of viZ-
lage functionalism.
The first key element in the logic connecting tithing and competent
self-governance is voluntarism in the tithing behavior. This does not pre-
cluded the possibility that social pressure might have been brought to bear
(indeed, the existence of coherent social pressure is a prerequisite to
being a functional village), but rather it precludes legal obligation or
coercion. The distinction is that which exists between donating regularly
to a church and paying taxes -- the distinction that was the source of the
terminology, "tithing." Thus, to take one common example in Thailand, the
amount of village money or labor contributed to a government-sponsored
project is not a reliable indicator, because of the uncertainty about whether
the villager gave his resources voluntarily or in response to an official
request of government officials in charge.
A second key link is the continuity or regularity of the behavior.
Here as well as with volunteerism, the analogy with the literal meaning of
tithing is apt: giving a certain amount every week, year in and year out,
has much more powerful implications for degree of commitment than the sporadic
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donation, however large.
The third specification, that the behavior be widespread in proportion
to the village population, has a self-evident utility. One man's donation
of the cost of a church (or of a wat, as actually happened in one village
of the sample) is not indicative of the congregation's commitment.
We return then to the question, what do people do in functional
villages that they do not do in nonfunctional villages? Four indicators are
used as answers, each of which reflects a somewhat different type of func-
tional strength in the community.
First, the compoiind-, of the houses in functional villages tend to be
cleaner, neater, and generally better-kept than the compounds in nonfunctional
villages. 3 It is an indicator that (with modification for local conditions)
probably could be used in communities throughout the world; in effect, it
refers to the difference between a community of poor people and a slum. For
a Thai village, other manifestations of widespread high morale could be used --
for example, the cleanliness of the children's school uniforms might serve.
But the condition of the village's compounds is the easiest to observe and rate
accurately. The short label for this variable is YARDS. It refers to the
percentage of a village's houses that was rated "5" or higher on the nine-
point scale for judging the condition of the compound (see chapter I for
details)
Second, the functional village tends to build and maintain internal
streets, even if they are only dirt tracks. Access to a street is important
to villagers, but it is a facility that one cannot get unless others help.
The initial clearing operation and subsequent maintenance require group
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initiative, organization, and a sense of mutual cooperation. If a cluster
of houses is cut off from a street, or if the streets have degenerated to
the point of uselessness, the village is not doing a job that is both surely
desired and well within its capacity to perform. The label of this variable
is STREETS. It is a scale based on the extent of construction and the main-
tenance of village streets; details are given in Appendix C.
Third, a functional village maintains a wat in good condition,
whether it is small and made out of bamboo mats or large and elaborate.
A village committee sees to it that the grounds are swept daily, fences
are maintained to prevent animals from entering the wat precincts, and that
the walls and roof are sound. If a Wat is in disrepair or debris litters
the compound, it is safe to assume that it is not because the village has
abandoned Buddhism, but because the community cannot muster the organization
and cooperation to meet a standard function. The variable is labelled WAT,
and is scored on a three-point scale. Again, details of the scoring are
given in Appendix C.
Fourth, a functional community will take the initiative in solving
local problems through development projects. This is the classic indicator
of problem-solving capacity (though in many ways the most unreliable one,
unless all the facts about the project are known). For this study, such
projects are included only if a reconstruction of the events leading to it
indicate that the village, not the RTG, took the initiative.4 The variable
is labelled PROJECTS, and refers to the number of village-initiated projects
during the five years preceding the research.
The four types of tithing behavior are summarized in table 4.1. The
range of variation on the four indicators is shown in table 4.2.
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TABLE 4. 1 Indicators used in the tithing index (TITHING)
Short Label
YARDS
STREETS
WAT
PROJECTS
Indicator
Upkeep of house compounds
Extent and upkeep of internal village streets
Upkeep of the village's temple(s)
Village-initiated development projects
TABLE 4. 2 Variation among the 41 villages on the tithing indicators
Short Label
YARDS
STREETS**
WAT***
PROJECTS
Mean
67.3% of hh*
2.0 projects
S.D.
13.3
1.6
High Score
95.3% of hh
100.0% of hh
7 projects
Low Score
44.2% of hh
3.0% of hh
0 projects
Notes:
* "hh" denotes number of households in the village.
** STREETS was expressed in terms of a 12-point scale; the mean and
standard deviation were not relevant (see the normalizing procedure
used for obtaining standardized scores on ordinal variables, in
Appendix C). The high and low scores refer to houses fronting on
a village street, and are given only to illustrate the range of
variation in the sample. They should not be confused with data
points used for scoring the variable.STREETS.
WAT's distribution was: 5 villages rated "poor," 24 villages rated
"neat, regular maintenance," and 12 villages rated "outstanding
maintenance."
As in the case of the investment index, the aggregate index scores on
TITHING showed broad variation. The distribution of mean scores is shown in
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figure 4.1 below. Again remember that the plot refers to the average
standardized score on the four tithing indicators.
Percent of
villages in
the sample
30
20
10
0
-1.00 -. 50 .00 +.01 +.50 +1.00
or to to to to or
less -.99 -.49 .49 .99 more
FIGURE 4.1 Distribution of the TITHING scores among the 41 villages,
The intercorrelations among the items in the tithing index, and
correlation of each item with the other three, are shown in table 4.3.
reliability of the index, again using Cronbach's coefficient alpha, is
the
The
.56.
TABLE 4.3 Intercorrelations of the TITHING items and item-index
correlations corrected for part-whole spuriousness
1 2 3 4 T
1. YARDS --
2. STREETS .34 --
3. WAT .25 .44 --
4. PROJECTS .09 .18 .18 --
T. TITHING .32 .47 .41 .20 --
The very low correlations of self-initiated development projects with
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each of the other three indicators led to the thought of discarding it
entirely. This was not done. It is a reasonable hypothesis that a functional
village at advanced stages of exposure to modernization tends to manifest
itself more in development projects and less in behaviors such as well-
maintained yards, temples, and streets. To have disregarded development
projects might have resulted in systematically underestimating the functional
capacity of the more modern villages.
C. The Validity of the Tithing Index
TITHING is a much more indirect measure than INVESTMENT. If a village
is high on the investment indicators -- if it has (proportionately) many
stores, vehicles, rice mills, cash crop farmers, and the rest -- it is in
a sense redundant to ask if the index score for that village reflects a "real"
level of investment apart from the indicators. The items that make up the
score also make up the reality of investment. But it is very pertinent to
ask of TITHING: does knowing that a village exhibits characteristics such as
clean house compounds accurately reflect the way that the village goes about
governing itself?
A review of the qualitative record suggests that it does.
First, consider the two villages that were used to illustrate the
extremes. Khao Soi, the example of the functional village, had a mean score
on the four tithing behaviors of +.97. It ranked third from the top out of
the 41 villages. Pat Pong, the example of the nonfunctional village, had a
mean score of -.52. It ranked 32nd from the top. On a purely subjective
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basis, we are of the opinion that Pat Pong's TITHING score was a little "too
high" -- but the general consistency of the qualitative indicators of leader-
ship and the quantitative scores in the two villages is clear.
In a parallel fashion, the villages with the most extreme quantitative
scores also showed obvious and consistent qualitative signs of extremes in
functional capacity.
The lowest ranked village of the 41 (with a mean TITHING score of
-1.04) is divided sharply into two factions, comprised of those who live
south of the road through the village, and those that live north of it. The
current headman has frequently tried to resign and actually did so for a
period of two years; but he was prevailed to take office again because none
of his successors would keep the job for more than a few months. The head-
man spends very little time at his job -- he is too busy claiming newly
opened land 30 kilometers from the village. The only project that the village
did complete -- a new meeting hall for the temple -- was accompanied by open
acrimony during the planning meetings, and finally a refusal to participate
by people from the north half of the village. Later, it turned out that
even the people from the south half of the village could not organize them-
selves to complete the work. The hall was finished by the youth of the village,
working under the orders of the abbot of the wat. As the school headmaster
put it, "The people of this village do not like to support each other (maj
chorp snap snun kun)."
The top-ranked village of the 41 had an astonishing mean score on
the four tithing indicators of +1.51. It also happens to be the only village
in the country with a kamnan (who serves as headman for that village) who
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has been awarded an honorary Master's degree in political science from Thai-
land's most prestigious university, Chulalongkorn. This is not proof in
itself that TITHING reflects a high quality of functional capacity -- the
officials who recommended the kamnan for the honorary degree were to some
extent influenced by the many development projects and the almost garden-
like appearance of the village that helped generate the high TITHING score.
But the more data that we accumulated about the village (all four field inter-
viewers, plus the writer, were resident in the village instead of the usual
lone interviewer) the more it appeared that the village was indeed exception-
ally cohesive and well-governed. Problems seldom even reached the kamnan for
resolution; most of them were decided by one of the five assistants to the
kamnan who had responsibility for different blocks of houses in the village.
And in addition to the five block chiefs, the kamnan had also given his two
deputy kannan differentiated responsibilities: one, responsibility for over-
seeing the maintenance of the various public facilities in the village; the
other, responsibility for overseeing correspondence with district officials
and the status of ongoing development projects. In no case did we uncover
evidence of an undercurrent of opposition to the village leadership, as is
5
often the case for "model" villages discovered By Bangkok officials. This
village appeared to be as good as its press, and as good as the TITHING score
indicated.
Finally, we may offer this more general statement of the relationship
between the quantity captured in TITHING and the qualitative nature of village
governance.
Of the 17 villages with a negative TITHING scofe of, at least -.25 --
that is, villages with moderately low to very low levels of tithing behavior --
11 exhibited at least one glaring symptom of maladroit governance, venal
governance, or no governance. The symptoms included under this heading were
* two cases of long-standing, bitter intra-village feuds
that have paralyzed village cooperation (Pat Pong and
the lowest ranking village on TITHING),
" a kamnan pocketing the money for a bridge that would
have linked the isolated other half of his home village,
" continuing tension, often involving fights, with neighbor-
ing villages,
" consistent referral of very minor crimes (e.g., the theft
of a melon) to the police, rather than resolution within
the village,
" bribery and other fraud in the election of the headman,
" two cases of removal of the headman for incompetence,
and another of attempted removal,
" inability to obtain even small donations of money or
labor for any development project,
" systematically preferential treatment in development
projects for a subgroup within the village, and
" consistent avoidence of village offices.
The 11 villages in the middle range of scores, from -. 24 to +.24,
showed mixed indications. The tithing index appears to have relatively little
discriminating power for this type of village: some villages with a minor
negative index score seemed from a qualitative assessment to have greater
functional capacity than other villages with a minor positive score.
For the 13 villages with moderate to high TITHING scores (greater than
+.224), the index again appeared to have substantial predictive capacity.
In none had the village petitioned for the removal of the headman; in none
had there been discernable village feuds; in none did we find evidence of
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corruption on the part of any village leader; in none did we find evidence
that a subgroup within the village was getting preferential treatment.
Going beyond these negative indications is difficult: impressively high
functional capacity has fewer strikingly obvious symptoms than poor functional
capacity. Instead, it tends to manifest itself through a series of small
successes that require a more extended description. It may be in order
to note-in addition,) if very subjectively, that some village leaders quickly
and strongly impressed us with their intelligence, or energy, or fairness,
or any of a number of other qualities that came through clearly during the
interviews. The villages where such leaders lived almost invariably also
did well on the TITHING indicators. 6
In summary, TITHING appears to have substantial value as an indirect
measure of village functionalism. The predictive power of the index is
greater for villages outside the middle range. Once outside that range
(roughly, the middle 20 percent of a normal distribution), the index was
for this sample equally accurate in identifying high and low levels of
functional capacity.
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Notes to Chapter IV
1. See Snit Vilaichitt, Kamnan and Phuyaiban: Their Origin, History,
and Importance to Village Development in Thailand (Bangkok: US-AID),
1964, for a thorough description of the legal structure of the headman
and kamnan offices.
2. I have Paul A. Schwarz to thank for putting a word to the village
quality I had in mind.
3. A distinction is important here. The individual house and compound
are maintained by the individual householder. Keeping compounds
neat is not usually a function of village government, and obviously
no conclusions about the governance of a village can be drawn from
the appearance of any one house or even from a small sample. But in
the aggregate, villages do unquestionably vary widely in their general
appearance; too widely to ascribe to chance variation. In fact, it
was this variance observed impressionistically in dozens of villages
that first suggested to me that a village's functional capacity could
be inferred through visual observation alone.
4. For each development project, narratives were obtained about the
initiation of the idea. The village role during the initiation phase
was rated from "1" (no role at all) to "5" (exclusively initiated by
the village). Projects scored "4" or "5" were included in the PROJECTS
count.
5. One of the four villages revisited for this study had been promoted as
a model village in 1968. But the village turned out to be, as one vil-
lager put it, "like a man who wears beautiful clothes but has a hole
in his pocket." For a description, see Murray, Thai Local Administration,
pp. 74-83. This experience made us extremely wary of the kamnan and
his M.A.
6. Three of the four TITHING items -- YARDS, STREETS, and WAT -- were scored
on an observational survey conducted on the first day in the village.
The ratings were thus protected from biases because of personal reactions
to the local leaders.
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CHAPTER V
MODERNIZATION AND TITHING
The behaviors we have called "investment" and "tithing" are at once
very similar and very different.
They are similar in that they all represent initiative and goal-
directed behavior on the part of villagers. A villager growing a cash crop,
buying a rice mill, learning nonagricultural skills, or joining with his
neighbors to build a road, beautify his village, solve a community problem --
all are evidenceof a villager's willingness to take affirmative action in
pursuit of some value.
They are different in the nature of the values and in the instrumental-
ities by which the values are realized. Investments tend to be highly
individualized. The return not only accrues to the individual, it is usually
the individual acting alone who gets the job done. Tithing behaviors not
only tend to yield returns which are available to the community as a whole,
they also require group action, cooperativeness, inter-dependence.
The similarity argues for the hypothesis that the two types of behavior
should occur together. And in fact the field research for this study began
with the assumption that villages could be characterized in terms of a single
dimension of goal-directed activity, including items from what are now called
the investment and tithing indexes. It is plausible that villagers who show
intelligence and initiative in governing their community will also show
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intelligence and initiative in dealing with opportunities for personal
improvement.
The difference argues for the hypothesis that the two types of behavior
will not occur together. Private and public goods have not been mutually
reinforcing in most cultures. More often they have been competitive. The
qualitative observation during the field research that they were competitive
in Thai villages as well was the original motivation for reassessing the
utility of the unified index of goal-directed activity.
The results from the villages of the sample are as ambiguous as the
competing hypotheses would lead one to suspect. The correlation between the
investment and tithing indexes was almost exactly zero -- .019. The inter-
index correlations are shown in table 5.1 below. 1
TABLE 5.1 Inter-index correlations for INVESTMENT and TITHING.
WAT STREETS YARDS PROJECTS TITHING
CASHCROPS -.04 -.26 -.06 .17 -.02
COOPS -.01 -.18 .15 .03 .00
STORES -.07 -.19 .22 .17 .06
MILLS -.13 -.32 .25 -.04 -.08
TRUCKS -.07 -.03 -.05 .17 .01
NEWJOBS .19 .03 -.04 .02 .07
INVESTMENT -.03 -.26 .16 .15 .02
The results clearly support the utility of examining goal-directed
behavior in terms of separate indexes for the public and private dimensions.
Not only are the two indexes not correlated, the inter-index correlations are
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uniformly low.2 But neither is it apparent that the two types of behavior
are competitive. The villages in the sample were sometimes rated high on
both INVESTMENT and TITHING, as well as low on both or high on one and low
on the other -- just as the .02 correlation implies.
In view of the lack of correlation with INVESTMENT, it comes as no
surprise that TITHING was also unrelated to the unchanneled exposure variables.
TITHING's correlation with economic infrastructure was -.01, exactly zero
with social infrastructure, and -.16 with accessibility to the outside world.
Those correlations, however, are taken from a cross-sectional cut into
a dynamic process. Tithing behaviors antedate modernization, and so does
variance in them: Thai villages in the premodern environment were not on a
uniformly high plane of self-governance from which they are now being dragged
by modernization. Remember the example of Pat Pong, a miserably governed
village that had hardly been touched by modernizing influences. But this
also means that the variance in tithing behaviors for premodern villages
cannot be explained by the influence of modernization or investment. Or in
other words, by including villages in the sample which have low levels of
modernization, we have guaranteed a great deal of noise in the system when
we try to identify a relationship between modernization and tithing behavior.
So the correlations between modernization and TITHING may mean what
they say most directly -- modernization and tithing behaviors have no sys-
tematic relationship. Or they may mean that the true effects of modernization
on tithing take time to show themselves, and the survey cut into the process
at an early stage.
In this chapter, we shall present a case for the latter proposition.
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The structure of the argument is uncomplicated.
First, we will discuss the link between unchanneled exposure to
modernization and village functionalism. Evidence will be presented that
unchanneled exposure and the resulting increases in investment lead to
three sets of consequences.
One set of consequences involves the increasing heterogeneity of
income and interests within the village, which increases the stresses on the
village political system.
Another set of consequences involves the increasing imbalance between
the rewards of private investment and public positions, which tends to dis-
courage time and attention to leadership duties, and support from the popula-
tion for community efforts.
The third set of consequences deals with the concentration of leader-
ship positions among an economic elite within the village, whose members
naturally gravitate toward one side of the newly emerging interest conflicts.
These three sets of consequences reinforce each other. The net effect
is that unchanneled exposure to modernization, and particularly investment,
tend to reduce the functional capacity of villages. The natural course of
events -- that is, in the absence of counteracting public policy -- suggests
that the deterioration in functional capacity will accelerate as modernization
spreads.
We will then turn to a discussion of the relationship between channeled
exposure to modernization and village functionalism. This section presents
evidence that channeled inputs of development resources and training programs
may be able to do for village functionalism what they could not do for
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investment behavior; namely, to shape villager responses to modernization.
In particular, it is suggested that channeled exposure has the effect of
raising the stakes for village leadership positions, and making continued
sacrifices of time and energy for public goods a more reasonable option
despite the increasing incentives to raise personal income.
A. Unchanne led Exposure, Investment, and the Functional Village
A Note on the Presentation
As stated above, the fundamental line of the argument is simple:
unchanneled modernization and investment produce heterogeneity and detract
from the quality of village leadership, both at the same time. Consequently
the functional capacity of the village decreases.
But stating the conclusions is considerably easier than proving them.
We shall be drawing on a variety of evidence, some quantitative and some
qualitative, some hard and some that is frankly speculative.
The discussion will be framed by the use of a causal map. The word
"map" is used to distinguish it from a causal model, which has a specific
technical meaning. The map is nothing more than a way of summarizing the
argument: it contains brief, non-technical and non-quantitative statements
of the principal events in the causal chain, presented diagrammatically.
It will be presented in pieces, at the-conclusion of the presentation of
each major component of the argument. Its primary purpose is heuristic,
to show how the pieces of the process fit together.
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Accompanying the causal map will be a path model. 3 It in effect is
the operational shadow of the map: following exactly the same causal
directions and linkages, it inserts the quantitative counterparts of the
variables in the map wherever quantification was judged to be feasible. But
the path model is not complete in itself; it should always be examined against
the backdrop of the more complete causal map. The model only summarizes the
relevance of the quantitative relationships to the full exposition.
The reason for this procedure is that the argument from the entire
body of data is substantially richer than the argument from the quantitative
data alone. The steps in the process which we have been able to measure
with numbers bridge intervening qualitative variables in some cases, and
stop short of the most interesting outcomes in others.
To some extent, those statements are still true of most of the impor-
tant topics in the social sciences. But they are particularly relevant to
this topic, because we are describing a process that takes place over an
extended period of time, and one that has barely gotten started in some of
the villages of the sample. The early steps in the process -- the ones
toward the left-hand side of the causal map -- have occurred in almost all
of the villages; the ones in the middle of the process have occurred in
some of the villages; the ones at the end of the process have occurred in
only a handful of villages with a long history of exposure to modernization.
It is argued that the latest steps have occurred only in those villages
because of the length of exposure to modernization required to produce them --
it makes sense that they were scattered in occurrence, according to the
theoretical outlook. But in practical terms it means that the "sample" of
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villages in which we can expect to observe the ultimate outcomes is far less
than forty-one. An attempt to quantify would have produced variables on
which thirty-eight or thirty-nine villages would score zero, every time.
So the best quantitative measures are available for variables that are first-
order outcomes in point of time and (usually) in significance. The more
ultimate outcomes, and the most important ones, are also the ones which occur
latest in the time sequence and hence tend to be the ones for which we have
the least systematic data.
With these comments about the presentation in mind, we are ready to
start tracing the links b5etween unchanneled exposure to modernization and
the functional village.
The Causes of Investment (Recapitulation)
The discussion of investment and its causes argued that a relatively
simple causal sequence effectively explained the aggregate investment be-
havior in the villages of the sample: villagers were exposed to modernizing
influences through the development of economic and social infrastructure in
the local environment, and increased accessibility to the outside world. The
economic infrastructure and accessibility increased the opportunities to
improve one's lot in life; all three types of exposure increased the incen-
tives to do so. The result was the type of risk-taking self-improvement
behavior we have called investment. Diagrammatically, the causal sequence
may be displayed as shown in figure 5.1 on the following page.4 The path
model corresponding to that diagram is shown in figure 5.2 immediately
following it.
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FIGURE 5.1 Causal map of the links between unchanneled exposure and
investment.
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Notes: eStraight lines denote causal links. The numbers are path
coefficients (in this case, identical with standardized
regression coefficients).
* Curved lines connect exogenous variables assumed to be
causally unrelated. The numbers are correlation coef-
ficients, and should not be confused with the path
coefficients.
FIGURE 5.2 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map in
figure 5.1.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 bring us to the first of the three major causal
sequences flowing from unchanneled exposure and investment: increased
heterogeneity of economics and interests within the village.
Line I: Increased Heterogeneity within the Village
The initial stress on self-governance has its origins in the intrin-
sically risky nature of investment. Nowhere is investment universally suc-
cessful. In a high-investment village, a great many of its members are
actively trying to make money. Some succeed and get richer. Others fail
and do not get richer. Perhaps they even get poorer. Inexorably, invest-
ment increases economic disparity within the village if we make the extremely
plausible assumption that the better-off invest as actively as the poor.
Over and above the increases in disparity caused by investment are
the general factors in unchanneled exposure to modernization which tend to
raise villager income unevenly. A new road happens to pass one villager's
land and an oil company buys a piece of it for a filling station. A new
irrigation system reaches one villager's land, and not his neighbors.. A
new pineapple cannery is builtnear the village, and hires fifteen village
girls and no others. These new opportunities brought by modernization are
invariably distributed with a large helping of luck.
Finally, along with the opportunities to improve one's situation
come the opportunities to be tricked, conned, and otherwise manipulated by
outsiders. Accessibility to the outside world is a double-edged resource
in this regard.
These facts of life about investment and modernization in all but the
most thoroughly controlled developing economies are reflected in high
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correlations with the measure of economic disparity used for this study.
The variable, labelled DISPARITY in the tables and figures, measures the
disparity in village housing. More formally, DISPARITY refers to the stan-
dard deviation by village of the combined ratings for size of house and
expense of materials of the house;5 The correlations of DISPARITY with
all of the exogenous resource variables are shown in table 5.2 below.
TABLE 5. 2 Correlations of economic disparity with the exogenous
resource variables and investment.
DISPARITY
Channeled Exposure
CDINPUT -.02
TRAINING -.05
Unchanneled Exposure
ACCESS .42
ECOPS .53
SOCFAC .38
Modern-Neutral Resources
NATRES .42
INVESTMENT . 57
DISPARITY's high correlations of .57 with investment behavior, .53 with
economic infrastructure, and .42 with accessibility to the outside world
are believed to reflect the kinds of uneven gains described earlier. The
correlation of social infrastructure with DISPARITY is hypothesized to
be indirect: the development of social infrastructure has no apparent
effects on income directly but it does (as discussed in Chapter III) directly
encourage greater investment behavior.
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Note that natural resources of the village (NATRES) is also sig-
nificantly related to economic disparity (r = .42). Presumably this
relationship has held true since periods antedating modernization. Good
soil and plentiful water have attracted competition for land, and subse-
quent disparities in distribution of wealth, in traditional and modern
societies alike.
Note also that neither of the channeled exposure variables (CD inputs
and training inputs) are related to economic disparity, consistent with the
previous finding that they are not related to villager behaviors for increas-
ing income.
The causal relationships we have been discussing are summarized in
figure 5.3, which begins where the previous causal map left off. The
corresponding path model follows in figure 5.4.
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Note: Dotted lines indicate relationships shown in an earlier figure.
FIGURE 5.3 Causal map of the links between modernization and increases
in economic disparities within the village.
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FIGURE 5. 4 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map
in figure 5.3.
The importance of increasing economic disparity depends in part on
the way in which it is taking place. A situation of simultaneous enrich-
ment and impoverishment among the extreme income groups has different
implications than one in which disparity is increasing because some are
getting richer faster than others, but everybody is getting richer.
The shape of the increasing disparity is treated as an entirely
empirical issue in this study. The approach to modernization which we have
presented lays down no constraints on whether everybody "should" intheory get
richer, or the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. In order to explore
the question, two additional variables were scored, using the same obser-
vations of house size and expense which were the basis for the DISPARITY
variable.
POORHOUSE was scored, in order to estimate the size of the bare-
subsistence population in each village. It denotes the percentage of houses
rated "3" or less on both size and expense, using the nine-point scales for
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each data point. A house scored low enough to qualify as a unit of POORHOUSE
was made out of leaves or mats, and was smaller than the size of a typical
motel room in the United States. It is substandard housing, even by Thai
village standards.
RICHHOUSE was scored in order to estimate the size of the clearly
surplus-product population in a village. It denotes the percentage of houses
rated "7" or higher on the scales for both size and expense. A village's
houses included in the RICHHOUSE rating were solidly made of wood or masonry,
with some evidence of other purchased materials. They were about the size
of a two-bedroom bungalow in the United States.
The correlations of substandard housing (POORHOUSE) and superior
housing (RICHHOUSE) with the antecedent variables in the modernization sequence
are shown in table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3 Correlations of substandard and superior village housing
with the antecedent variables in the modernization sequence.
RICHHOUSE POORHOUSE
NATRES .20 -. 25
SOCFAC .25 -.04
ECOPS .53 -. 24
ACCESS .34 .15
INVESTMENT .62 -.37
DISPARITY .77 -.19
RICHHOUSE -- -.46
The correlations suggest that the increase in economic disparity
is being generated by increases in the number of families at the upper end
of the income scale rather than by increases in the number of very poor
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families; compare the .77 correlation between economic disparity (DISPARITY)
and superior housing (RICHHOUSE) with the -. 19 correlation between DISPARITY
and substandard housing (POORHOUSE). Interpreted optimistically, investment
does tend to reduce the number of families in the lowest strata; disparity
is increasing only because the progress of those families is not as rapid
as the progress of the higher income levels. 6
The bivariate relationships in table 5.3 are better seen in the con-
text of the relationships in the causal map. We have been suggesting that
the trigger for increasing disparity is exposure to modernizing influences
and the investment behaviors which follow from those influences. Disparity
does exist in the pre-modernizing village when natural resources are high,
but it is argued that the dramatic changes -- the villager who gets rich
or loses everything -- are more characteristic of the village that has
entered into the modernization process.
The logic of the sequence just described is summarized in the expanded
causal map on the following page (figure 5.5). Note that no causal arrows
link overall economic disparity with "village-level wealth" and "extreme
poverty." They are more properly conceived as representing different foci
on the same general phenomenon -- distribution of wealth within the village --
than as discrete conditions which "cause" each other. As usual, the causal
map is followed by its operational analogue (figure 5.6). We continue the
convention of using dotted lines to denote relationships that were shown in
an earlier diagram. For the path model, we also add a convention of omitting
the coefficients shown in earlier diagrams, as an aid to readability of the
figure.
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FIGURE 5.5 Causal map of the Links between modernization and changes
in the size of the extreme income groups within the village.
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FIGURE 5.6 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map
in figure 5.5.
The path coefficients shown in figure 5.6 suggest, if taken.literally,
that the investment process in rural Thailand is serving to increase the
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number of surplus-income families and reduce the number of marginal subsis-
tence families at approximately the same rate overall (p of INVESTMENT with
RICHHOUSE = +.47; p of INVESTMENT with POORHOUSE = -. 49), but not at the
same rate within each village -- remember INVESTMENT's .57 correlation with
economic disparity.
Note also that the development of economic infrastructure has a
positive relationship to superior housing (p of ECOPS with RICHHOUSE = +.30)
independently of the path through INVESTMENT. This is to be expected. Build-
ing a dam that provides year-round irrigation to an area (to use a common
type of input that was counted in the ECOPS variable) should increase the
productivity of even traditional farming behaviors, apart from the invest-
ment uses made of the new irrigation resource.
A final implication of the path coefficients, and one which should be
of interest to development planners, is that the double-edged nature of
increased accessibility was statistically evident for this sample of villages:
accessibility to the outside world (ACCESS) in this model had only a trivial
effect on the number of surplus-income families (p with RICHHOUSE = +.06)
but a substantial relationship to the number of marginal subsistenee families
(p of ACCESS with POORHOUSE = .34). In fact, ACCESS was the only antecedent
variable in the system which showed a positive relationship to substandard
housing.
The premise linking the discussion of increasing economic disparity
with the following discussion of social heterogeneity is that social relation-
ships change as economic relationships change. When a community is economically
homogeneous, an important source of competitiveness, class distinction, envy,
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and conflict of interest is absent. As economic heterogeneity increases,
so does.the incidence of those undesirable social phenomena. The premise
is not new to this study.
Because we did not gather systematic attitudinal data, we do not know
the extent or the exact nature of changes in social perceptions as economic
differentiation within the village increases. Conversations with villagers
on related topics suggest (not surprisingly) that villagers themselves do not
consciously perceive changes in social interactions occuring because of
economic changes within the village. There were, however, two observational
indications that such changes might already be taking place.
In low-investment villages, even those with moderately high levels
of apparent economic disparity, income groups appeared to be scattered ran-
domly about the village. A large, solid house might be found next to the
smallest mat shanty in the village. This economic formlessness in the layout
of the village generally characterized villages up through average and even
above average investment levels. But in villages with very high INVESTMENT
scores, housing patterns often did appear, with distinguishable high-rent
districts and a wrong side of the tracks. In one community divided by a
main highway, all of the small, mat houses were concentrated on one side of
the road; all of the large wooden houses on the other side. In another
village, the poorest houses were concentrated on a hill. In a third, all of
the best houses lined the road; the further back from the road, the poorer
the house.
Inquiries revealed that the phenomenon was not the result of recent
in-migration by poor outsiders. The poor families had roots in the village
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as deep as the richer ones. Either they had "always" been poor or, frequent-
ly, they had recently suffered some misfortune, miscalculation, or both,
which had resulted in the loss of the family's land holdings. Typical was
the case of one young couple living in a small leaf hut on the outskirts of
the village with the second highest INVESTMENT score out of the forty-one
villages. The husband's father had sold his land for what had seemed a
fortune, with the intention of purchasing cheaper land elsewhere. But the
cheaper land turned out to be more expensive than he had thought, and some
injudicious purchases ate into the capital, and now the son and his wife
work as hired labor for other farmers in the village.
A second indication that social relationships within the village may
be changing as a result of changes in economic relationships is found in
the indicator of upkeep of village houses used for the TITHING index. It
will be remembered that the YARDS indicator was created in order to measure
the combination of a high average in the upkeep of house compounds and high
uniformity of upkeep within the village. YARDS was argued to reflect an
overall state of high community morale, esprit, and a certain sense of
obligation to do one's part in maintaining the appearance of the community.
In order to further explore the possible effects of economic differen-
tiation on social perceptions, the data used to score YARDS were applied to
an additional variable, labelled SLUM. SLUM refers to the combination of
substandard housing and slovenly housing -- that is, the percentage of sub-
standard houses (as defined for POORHOUSE) which were rated "3" or Lower on
the nine-point scale of compound upkeep. Since we shall be relating SLUM to
TITHING, the question arises whether the correlation is inflated by a spur-
ious relationship to one component of TITHING, YARDS. A detailed discussion
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is included in the notes.7 Its basic conclusion is-that the correlation
between SLUM and TITHING can be taken at face value for our purposes.
The source of the label "SLUM," is the slum mentality observed so
widely in the West: the state of not only being poor but feeling poor as
well, with little or no hope of being able to change the situation. A high
SLUM score is very suggestive that the poorest families in a Thai village
have taken on that outlook. The correlations of SLUM with the antecedent
variables in the sequence are reported in table 5.4.
TABLE 5.4 Correlations of slum outlook with the antecedent variables
in the modernization sequence.
SLUM
NATRES .11
SOCFAC .12
ECOPS .00
ACCESS .19
INVESTMENT .24
DISPARITY .18
RICHHOUSE .22
POORHOUSE .10
As the table indicates, the bivariate correlations of SLUM with the
antecedent variables are low. But as in the case of substandard and superior
housing, we are primarily interested in the patterns of relationship within
the system. The place of the slum outlook in the causal map is shown in
the detail (figure 5.7) from the overall diagram.
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FIGURE 5.7 Causal map of the links between income distribution and
social stresses within the village.
The box, "new potential for conflicts of interest" has obvious political
implications. As conflicts of interest increase, it follows that governance
becomes more difficult and more subject to deformations out of personal
interests on the part of the leaders. We will leave the discussion of that
step until later, when we shall reach the same conclusion from a separate
chain of events. For now, consider what happens when the links in figure
5.7 are operationalized by inserting SLUM as a proxy for "demoralization at
the bottom," as shown in figure 5.8.
DISPARITY
-.08
POORHOUSE .27 s-SLUM
.41
RICHHOUSE
FIGURE 5.8 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map
in figure 5.7.
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The path coefficients suggest that simple economic disparity did not
in itself push the slum outlook among the lowest income groups, as long
as the disparity was.concentrated within the middle income ranges. They
suggest instead that it was imbalances at the extremes, and particularly
at the rich extreme, that was the primary source of the (apparent) don't-
give-a-damn behaviors among the very poor: p of RICHHOUSE with SLUM = .41,
p of DISPARITY with SLUM = -. 08.
This completes the first of three lines of argument connecting
unchanneled exposure to modernization with outcomes that are stressful to
the village as a political and social community. We have focused on village-
wide effects: changes in the structure of the village. For summary purposes,
the pieces of the causal map are connected in figure 5.9 on the following
page.
Now we turn to the second line, focusing on the effects of moderniza-
tion on individuals within the village who might ordinarily be expected to
counteract the disruptive tendencies we have been describing.
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FIGURE 5.9 Summary of the first line of the argument linking unchanneled exposure to
modernization with deterioration in the functional capacity of the village.
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Line II: The Increased Value of a Vi Zagerfs Time
We return again to the point at which the villager has been exposed
to modernizing influences. This time we will focus on the individual villager
who does decide to invest. The proposition is that for the investing villager,
the value of time increases. Even after the subsistence harvest could have
been sown, reaped, and stored, he has things to do. As the headman cited
earlier said, he can no longer just sit around during the dry season --
there are too many things to buy in the stores.
Nor does time become more valuable only during the dry season. When
the villager has decided to supplement his subsistence rice crop with a
cash crop, a part-time job, or one of the other sources of extra income, his
hours lengthen during the growing season as well.
A number of indicators are available that villagers are busier than
they used to be, although none were quantified. One of the most consistent
emerged as a by-product of trying to conduct village research: the avail-
ability of villagers for interviews varied with the village's level of
investment. In all villages, the rainy season is a busy time and the
village is nearly deserted during the day. Most interviewing has to be
done at night. But during the dry season in low investment villages, it
is customary to find a number of male adults relaxing or doing minor chores
around the house compound. It is reasonable to expect a full day of inter-
viewing. But in high investment villages, the same assumption is not reason-
able. Particularly if the respondents are village leaders, it turns out that
they are in the fields or, very commonly, in the district town on business.
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In high investment villages, most of the interviewing has to be done at night,
rainy season or dry.
Another indication of the trend was obtained from the re-study in 1973
of villages first visited in 1968. In all four cases, we had a pervasive
impression of a higher level of activity in the village: more people going
to town more often, more construction underway, more activity in the house
compounds -- weaving, charcoal-making, peppers being dried for sale, silk-
worms being raised, kitchen gardens, and in general more coming and going
than in 1968.
The reduction of leisure time is in itself a major change for a people
who can call sitting alone, doing nothing as "nang Zen" -- "sitting for fun."
To speed up the pace of Thai life is to change some of its most fundamental
characteristics. But there are a number of more directly political conse-
quences of the increased value of time as well.
When time takes on value, it becomes harder to justify contributing
labor to built a neighbor's house, or to dig a roadbed, or to help track
down a buffalo thief. There is less time to help design a new temple or
to prepare the decorations for a community ceremony. If one man's time has
more value than another's, a simple trade of time for purposes of mutual
help becomes unworkable, and so it becomes more reasonable to hire or to
sell labor than to exchange it or to contribute it.
This latter phenomenon was apparent in the case histories of develop-
ment projects. It has been customary for some years to set the labor com-
ponent of a project in terms of contributions per household: so many cubic
meters of dirt to be dug per household, or so many clay bricks fired per
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household, or so many days of labor per household. If a villager did not
want to do the work himself, he was free to hire someone else to do it for
him. In high investment villages, this option appeared to be increasingly
popular. In the three villages rated highest on the investment index, not a
single project had taken place in the last five years which involved a gen-
eral contribution of labor by the members of the community.
The substitution of money for labor does not necessarily cripple
the village's capacity to undertake community projects. But it does repre-
sent a higher cost of contributing. The traditional commodity, time, had
been free. Because the cost is higher, villager support for community pro-
jects tends to become more fragile, and more susceptible to interruption.
A clear example of this occurred in a high-investment village which
decided four years ago to build a simple wooden temple. The project has
been sustained entirely by money contributions; to the best of our knowledge,
no villager has donated labor. At the time of the research (after four
years, for a simple project) the job was almost done. All that remained
was to nail up the boards for the side of the temple. The lumber was already
at the site, the nails were at the site -- and the work was at a standstill
because, the headman told us, the wat committee could not collect enough
money to hire someone to nail the boards in place. Why not just collect
a few volunteers and finish off the work? Because, the headman said, no
one would agree -- the villagers had no time.
The most important political effect of the increased value of time
is not, however, what it does to contributions from the population at large.
Rather, it lies in its tendency to siphon off the talents of the potential
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leadership group of the village.
The position of headman is expensive and time-consuming. So also to
a lesser degree are the other leadership positions in the village. A leader
is not only expected to be on call for any villager, any time;: he also must
expend serious money (for a villager) in the course of pursuing his official
duties -- entertaining visiting officials, paying for his uniform, donating
example-setting amounts to village projects and festivals. The honorarium
that the headman and his two assistants receive seldom covers expenses. The
only compensation has been the respect and prestige that go with the jobs,
and perhaps a certain amount of merit which is stored up for credit in the
next incarnation.
In the traditional village, such compensation was usually enough
to ensure that the most able men in the village occupied recognized positions
as leaders -- not always, by any means, but usually. And in every village,
including the most traditional ones, the same complaints are heard that
being a leader is a burden, a constant source of aggravation, a duty from
which the respondent would like to be relieved. But regardless of the com-
plaints, to be a good headman or a good advisor has traditionally meant that
the incumbent was stuck with the job. One may speculate that this reflects
more job satisfaction than the leader feels free to admit, as well as
submission to the call of duty.
In high investment villages, the formerly high costs of being a
village leader go even higher; and at the same time, the sources of satis-
faction may well become less important.
The first of these statements is derived from a number of cases in
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the research when successful and enthusiastic village investors were find-
ing village leadership to be an unacceptably expensive luxury. They tended
to use one of three remedies: refuse to serve at all; serve without devoting
much energy to it, or serve and use the position for private profit.
The evidence for the first option, refusing to accept positions,
usually emerged by accident. While staying in the village, an observer
would notice that one obviously rich villager (obvious because he owned a
tractor or truck or an expensive house) played no leadership role, ask
why, and find that the man ihrquestion had refused all nominations to official
positions and had discouraged any informal role as well.
Another indication that able men, or at least men thought to be
able, were refusing positions was found in the responses of villagers to
the question, "Why was X chosen for his position?" In low investment and
moderate investment villages, the answers tended to be of the "He is a smart
man," or "He is a pious man," or "He is a good talker" variety. In one way
or another, the respondents addressed the question of qualifications for the
job. In high investment villages, an answer was frequently given which was
never heard in low investment villages: "He was chosen because he has spare
time."
Finally, there was the occasional very direct statement of the relation-
ship between investment and unwillingness to serve. The clearest of these
examples was the headman who resigned his position after three years in office,
then resumed it two years later. He was asked to explain the gap. He replied
that he had quit in order to make money. He had a son whom he wished to
send to secondary school in Bangkok, and being headman took too much of his
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time. Later, when the son was already in school, the villagers prevailed
upon him to become headman again. He had agreed, reluctantly, but was once
again trying to resign. The reason was to have more time to invest in his
livilihood, even though he was already extremely well-off by village
standards.
The evidence for the second option, serving without devoting much
time or energy to it, was comprised of two types. First, it was noticed that
assistant headmen in high investment villages had substantially fewer duties
than men in the same positions in a lower investment village of the same
size and characteristics. Assistants in the high investment villages tended
to give nonspecific answers to questions about their function -- "I help
the headman in whatever he needs" -- which upon closer examination seemed
to be another way of saying that he did nothing much at all. In the top-
ranked village on the investment index, a harder indicator was available:
the two assistants had a rotation system, one month on and one month off.
There was not, said the headman, enough work to keep both of them busy.
Assistants in the lower ranked villages on investment often were able to
list specific, regular duties. Sometimes these were fit within a relatively
complex administrative framework: one assistant for administration of daily
affairs, another for overseeing the organization of village-wide projects;
or, in one case of a village on the bank of the Mekong river, an assistant
to keep track of the night guard-duty roster for the boat pen. Sometimes
the village had independently instituted these kinds of divisions of labor,
sometimes they had been instigated by a CD worker. The main point is that
"lack of'-ork" for leaders seemed to beacon'entrated in the high investment
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villages.
A second type of evidence that village leaders in high investment
villages were reducing their work load emerged from the narratives which
were obtained about settlement of disputes and petty crime.
Of all the headman's duties, that of keeping peace from day to day
ranks high, and perhaps highest, on most villagers' list of priorities.
As we noted in Chapter IV, it was consistently cited as a primary source
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a headman's performance. It is also
one of the most appropriate duties for a village headman. The upcountry
judicial capacity of the RTG is spread very thin. That it functions at
all depends on the ability of the village to weed out all but the most im-
portant civil disputes and criminal offenses. And beyond that, the village
is clearly the place where special circumstances are best known and (given
a fair judge) can best be taken into account. 8
In view of this, it is significant that headmen in high investment
villages appeared to be readier than their more traditional counterparts to
send villagers to the hamlet police station or district office when petty
crimes and disputes arose. Again, it must be emphasized that we are dealing
with scattered cases in the highest investment villages of the sample: the
headman or another respondent would occasionally tell of a case being referred
to the police or the district which, in less modernized villages, were
settled locally except in the most obviously exceptional circumstances (e.g.,
the case of the chicken thief who was the headman's brother in Pat Pong).
The curiosity was not that the district and the police were being called
in frequently on petty disputes and crimes, but that they were ever called
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in, when the issue was one that would result in a reprimand if settled in
the village but a jail term if taken to the police.
To this point we have argued that a sequence of events following
from investment occurs roughly as shown in figure 5.10 below:
value of
time in-
/creasesvillager
investment
decreased labor substitution increased in-
support for vil- --l-of money for -- consistency
lage projects labor support of support
refusal to accept
positions
increased costs\ nholding pub- decreased effortof hosins by village leaderslic positions
increased temptation
-to use position for
private profit
FIGURE 5.10 Causal map of the links between villager investment and
deterioration of support for public goods and positions.
The third option resulting from the increased costs of holding public
office, "increased temptation to use position for private profit," will be
discussed with the third line of the argument.
There is no corresponding path model for the diagram in figure 5.10.
The nature of the evidence was anecdotal and descriptive, as the preceding
discussion indicated. None of the boxes were susceptible to quantitative
treatment through the available data.
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Line III: Concentration of Leadership Among an Economic EZite
The third line connecting unchanneled exposure to modernization with
deterioration in village functionalism continues to focus on the leadership
group; now, with the emphasis on their economic position in relation to
the average villager's.
The first line of the causal chain ended with the argument that
investment and exposure to modernizing influences work in tandem to
produce socioeconomic differentiation which in turn increases the potential
for conflicts of interest. This potential is heightened by the leadership's
entanglement in the differentiation.
Thai villagers traditionally have respected wealth and chosen their
leaders partially on the basis of economic standing within the community.
In view of the money costs associated with some of those positions, it has
not been an unreasonable criterion. But the more persuasive consideration
appears to be that a man smart enough to be headman or a committeeman also
should be smart enough to maintain a prosperous household.
As we have already discussed in detail, modernization and investment
are apparently being accompanied by substantially increased economic dis-
parity; moreover, the disparity is being increased largely by the enlargement
of the upper income groups. In sum, the villager who always tended to pick
his leaders partially on the basis of wealth now has a larger and more
clearly delineated "rich" group of villagers from which to choose. Even if
those men are also becoming more reluctant to accept village offices (and
that phenomenon is still scattered among the very high investment villages,
as noted earlier), the net effect is that leaders tend to be chosen from
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among an economic elite of successful investors.
Two separate assertions are involved, and each was susceptible to
quantitative tests.
The first assertion is that leaders are being drawn from among the
successful investors. Two measures of the investment behavior among leaders
were devised. First, we asked what proportion of the leadership group had
moved away from agricultural subsistence farming. The variable is labelled
NOFARM, and it refers to the percentage of village leaders whose predominate
source of income is nonagricultural. The second variable is concerned with
agricultural investment as well as commercial or service investments. It
is labelled NEWINC (for "new income"), and it represents the leaders' mean
annual income derived from non-crop sources; e.g., livestock, stores, seri-
culture, rental of equipment.
The correlations of non-farming leaders and new leader income with
the antecedent variables in the causal chain are shown in table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5 Correlations of non-farming leaders (NOFARM) and mean leader
investment income (NEWINC) with the antecedent variables in
the modernization sequence.
NOFARM NEWINC
NATRES .06 .18
SOCFAC .18 .21
ECOPS .29 .27
ACCESS .35 .15
INVESTMENT .42 .52
DISPARITY .39 .57
NOFARM -- .66
The correlations support the view that investing villages tend to choose
investing leaders (r of INVESTMENT with NOFARM = .42) and, more importantly,
they tend to choose successful investing leaders (r of INVESTMENT with
NEWINC = .52; r of NOFARM with NEWINC = .66).
The second assertion is that the gap between leaders and led is
increasing as well. This proved difficult to test directly in the absence
of detailed information (comparable to that obtained from the leaders in a
village) on mean wealth among the non-leader population in a given village
of the sample. An indirect test was possible, and is described below.
The only available economic datum about the general village population
was the mean landholding of a random sample of ten percent of the households
9
in each village. In order to use landholdings as the basis for a compari-
son of leader versus non-leader wealth, two complications had to be dealt with.
First, increments of one unit of land mean different things in dif-
ferent places. The leaders in village X may have three times as much land
as the average villager in X, but be very little richer if the land is unusable
scrub. The leaders in Y may have only twenty-five percent more land than
the average villager in Y, and be much richer -- if the extra land is located
on rich bottomland.
Second, most successful nonagricultural investors were designated as
leaders by the respondents in the village, despite their reluctance (as
noted earlier) to accept the headman or assistant positions in very high
investment villages. But these same men, who are often the richest men in
the village, also frequently have very small amounts of land -- their money
is being made from the market, not the rice fields. The comparison of
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leaders and non-leaders on landholdings misses that source of wealth, and
most of it is concentrated among the leader group. The result is severe
underestimation of real leader wealth, particularly in villages with high
scores on NOFARM (non-farming leaders).
The first problem was not amenable to a wholly satisfactory solution.
It was, however, substantially reduced by the following procedure. The
mean and standard deviation of landholdings among the random sample of
heads of household were calculated for each village. Then the mean land-
holding of the leader group for that village was expressed as if it were
a standardized score based on the parameters from the random sample.
The resulting "proxy z-score" is labelled GAP, and it refers to the mag-
nitude of the economic gap between Zeaders and non-leaders, measured in
terms of landholdings.1 0
The second complication, that any landholding measure underestimates
the true wealth of the leader group, is treated more easily. The path
model should treat both leader investment income (NEWINC) and percentage
of non-farmers mong the leader population (NOFARM) as causes of the gap
between leaders and led, recognizing that NOFARM's negative relationship
with GAP reflects the characteristics of the measure of the economic gap,
not the construct itself.
GAP attempts to measure the magnitude of the average difference between
leader and led. A second variable is needed to measure the extent to which
leaders are being drawn exclusively from an above-average income group.
Again the landholding data have to be used, and the same cautions apply.
The variable to measure economic non-representativeness among the
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leader group is labelled ELITE, and is defined as the percentage of leaders
whose landholdings are larger than the mean landholding of the random sample.
The place of the two variables, GAP and ELITE, in the chain of events
leading to deterioration of functional capacity is squarely in the middle
of the other two lines. At the same time that socioeconomic differentiation
is occuring within the village, and at the same time that the leaders' com-
mitments of time and energy and enthusiasm are dwindling, two economic
trends within the leadership group make it less likely that they will respond
to the new problems or resist new temptations. First, their economic
interests become more widely separated from those of the village as a whole;
second, their own intra-group interests become more homogeneous. The
hypothesized sequence of events is shown in the detail below.
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FIGURE 5.11 Causal map of the links between economic disparity and
economic distance between the leadership and the village.
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The correlations of ELITE and GAP -- the extent of leadership domina-
tion by an economic elite, and the magnitude of the gap between them and
the rest of the village -- with the rest of the variables in the path model
are shown in table 5.6 below. With only a few exceptions, the correlations
TABLE 5.6 Correlations of a leadership economic elite and magnitude
of the economic gap between leaders and the village average,
with the antecedent variables in the modernization sequence.
ELITE GAP
NATRES .20 .30
SOCFAC .24 .08
ECOPS -.10 -.20
ACCESS .11 .02
INVESTMENT .05 .12
DISPARITY .15 .13
RICHHOUSE -.09 -.04
POORHOUSE .40 .24
NEWINC .27 .08
NOFARM -.02 -.18
ELITE -- .60
are insignificant, consistent with the earlier discussion about the limita-
tions of landholdings as a measure of wealth. Some of the very rich leaders
have very little land. Much of the non-crop income requires very little
land. In this kind of situation, the path coefficients become particularly
useful. The operationalized aspects of the diagram in figure 5.11 are shown
in the continuation of the path model (figure 5.12) on the following page.
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FIGURE 5.12 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map
in figure 5.11.
As expected, percent of non-farmer leaders (NOFARM) has a negative relation-
ship to both measures of leader wealth relative to the rest of the village.
But the measure of mean leader income from non-crop sources (NEWINC) does show a
strongly positive relationship. And it should be considered a conservative
estimate: NEWINC also contains pertinent information about leader income
that GAP and ELITE systematically ignore. It is quite plausible to expect
that a better measure of villager income -- that is, one not limited to
landholdings -- would further substantiate that modernization is bringing
with it village leaders who are decreasingly representative of the village
as a whole, in economic terms.
Tying It All Together
We come now to the point at which the outcomes stemming from unchan-
neled exposure to modernization, and particularly investment, begin to
interlock. The same forces that lead to a greater potential for intra-
village conflicts of interest also tend to produce a leadership which has a
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vested interest on one side of those conflicts. The same phenomena which
make it more expensive for villagers to devote time to community efforts
also make it less likely that their leaders will ask sacrifices from them.
At the same time that the lowest income groups in the village are likely
to be demoralized by the increasing gap between them and their more for-
tunate neighbors, the leaders who could serve to counter that demoralization
are exposed to greater temptations than ever before to use their positions
for their own benefit, not the community's.
Eight separate negative outcomes shown in previous diagrams are listed
together and consolidated into four categories in figure 5.13 below:
increased inconsistency of support reduced scope for
for village development projects community-wide efforts
-- srefusal to accept official positions - decreased competency of
.. decreased effort by village leaders village leaders
.increased temptation to use
positions for private profit
greater interest difference between greater potential for abuses
leaders and led by the village leadership
greater homogeneity of interests
within the leadership group
greater potential for intra-
-vvillage conflicts of interest ' - increased divisiveness of
village response to actions
demoralization among the bottom - t taken by the leadership
income groups
FIGURE 5.13 Consolidation of the outcomes leading to deterioration in
the functional capacity of the village.
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These are the ultimate outcomes from the modernization sequence, and
the ones which are argued to occur relatively late in time as well. Evidence
touching on some of them -- inconsistency of support, refusal to accept
positions, decreased effort by village leaders, demoralization -- has already
been discussed. But we have as yet said little about perhaps the most
disrupting of all the outcomes, "greater potential for abuses by the village
leadership;" for that outcome is not traceable to any single line of the
chain, but draws from all three of them.
The problem should not be confused with the occasionally corrupt head-
man who can appear in any context, modern or traditional. Rather, the question
is whether the dynamics of modernization are tending to subvert the integrity
of village leadership. Presumably the best place to test the hypothesis
would be in villages near Bangkok, exposed to modernization much longer
than the villages in our sample. But even in the forty-one villages, a few
signs are worth citing.
Consider as an example the village with the highest INVESTMENT score
among the forty-one in the sample. During the last five years before the
research it had completed only one project on its own: a concrete dam
thrown across a stream near the village. Only one project in five years
is in itself well below the average for the sample (the village's TITHING
score was sixth from the bottom), but the more important inferences come
from the nature of the project and the way it was carried out.
The dam diverts most of the flow from a stream which runs through
the fields of many villagers but does not (in its natural course) provide
water for the wealthier members of the community. They were the sponsors
of the dam project -- one of them owned the land bordering the stream where
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the dam was constructed -- and they carried it out themselves, without
participation by other members of the village. They also maintain it
through the mechanism of a "water association," a type of group responsi-
bility for maintenance of irrigation systems that is common throughout many
parts of rural Thailand. They also sharply cut the supply of water available
to villagers who do not have access to the irrigation system.
The same men who built the dam also happen to hold the leadership
positions in the community: all of the men designated as leaders are
menbers of the water association. They also live in a single, clearly
defined part of town, along the main highway.
The dual facts of their leadership positions and proximity as neigh-
bors may have had a bearing on a second project which was being considered
at the time of the research. The Electric Authority had advised the head-
man that the village could tap into the main electrical lines running along
the highway, and gave him an estimate of the cost required to string wires
throughout the village. The village committee met to consider the Electric
Authority's estimate. And it was decided that stringing the wires to all
of the houses in the village would be too expensive and too much trouble.
Why not just wire the houses along the road, where it was easy and cheap?
So the members of the committee get electricity; the rest of the village
does not.
In another high investment village, the houses of the community are
divided by a river. There is no bridge. It also happens that all but one
of the official positions are filled by people who live on the side of the
river that has access to a road. Three years ago, budget money for a bridge
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was offered by the district office, and a health center was built in its
place.
The decision to build the health center instead of the bridge may or
may not have been in the best interests of the village as a whole. It is
certain, however, that it was in the headman's best interests. He is him-
self an active investor, and ambitious for his children. One of them, a
daughter, had been sent to school for training as a midwife. She will now
come back to work in the health center which was built instead of the bridge,
and make several hundred baht a month -- or so her father expects -- even
though the official salary for a midwife is only a fraction of that. The
advantages of this situation for the headman are freely pointed out by the
people who live on the other side of the river.
Examples like these are not black and white. Decisions are being
made on the basis of normal human self-interests. None of the three pro-
jects above involved a sin as simple as graft. Instead, it is suggested
that they are glimpses of the kinds of problems that follow from the
chain of events we have been outlining in these pages: for a variety of
reasons, modernization and investment increase-the opportunities and the
inclination to use village positions to further personal interests.
The correlations of the expression of village functionalism, TITHING,
with the rest of the variables in the model are shown in table 5.7 on the
following page. The three correlations significant at the .01 level are
TITHING with size of the bare-subsistence population (-.45), with concentra-
tion of leadership positions among an economic elite (-.32), and with exis-
-158-
TABLE 5.7 Correlations of village functionalism with the antecedent
variables in the modernization sequence.
TITHING
NATRES -.11
SOCFAC .00
ECOPS -.01
ACCESS -.16
INVESTMENT .02
DISPARITY -.04
RICHHOUSE .10
POORHOUSE -.45
SLUM -.61.
NOFARM .17
NEWINC .03
GAP -.23
ELITE -.32
tence of a slum outlook among the poorest segments of the village (-.61).
Two of those three variables (SLUM and ELITE) are directly linked to TITHING
in the path model which operationalizes -- to a very limited and proximate
extent at this point -- the causal map. The third variable with a direct
link to TITHING is GAP, which measured the magnitude of the economic gap
between leaders and the village at large. The path coefficients are shown
in figure 5.14 below.
-GAP
-. 10
ELITE 27 1 TITHING
- a SLUM
FIGURE 5.14 Path model of the operationalized variables from the map
in figure 5.13.
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Of the three variables, demoralization among the poorest strata of
the villages, represented by SLUM, would appear to have a clearly negative
effect on a village's functional capacity. How much this coefficient would
drop if the feedback loop were calculated is unknown; certainly it would
drop to some extent, since low levels of functionalism must reinforce the
demoralization process.
The measures of economic differences between leaders and led (GAP
and ELITE) were only moderately associated with low levels of tithing behav-
ior, and together they account for only 10.1% of the variance in TITHING.
The -.45 correlation between TITHING and size of the bare-subsistence
population (POORHOUSE) is not matched by a direct causal link in the map,
and consequently not in the path model either. The map focused on the
relationship of modernization to village functionalism; presumably poverty
has the same direct effects on functionalism in the traditional and in the
modern cases. But disregarding its irrelevance to the special concerns of
the causal map, the correlation makes very good sense. Poverty in itself
should be expected to degrade the functional capacity of the village. This
is an expectation taken straight from the literature on peasant social inter-
actions in the scarcity environment, as reviewed in Chapter II. It also helps
answer the question, what were the causes of variance in functionalism prior
to the onset of modernization?
In a purely statistical sense, then, the three variables said to
be encouraged by modernization and directly debilitating to village function-
alism -- SLUM, GAP, and ELITE -- explain 48.0% of the variance in TITHING.
When a fourth variable, POORHOUSE, is hypothesized to be a general negative
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influence on village functionalism in both the traditional and modern cases,
and is added into the equation, 55.8% of the variance in TITHING is explained.
But as we stressed at the outset of the analysis, the latest stages
in the interaction between unchanneled exposure to modernization and func-
tional capacity are also the ones for which the quantitative data are most
tenuously representative of the dynamics hypothesized to be at work. To
conclude that we can "explain" 48% or 56% of the variance in functional
capacity is both to overstate and understate the situation. It is an over-
statement in that the correlations did not represent wholly one-way causa-
tion, and in that the operational variables do not exactly represent the
constructs in the causal map. But it is equally an understatement: eight
outcomes were argued to be encouraged by unchanneled exposure to moderniza-
tion, and to be directly inimicable to a village's functional capacity.
Only three of those were even incompletely expressed in quantitative form.
The presentations of the causal map and the path model are finally
completed in figures 5.15 and 5.16 on the following pages, as all the
pieces from the separate diagrams are shown together. They serve as a
summary of what has been a long and complex description. But as the
discussion moves to a consideration of channeled exposure to modernization
and functional capacity, perhaps the best summary of the argument is this:
an analysis of the consequences of unchanneled exposure is of some help in
understanding why functional capacity is low. But neither the qualitative nor
the quantitative variables in that sequence inform the other side of the
question: what makes functional capacity high?
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FIGURE 5.15 The completed causal map.
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FIGURE 5.16 The completed path model operationalizing the causal map in figure 5.15.
B: Channeled Exposure and the Functional Village
We have just described what might be called "the natural course of
events" for rural modernization. Developing countries like Thailand
naturally tend to build infrastructure in the form of schools and health
centers, roads and electrification and irrigation systems. Economic
opportunities from the private sector naturally tend to expand into the
rural areas, and the growth of district and provincial towns naturally
tends to bring urban-like influences to formerly isolated areas.
These were the inputs that went into the calculation of the quan-
titative variables used in the analysis. None of them were significantly,
positively related to the measure of functional capacity, TITHING. Or to
put it another way, the data indicate that there is nothing in the natural
course of modernization that works in favor of good village government. The
highest positive correlation between TITHING and the thirteen antecedent
variables in the model was .17 (see table 5.7).
On these grounds alone, it is immediately provocative that we have
called "channeled exposure" to modernization is significantly, positively
related to the tithing index. TITHING's correlation with community develop-
ment inputs (CDINPUT) was +.35, and its correlation with training programs
for village leaders (TRAINING) was +.37. Moreover, the relationship
between channeled exposure and functional capacity was most conspicuous
for villages at the higher levels of unchanneled exposure to modernization,
as shown in table 5.8 on the following page.
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TABLE 5.8 Mean TITHING scores for different combinations of
channeled and unchanneled exposure to modernization.
+.14 +.24
high
Channeled exposure n=10 n=12
to modernization
-. 07 -. 49
low
n=7 n=12
low high
Unchanneled exposure
to modernization
Notes:
* Cell entries are mean TITHING scores for the n villages
in that category.
* "Low" is defined as less than zero on the summed standardized
scores for that type of exposure (CDINPUT + TRAINING for
channeled exposure; SOCFAC + ECOPS + ACCESS for unchanneled
exposure. "High" is defined as greater than zero on those
same summed scores. No village in the sample was exactly
zero on either type of exposure.
Interpreting the numbers in the table, development and training inputs
for this sample had these effects:
If the village was relatively isolated from unchanneled exposure,
channeled inputs were associated with a modest rise in functional capacity,
from a -.07 mean TITHING score to a +.14 mean score. But the change was
so modest that it was almost no change at all; remember the comments in
Chapter IV about the insensitivity of the TITHING index to qualitative
differences in functional capacity when small increments are involved. But
for villages rated "high" on unchanneled exposure to modernization, it
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made a clearly noticeable difference whether the village had or had not
received channeled inputs -- from a -. 49 mean TITHING score for villages
low on channeled exposure to a +.24 mean score for high villages. The
implication, and a surprising one in view of channeled exposure's nil effect
on investment behaviors, is that in the natural course of events moderniza-
tion brings on a sharp drop in functional capacity, but one which the inter-
vention of RTG inputs can not only brake but reverse.
To state the implication assumes that the relationship between
channeled exposure and TITHING is a causal one. And if it is causal, it
should be possible to identify the mechanisms at work. What is it about
development and training inputs that raises the TITHING measure of a village's
functional capacity?
The logical first answer is that the inputs are doing what the
RTG thinks they are doing: teaching villagers new techniques through thb
training courses, and giving them practical experience through the adminis-
tration of development projects under the tutelage of the government's CD
workers. It is a new variation of the "tutorial hypothesis" that we examined
in relationship to the adoption of investment practices, in Chapter III.
A second explanation will be considered as well: that the provision
of development inputs and training programs interacts with the characteristics
of village leadership -- not in an educational sense, but by altering the
content of being a village leader, and evoking responses that would other-
wise cease to occur as modernization in the private sector proceeded. To
put it simply, we will suggest that development assistance raises the stakes
for village positions, and keeps them vital and competitive with the distrac-
tions of private investment.
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The Tutorial Hypothesis Revisited
Some aspects of channeled exposure have an intrinsic educational
component. Many of the training programs deal with subject matter that
is unfamiliar to villagers. Many of the development projects use technology
or concepts that are unfamiliar to villagers. So insofar as the training
instructions are remembered and the technology is understood, the tutorial
explanation must have some validity.
But it is extremely difficult for a person who has observed village
training programs and their aftermath to persuade himself that the educa-
tional component accounts for the statistically significant correlation
between them and the tithing index. To begin with, only half of the
programs that went into the calculation of the TRAINING variable had any-
thing to do with village self-governance. Of the 515 training experiences
reported by the leader respondents, 240 (46.6%) were general leadership
training (most of them for the Developing Democracy Program or for village
development committee training). Another twenty (3.9%) dealt specifically
with health or education, but are presumed to have relevance to leader
decisions in those areas. The others were concerned with agricultural
innovations, technical training, and a wide variety of topics related
to economic improvement.
But beyond this consideration, even those training sessions that
did deal with leadership skills were not necessarily learning experiences.
Often, respondents told us that they had not even understood most of the
presentations, because the speakers had used central dialect. The central
dialect is understood by most Northern and Northeastern village leaders when
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spoken slowly and applied to everyday subjects. But spoken rapidly and
about unfamiliar topics, the average respondent told us that he could catch
only the gist of the speech, if that. And even if the speaker used the
local dialect or the audience understood central Thai, meetings were often
so soporific that the audience was barely awake. And finally, it is not at
all clear that the leadership programs were teaching anything new to their
leader students. As we shall discuss shortly, Thai villagers are not
necessarily lagging behind the Thai government in understanding the workings
of democratic and community action.
These comments should not be read as a blanket denial that training
programs have any educational value. Sometimes presentations were effective;
sometimes they raised questions and possibilities that villagers probably
had not considered on their own; and sometimes subsequent conversations
around the village would indicate that the lessons of the training session
were being remembered and absorbed for future application. But the overall
effects of the training programs in changing the-way that village leaders
operate appeared to be minimal.
What of the training value of the community development inputs? As
in other developing countries, the RTG expects the leading benefits of
CD to include educational ones. Community development is expected to be
"an instrument for training the people in self-government and democracy,"
as one Thai development official put it. 1 1 But in this as in the effects
of training programs, the tutorial explanation of the correlation between
CD inputs and TITHING is hard to justify; for one of the most striking
features of the Thai village is the existence of administrative, managerial
capacity that appears to antedate contact with development assistance from
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the government. It is difficult to find ways in which the current RTG
development efforts have offered better ideas for village governance than
the village has already picked up from other sources on its own. Some
examples follow.
In the discussion of Khao Soi (Chapter IV), it was mentioned in pass-
ing that villagers were assessed different amounts for development pro-
ject costs, depending on a household's ability to pay and the advantage
that it would derive from the completed project. This type of system was
not unique to Khao Soi. It occurred in other villages of the Northeast,
and was observed in an even more complex form in Chiang Rai province, six
hundred kilometers away. There, several villages visited during this
study had for many years maintained a standing classification of each house-
hold in the village as belonging to one of four economic groups: rich,
average, poor, or destitute. The ratings were kept in the headman's books,
and whenever the village sponsored a ceremony, festival, or project, costs
were varied according to the four groupings. If a villager believed that
he had been put in the wrong category, or if his economic situation
changed, he appealed to the Wat committee for reclassification.
The question asked in each of these villages was, where did the idea
originate? The practice was too "modern," too systematically, organized,
and too apt to the peculiar problems of paying for self-help development
projects to be accidental. The mystery was deepened by the fact that the
system was first observed in an exceptionally isolated village, with no
history of development assistance from the RTG.
Piecing together the answers from several villages in the same hamlet,
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it seems that the idea was spread by a highly respected headman, some twenty
or thirty years ago. He had instituted the system in his own village, and
its use had been adopted in neighboring villages on the basis of its
success. But how it occurred to the headman to start the system is not
known.
Other startlingly modern-appearing procedures surface in Thai villages.
Rotating work crews, with separate crew chiefs reporting to an overall
labor supervisor who reports to the headman: this kind of elaborate organ-
izational system was used repeatedly by villages which had neverbeen instruct
ed in it by a Thai development worker. In one case, a village which was too
poor to pay for brickmakers hit upon the idea of hiring one to teach a
three-man committee of villagers (the village could afford that much of the
brickmaker's time), who in turn taught the rest of the villagers. When a
village decided to build a temple, it appointed a design committee to visit
other temples in the district, and report on the type of design best suited
to the village's size and budget. Frequently, villages purchasing their
own materials for a project would systematically check the prices in several
district towns before settling on a supplier. And almost without exception
villages maintained detailed account books of community expenditures, com-
plete with receipts. If the village maintained a community fund, it was
usually kept in a bank. in a district town, in an account held jointly by
three of the most respected men in the village, all of whose signature were
required in order to make a withdrawal.
In any of these cases, the advice of government officials may have been
the source of the practice; but, if so, it was ad hoc advice, Community
development workers will testify that they as often get their ideas for
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organization from the villagers as they do from their own department. 1 2
Quantitative analysis of this issue has been developed by the author
elsewhere.1 3 The thrust of the conclusion was that village participation,
in the sense of administrative control, was important not because it was
good training for the villagers, nor because it gave pride of accomplish-
ment to the villagers (two common justifications for local participation)
but because it was the most practical way of getting the project completed
without mistakes that the RTG officials were prone to make.
The point here is less extreme: that whatever it is about development
inputs and training programs that produces the correlation with the indicators-
of functional capacity, it is not their tutorial content.
Channeled Exposure and Characteristics of Village Leadership
A second explanation is that development inputs have an effect on
TITHING when the leaders of the village have the personal abilities to
use them. This was the hypothesis taken into the research: the independent
variable was the ability of the leader, and the development assistance
played a facilitative, intensifying role.
A corellary of that hypothesis was that the facilitative role of
development inputs would be most effective in villages where the more
tradition-bound, conservative type of leadership was giving way to the
selection of younger, more flexible leaders, and the selection of leaders
who were merchants or entrepeneurs or others who were showing an aptitude
for coping with the modernizing environment. This is not an original
viewpoint; something like it is implicit in the attitudes of a substantial
proportion of Thai development workers and US-AID technicians whom we have
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known. It was a similar set of expectations which prompted the RTG in 1972
to apply the mandatory retirement age of sixty to village headmen and
kamnan.14
These expectations were first upset by the finding noted earlier, that
leaders who were engaged in nonagricultural occupations (expressed in the
variable NOFARM) or who were successfully making money from investments
(NEWINC) were showing no signs of being better leaders in community affairs
than their non-investing, rice-farming counterparts. In fact, it appeared
that indirectly their capacity as leaders might be suffering because of
their preoccupations with private investment.
The expectations were additionally confounded by the finding that as
unchanneled modernization proceeded, villagers were not choosing younger
leaders and they were not replacing elders who had been in positions for
years with fresher blood. Even the assumption that investment behaviors
would be more likely to occur among the younger men rather than among the
older (and presumably more conservative)leaders turned out to be unfounded.
The statistical evidence for those statements is shown in figure 5.9
on the following page, using two variables about the leader groups: AGE,
referring to the mean age of members of a village's leadership group, and
EXPO (for "experience"), referring to the mean number of years that members
of the leadership group have held an official village position.
The table should be read in light of the expectation taken into the
research, that these correlations would be significantly negative. None
of them met that expectation; one of them (the .40 correlation between
leader experience and TITHING) was significantly positive.
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TABLE 5.9 Correlations of TITHING and variables related to
modernization with leader age and years in office.
AGE EXPO
Unchanneled exposure to modernizing influences
SOCFAC .09 -. 09
ECOPS .10 .22
ACCESS .02 -.03
Investment behavior in the village as a whole
INVESTMENT .10 -.05
Investment behavior among the village leaders
NOFARM -.06 -.02
NEWINC -.10 -.12
Behaviors indicating village functional capacity
TITHING .06 .40
Qualitatively as well as quantitatively, the relationships we had
anticipated did not materialize. Some of the oldest leaders were among the
most enthusiastic and receptive to new ideas. Some leaders who were sub-
sistence rice farmers where their neighbors were actively investing turned out
to be highly capable of initiating ambitious community projects. We found
no signs that merchants, or other non-farmers in the village were playing
leadership roles as brokers between the village and the modern outside world
which more traditional leaders were unable to play as effectively. The new
breed of leader, the young Turk, generational differences in leadership style --
this sample of villages substantiated none of these expectations.
We return then to the question: why should community development inputs
and training inputs be associated with high levels of TITHING; and in particular,
why should they appear to be most effective in villages with high levels of
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unchanneled exposure to modernizing influences?
The answer that seems most realistic is that channeled exposure
plays the same role in encouraging functional capacity that unchanneled
exposure plays in encouraging investment. We argued that the development
of accessibility and infrastructure acted to produce both the opportunities
and the incentives to invest; now, we are suggesting that CD inputs and
training inputs produce 'the opportunities and incentives to perform
leadership roles. They help enrich the content of "being a leader" in a
Thai village, and keep it competitive with making money.
Certainly this explanation is consistent with the pattern shown in
table 5.8, that channeled inputs become more important in maintaining
TITHING as unchanneled exposure increases. It is not the isolated villages
that need to be taught how to induce tithing behaviors, but the modernizing
villages that need to be propped up. The explanation is similarly con-
sistent with the reasons for deterioration in functional capacity presented
earlier, when it was argued that village leaders' interest (and disinterest-
edness) are undermined by the consequences of investment -- we are now saying
that channeled inputs serve the function of reviving that interest.
Other evidence points to this explanation. It is exemplified by
one relatively young member of a village development committee who was
designated by the headman to attend a regional conference in a neighboring
province. He could remember only the most general contents of the training
sessions, but in listening to him discuss the experience with other villagers
it became apparent that the conference had meant two important things to
him. First, it had been fun, exciting, an outing of grand proportions.
Second, as he expressed it to the interviewer, being chosen by the headman
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as the village's representative had been a signal honor, "because there
are others who are older and have much more experience than I." The
training conference had been doubly reinforcing regardless of whether it
taught him anything. It is plausible to conclude that the conference also
made it more likely that he will continue to look upon his development
committee membership as worthwhile and important.
The reinforcement value of development assistance was also evident
in the responses of village leaders to official recognition of their develop-
ment work. For example, each district has a "headman of the year" award. It
is often given to a headman whose village happened to be chosen for substan-
tial development assistance that year -- because his village thus became the
one to show the most conspicuous development progress in that year. It is
a circular justification, and means that often an undistinguished headman
receives the award. But we often observed what seemed to be a self-fulfilling-
prophecy effect: the awarded headman showed more activity after receiving
the award, in order to maintain the image which he had been given gratuitously.
And frequently, conversations with other headmen revealed that their activities
were conducted with at least an eye to receiving an official award of merit.
A similar function is served by community development assistance when
it generates visits by outsiders to villages with conspicuous development
projects. The actual process of doing the project may not have had a spill-
over effect on the functioning of the village's leaders in other public
duties, but it is quite possible that the ceremonial admiration of the Bang-
kok dividion chief and the US-AID advisor (and maybe even visiting researchers)
of the headman, and the comments they leave behind in the ubiquitous visitors'
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book, do have an effect on the leaders' general level of motivation.
Thai villagers are at leas't as susceptible to praise from status superiors
as anyone else, and the input of development assistance vastly increases
the likilihood that a village leader will receive that kind of reinforcement.
A final indication that channeled exposure succeeds by enriching
the content and attractiveness of leader positions emerged from the RTG's
one major attempt to bolster hamlet government, the creation of "Council
275," so called after the number of the order establishing it in 1966.
In basic terms, Council 275 puts an annual development budget into
the hands of a council comprised-of headmen and selected villagers, chaired
by the kacmnan.15 It replaces the "Council 222," which had no regular bud-
get and which was chaired by the chief district officer.
Recent accounts indicate that Council 275 is well designed to
achieve its objectives, given proper implementation.16 But for our purposes,
the most pertinent aspects of the program related to the response of village
leaders to its initiation. Interviews with village leaders fresh from
the three-day training course to introduce the Council 275 in a district
of Nakhon Phanom province produced two consistent results: first, the
villagers were openly enthusiastic about the idea -- in itself, a rare
reaction. Villagers more commonly will withhold judgement about new
government programs. Second, and even more rare, many of the respondents
were explicit about what they saw as the main virtue of Council 275: it
expanded the scope of local government, and their own roles in it. As
one villager put it,
With the old system [Council 2221, members thought it
was the district's job rather than the hamlet's, be-
cause the meeting could take place only by order of
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the district office. The meetings were pointless....
The new council is the hamlet's responsibility, and
the hamlet will do its own work.
Sometimes the confidence of the villagers bordered on cockiness:
"I don't want government officers to interfere with the meetings at
first," said one headman. "We want to organize our own meetings, and we
think we can. Later, if there are any problems, we might ask for some
advice." Remembering the otherwise entirely deferential attitude of
these same respondents toward the RTG and its district representatives,
their response to the establishment of Council 275 is striking.
CD inputs and training inputs seldom so clearly change the scope of
village leadership (oriavrea potential for such change, to state it more
accurately) as the establishment of Council 275. The explanation we have
advanced is very tentatively established by the kinds of indications
that are available. But the issue itself is important enough to warrant
further exploration. If the statistical relationship of CD inputs and
training inputs with TITHING does indeed reflect a causal impact on the
functional capacity of the village, it would more than justify the money
spent on those programs. And if it turns out that the mechanism at
work is as simple as inspiring villages to do more by giving them more to
do, the implications for rural development policy are substantial -- as
we shall discuss in the concluding section of the study.
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Sumary
The relationship between modernization and the functional capacity
of a village has been presented in terms of two competing sets of dynamics.
The first set is close to being an inevitable part of the package
that accompanies modernization: the advent of unchanneled exposure to the
modern world and the consequences that go with it. One of the primary
triggers for these consequences is argued to be investment. From unchan-
neled exposure and investment flow three lines of effects, all inimicable
to the functional capacity of the village: increased socioeconomic hetero-
geneity within the village, increased costs associated with support of
public goods, and increased homogeneity of interests within the leadership
group. The net effect is that at the moment when the village is exper-
iencing greater internal stresses than ever before, it is contemporaneously
less likely than ever before to possess leaders who are able or willing
to cope disinterestedly and energetically with those stresses.
The second set of dynamics is not at all inevitable, but is pro-
duced by public policy for influencing, or channeling, villager responses
to modernization. In the Thai case, however, we have argued that the
success of that policy is almost inadvertant. Development inputs and
training programs have not educated or guided village leaders to skills
which they did not formerly possess. Instead, they have provided villagers
with incentives to continue performing the basic leadership functions, by
enriching the content of the overall role of the village leader.
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Notes to Chapter V
1. In this and subsequent tables, incomplete matrices are sometimes dis-
played in order to highlight the relevant correlations. See Appendix
D for a correlation matrix of all the quantified variables in the study.
2. This does not deny that a single, combined score of a village's goal-
directed activities can be a useful measure. See Robert E. Krug et al.,
"Measuring Village Commitment to Development," in Harold Lasswell,
Daniel Lerner, and John D. Montgomery (eds.), Values in Development:
Appraising Asian Experience (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), in press, for a
description of its application. But treating the single, combined
score as the dependent variable in a causal system seems to be undesirable.
As this chapter will discuss, very little that explains INVESTMENT also
explains TITHING, and vice versa.
3. See Chapter I, section C ("Data Analysis") and its notes.
4. See Chapter III for the complete discussion.
5. Mathematically,
DISPARITY = S.D. (SIZE + EXPENSE),
using the SIZE and EXPENSE measures by household as described in Chapter
I, section B ("The Field Research").
6. The alternative, of course, is to assert that poverty is a negative
cause of investment. But in effect, the model has already done so,
insofar as it says that physical isolation from the outside world,
low employment opportunities, and low agricultural opportunities all
act against investment. The problem has no;entirely satisfactory solu-
tion except to work with reciprocal causation -- which, for reasons dis-
cussed in Chapter I, is believed to inappropriate for these data. This
is, however, an example of why a causal map is useful as an explicit
statement of the logic behind the path model: statistical relationships
often (almost always) are fuzzy when it comes to interpretation of what
causes what. Making the judgements is eased when a ready comparison of
the operationalized nodes with the "real" variables and causal mechanisms
is available.
7. The problem is first to determine the effect of the common component
in SLUM and YARDS, then to extrapolate from that to the relationship
between SLUM and TITHING. Despite extensive effort, I have not been
able to demonstrate mathematically that there is no confounding effect
for this data set; hence the hedging in the text. But it does seem so;
certainly the effect is vanishingly small. Consider the algorithm for
the two variables, SLUM and YARDS, as scored by village:
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Notes to Chapter V cont'd.
SLUM - no. of houses with SIZE < 3 and EXPENSE < 3 and CONDITION 3
no. of houses with SIZE ' 3 and EXPENSE < 3
no. of houses with CONDITION > 5
YARDS =
total no. of houses surveyed
which we shall abbreviate in set notation as follows:
SLUM = S n Efl C1
C2YARDS =
The two constraints on these sets are that
S,E,Cl,C 2 D H and
C1 n C2 = 0
This translates into the following: If all the houses in the village
are rated 5 or higher on CONDITION, YARDS equals unity and SLUM must
equal zero. If none of the houses are rated 3 or lower on CONDITION
we know that SLUM equals zero (we do not know the value of YARDS, because
of houses that may have been rated 4). If none of the houses in the village
were rated 3 or less on both SIZE and EXPENSE, SLUM has no value. The
key point is this: if any houses are rated 3 or less on condition, the
range of values for SLUM is not constrained by the value of YARDS, even
though the size of the intervals is constrained. For example, if in a
village of 100 households, 98 of then are rated 5 or higher on CONDITION,
then obviously SLUM must be one of three values: 0, .50, or 1.00. But
knowing that 98 of the households are rated 5 or higher on CONDITION, or
thatYARDS equals .98, gives us no clue about which of those three values
SLUM will take. In the event, every village in the sample had houses
rated 3 or lower on CONDITION, and houses that were rated 3 or lower on
both SIZE and EXPENSE: hence the earlier statement that SLUM and YARDS
appear to be wholly unconfounded for this data set.
We may.add to that a fall-back position. SLUM was correlated with the
TITHING index less YARDS -- that is, with the combined standardized scores
of WAT, STREETS, and PROJECTS -- at -.43. So even if mathematical con-
founding between SLUM and YARDS can be demonstrated, it does not materially
affect the conclusions drawn in the text.based on the -.61 correlation
between SLUM and the original tithing index.
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Notes to Chapter V cont'd.
8. The Thai police widely (though unofficially) agree that the village
is the best place to settle all but the most serious offenses, and
data indicate that justice is usually served quite well by village
decisions. For evidence on both points see Paul A. Schwarz and Charles
A. Murray, A Preliminary Evaluation of the Village Police Program in
Udon, Sakhon Nakhon, and Kalasin (Bangkok: Provincial Police), 1970, and
Second Follow-Up of the Village Police Program: Results of the Evaluation
in Changwad PrachuablKhirikhan (Bangkok: Provincial Police), 1970, by
the same authors.
9. The data were collected by AIR in the 129-village survey from which
37 of the 41 villages in this sample were selected. Data for the other
four villages were taken from the 1968 raw interview reports used for
Murray, Thai Local Adninistration.
10. Mathematically,
mean leader mean villager
GAP = landholding landholding
standard deviation by village.
of villager landholdings
It is called a proxy z-score because the leader landholdings were not
included in the data used for calculating the standard deviation.
The procedure assumes that the variability in landholdings has been
subject to similar historical socioeconomic forces in the areas of
Thailand that are included in this study; and that therefore the
actual variance in landholdings in a given village (using variance
in its statistical sense) reflects, though imperfectly, the economic
weights attached to land near that village at the time of the study.
11. See Murray, Thai Local Administration, p. 138 ff., about the Thai case;
also Frank W. Sheppard, jr., "Recommended Changes in Selection and Pre-
Service Training of Village Workers for the Community Development
Department," mimeo (Bangkok: US-AID and the Community Development Depart-
ment, RTG), 1962. For a more general statement, see Arthur H. Niehoff,
A Casebook of Social Change (Chicago: Aldine), 1966, p. 58.
12. There are also community development workers who are convinced that
villagers are incapable of managing anything. Certainly the description
of village managerial capacity in this study is at odds with the
experience of any number of development officials. In response to that,
I can only point to the vast difference between villagers when an out-
sider and a status superior is present, and villagers when working a
problem out on their own. For confirmatory evidence on this point, see
Herbert J. Rubin's extensive description of rural development in Will
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and Awe: The Local Thai Official and Rural Development, unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge: M.IT.), 1972, esp. pp. 482-710.
13. Reported in "A Facet Analysis of Development Realization," in Marion
Just, Facet Analysis: Applications in the Policy Sciences (Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press), in press.
14. The field research was being conducted at the time the new order went
into effect. We (including Thai officials who were members of the
field team) had the overall impression that the net result was the
loss of several excellent headmen and kamnan, without the redeeming
result of also ousting any senile ones. This impression was, of course,
drawn from only the-4l cases of the'sample.
15. The six goals of the Council 275 as stated in Handbook of the Hamlet
Council (Bangkok: Ministry of Interior), 1967, p. 1 (translated from
the Thai) are 1) to expand ways for the people to participate in govern-
ment; 2) to promote progress in the local areas; 3) to encourage people
to take the initiative in responsibilities of the local area; 4) to
instruct local leaders in the ways of working together; 5) to lighten
the work of the RTG officials and CD workers in promoting progress;
and 6) to give the people practiee in democratic forms of government.
16. See Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, "Effects of Institutional
Change Upon a Dependency Culture: The Commune Council 275 in Rural
Thailand," Asian Survey, 13 (1973), pp. 270-287.
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CONCLUSION
IMPLICATIONS FOR A RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Throughout the study we have referred tangentially to the implica-
tions of the findings for development strategy. In this concluding section
we shall try to deal with them directly, grouped under three headings.
The first heading, methods, deals with the relevance of the findings to
a tactical question common to many developing countries: given that
economic growth is a priority goal of rural development, what kinds of
programs are most likely to succeed? The second heading, sectoral goals,
raises the issue of whether economic growth is the appropriate priority
among the many sectors of village life which need development. And the
third heading, structural goals, deals with an even broader issue: what
should-be the future of the village?
Methods
Increasing villager income is a priority goal, often the priority
goal, of rural development programs throughout the world. A major portion
of the energy that has gone into the design of those efforts has been con-
cerned with getting the villager to accept the innovations that would do
him so much godd if only he were;'not so stubborn and conservative. Yet
in this study we have portrayed a village population which is increasing
its entrepeneurial behaviors dramatically, quite possibly at an exponential
rate, without being discernibly affected by the Thai government's income-
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promoting programs. Instead, we have attempted to demonstrate, villager
behaviors to increase income appeared to follow naturally from general
infrastructure development in the form of roads, dams, irrigation systems,
electrification, and even such things as health services, police services,
and the availability of town meeting halls and movie "theatres." Give
the villager -the opportunities and the exposure to the outside world, we
have argued, and diffusion of innovation will take care of itself.
Part of the apparent contradiction between our portrait of the
Thai villager and those which depict highly change-resistant villagers
is a matter of focus. Even among Thai villagers, the entire population
of avillage does not immediately take up a new cash crop (for example)
just because it is getting a good price at the district town. From a
development worker's ground-level viewpoint, most Thai villagers are
resistant to change. From the aggregate level we have used, they are not.
We would argue, however, that the key to reconciling the great
differences among village populations in adopting what we have called
investment behaviors lies in the discussion of "scarcity" and "sufficiency"
environments. in Chapter II. When a villager is living on the ragged edge
of survival, he is suspicious of anything that upsets a familiar balance --
the more precarious the balance, the more suspicious he is likely to be.
When survival is not at issue, that villager is more open to innovation-
because he has some margin for error, for loss.
The basics of the argument are by no means new, but the lesson to'
be drawn for development policy seems to have been missed; certainly it
has not been recognized in Thailand. Put in its simplest terms, that
lesson is that what works for a-scarcity culture -- possibly a patient,
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tutorial approach -- can be exceedingly inefficient and unproductive
in a sufficiency culture.
In the real world, of course, very few nations fall into the extremes
of scarcity or sufficiency in their environments. Most countries fall
somewhere in between the poles; often, the environment varies dramatically
even within a country. But even if these gradations make it unrealistic
to seek-for a few "pure" development strategies, planners can at least be
warned against taking seriously global generalizations about how the
peasant mentality constrains their options. The relevent experiences for,
say, a Thai official are those of peasants in parts of Indonesia or
Malaysia, or perhaps parts of Latin America (if such exist) with a tra-
dition of independent peasants farming productive land. He can easily
be led astray if he tries to learn from the experiences among peasants
who have been coping with a hostile natural environment or a feudal tenure
system.
Similar comments could be made about structuring the powers to be
granted village government. In the scarcity case, when something on the
order of a familistic moral code has become deeply rooted, it may be
futile to try to work through traditional local institutions, or to try
to create new ones. But what is characteristic of local government in
the scarcity environment is not necessarily true of local government in
the sufficiency environment, as the discussion of tithing behaviors in
Thai villages sought to demonstrate.
What we are suggesting is that it is just as dangerous to share
the lessons learned by modernizing nations across the board, as it is to
treat each culture as a unique case. And because "scarcity" nations
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dominate the picture, it is likely to be the fewer (though more fortunate)
sufficiency nations which draw the wrong conclusions from others' develop-
ment experiences.
Sectoral Coals
The preceding discussion was based on the assumption that income
growth in rural areas is a priority goal. But the scarcity/sufficiency
issue ajso-raises the question of whether it should be so. Unquestionably,
an India faced with the prospect of massive food shortages and perhaps
famine must think first about economics. But do countries with sufficiency
cultures have to make higher villager income their top priority objective
in rural development? At least in the Thai case, it is by no means clear
that poverty holds first place among the many sectors in which village
life is deficient.
Compared to Western standards of living, of course Thai villagers
are poor, and of course villagers would welcome a higher economic standard
of living. But if the question is how village life can best be improved,
a number of answers besides higher income come to mind. Better health
care is one -- for every case of malnutrition caused by poverty, how many
are caused by ignorance about nutrition? For every infant death caused
by poverty, how many are caused by lack of prenatal and postnatal care?
Or if economics are to be given priority, is growth or distribution
the more important sector? Two of the great-advantages that Thailand
brought to the advent of modernization was its high proportion of independ-
ent landholders and its low population relative to arable land. A case
could be made that Thailand's development resources should be focused not
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on increasing its rural wealth, but on population control and measures
to protect the villager from losing his land.
Any number of other village-level needs in Thailand could be iden-
tified which compete with economic growth for attention. Presumably
similar examples could be cited in other sufficiency cultures. The point
is that although there are few things worse than starving, there are many
things worse than being "poor" in the sense that most Thai villagers are
poor. The governments of sufficiency cultures, like the governments of
other developing countries, do not have the resources to give every prob-
lem the attention it deserves. What does set the sufficiency nations apart
is the luxury they enjoy of being able to choose priorities on some other
basis than the simple physical survival of their populations. But at least
in the Thai case, it is a luxury that has not been recognized.
We are not suggesting that a developing nation deliberately avoid
economic growth or higher income for villagers. There is no intention iti
this study of arguing that villagers ought to be guarded from the evils
of Western materialism, still less that it would be possible to do so.
On the contrary, the evidence suggests that villager efforts to increase
income have a life of their own once villager incentives have been activated,
regardless of further government encouragement. A pragmatic argument
against concentrating rural development resources on economic growth could
be made on these grounds alone. Why spend scarce resources to encourage a
phenomenon that seems to be accelerating anyway? But that stance misses
the more important point: for a country like Thailand, rural economic
growth might -rank well below the top in a rational list of priorities.
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Structural Goals
The village is not in favor among development planners. Sometimes
it is criticized as being anachronistic, or too small to serve as an
effective unit of administration, or too poor in resources. More often,
as we discussed earlier, the village is simply overlooked. Its deficien-
cies as a tool for modernization are assumed.
Against this backdrop are two of the key findings of this study: that
Thai villages possess or are able to acquire a self-governing capacity
that is equal to a wide range of tasks, and that unless something is done
about it that capacity will deteriorate as modernization continues.
The underlying question is how the village fits into the structure
of the nation-state that each less developed country is struggling to
build. Is it assumed that the eventual product will be an urbanized society
similar to those of the West? Is the village a unit to be deliberately
discarded as soon as possible? Allowed to atrophy as nature takes its
course? Deliberately sustained through government policy?
These questions do not permit prescriptive answers; they are among
the most intensely individual to each country. But the following comments
based on the Thai case appear to be in order.
The first of the two findings, that Thailvillages can show a remark-
able ability to take care of their own affairs, has implications at two
levels. On the operational level, it suggests that developing nations look
at the possibility of pushing more responsibility out to the end of the
administrative structure, to the village. Again, the sufficiency nation
is probably more likely to find this to be feasible than scarcity ones;
as we have discussed, severe poverty constrains the civic impulses that we
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we have called "tithing."
Implementation of small-input local development projects is an
obvious use of the village. Too often, village participation in these
projects has been justified in terms of its psychological or public
relations effects. The tendency has been to limit the village's real
control over the managerial tasks to cosmetic levels. We are suggesting
that the real justification for village participation might be that the
village can do a better job than the government in choosing local projects
and implementing them -- or at the least, that the village can do as well
with much less drain on the government's limited manpower resources.
But beyond using the village to do its own projects, developing
nations should look more closely at questions about where to locate
police powers, juridical authority, tax collection and disbursement, and
the other governmental functions which are so widely being arrogated to
centralized bureaucracies which are undermanned, underskilled, and too
often undermotivated. How long will it be, for example, before the Thai
court system can provide the same judicial services to villages that vil-
lage leaders now provide? More importantly, should it try to do so?
Or is it instead desirable to look for ways to adapt and bolster the tra-
ditional system already in place?
As we have attempted to show throughout the study, there are good
reasons for considering the latter course. But what it amounts to is a
reevaluation of the proper structural goals for the government of a develop-
ing country. And the widespread identification of nation-building with
the development of centralized and national institutions makes this reeval-
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uation especially difficult. There is in fact no contradiction between
delegating substantial authority to local government and at the same
time developing national institutions. But at least among Thai officials
and, for that matter, among most scholars in the field of political
development, even limited 'autonomy in the hinterlands is seen as being a
hallmark of the pre-modern state. And historically it indeed has been
characteristic of pre-modern states; but that does not mean that it is
inappropriate, in transmuted form, for modern states.
It is this possibility that makes the deterioration of the village's
functional capacity a potentially tragic consequence.
Even on a very pragmatic level, that deterioration would be costly.
In the Thai case, there are some'43,000 villages with some 30,000,000
people living in them. For the foreseeable future, the Thai government will
not be ready to take on the burden of the de facto services now provided
by those communities to their inhabitants. Insofar as deterioration in
functional capacity takes place, so will those services go unprovided.
And insofar as they are not provided, it will mean fundamental deteriora-
tion in the quality of a villager's daily life for some extended period of
time. It is hard to accept that'this must be part of a "successful"
modernization process. It is even harder to accept in view of the evidence
that public policy designed to enrich the content of village government
may be effective in halting and even reversing the tendency to deterioration.
But it is the long range possibilities of building upon the village
that should be engaging our attention. For it seems peculiarly appropriate
at this particular point in history that a country like Thailand look to
its villages as a continuing focal point for self-governance. Why reflex-
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ively acquiesce in the consolidation of authority at the center, at the
same time when we in the West are casting about for ways to decentralize
units of government that have grown too large and unserviceable, and
at the same time when communications and information technology are
creating possibilities for combining centralized resources with local
authority?
The developing countries have had to bear enough prices for modern-
izing after the West. If there is any advantage in modernizing late,
it should be in the possibilities for learning from the West's experience
and for traveling on at least a somewhat straighter course to points
that the West is approaching very circuitously. In examining its villages,
a developing country should consider whether it is seeing only its society
as it has been or also, in however embryonic a form, what its society
should become.
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APPENDIX A
The Evolution of the Investment Construct
A detailed treatment of "investment" as a construct for analyzing
villager behaviors was first developed in the course of a research pro-
ject to develop methodologies for assessing the impact of non-military
counterinsurgency programs in Thailand. The research was conducted by the
American Institutes for Research (AIR) for the United States government.
The two central constructs of this study -- investment and tithing -- are
outgrowths of my participation in the project in 1969-70 and (after it had
shifted to a focus on developmental impact) 1972-73. The unique contribu-
tions of this study, as distinct from that which had already been accom-
plished, are most easily recapitulated by tracing the evolution of the
original concept.
Professor John D. Montgomery of Harvard University, a consultant to
AIR, first suggested in 1967 that an important measure of the effectiveness
of development programs is the degree to which citizens invest their own
resources to take advantage of government inputs -- among other reasons,
because the problems in most developing countries are so massive that
government inputs cannot possibly do the job alone.* Members of the AIR'
project staff -- principally Dr. Paul A. Schwarz, Dr. Robert E, Krug, and
*Montgomery's most recent statement of his use of the investment construct
may be found in Chapters III and VI of Technology and Civic Life: Making
and Znlementing Development Decisions (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), in press.
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myself -- subsequently elaborated on the concept as an indicator of vitality
and adaptive capability in the village. We felt then (and still do) that
development of these qualities, much more than military measures or cargo-
cult approaches to villager loyalty, is the key to what is too negatively
called "counterinsurgency." Later the insurgency aspects of the research
were de-emphasized, so that we could focus on the long-range development
implications of the investment hypothesis; That hypothesis was that a
community is developing a stronger polity to the extent that its inhabitants
are investing their own resources of time, energy, and funds in the lawful
opportunities for economic, social, and political improvements available to
them.*
The priority tasks of the project were to operationalize the concept
of investment and devise ways of testing the relationship between specific
development programs and investment level. Substantial progress was made
on both objectives. The state of the construct as of the time I rejoined
AIR to conduct the research that led to this study is described in the Krug,
Schwarz, and Bhakdi article cited above.
The approach to investment in the ongoing AIR project has since
evolved, in part as a result of the work that was the basis of this study.
But to a reader of the above article and the dissertation, it may be useful
to summarize the salient differences in the meaning of "investment" as it
is used in the two approaches.
First, the article's definition of investment is much broader than
*from Robert E. Krug, Paul A. Schwarz, and Suchitra P. Bhakdi, "Measuring
Village Commitment to Development," in Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and
John D. Montgomery (eds.), Values in Development:- Appraising Asian Exper-
ience (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), in press.
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the one in this study, particularly in not specifying either the risk or
the profit components of investment. Listening to a government broadcast
about agricultural techniques is considered to be an investment, as are a
broad category of behaviors (e.g., buying a radio) that I would term "pur-
chases," signifying very little about changes in the villager's outlook.
The rationale for requiring risk and profit-seeking to be part of an invest-
ment is given in Chapter II.
Second, the article presents measures of social and political invest-
ment as well as economic investment. While agreeing that the investment
construct conceptually spans the social and political sectors, I am
extremely unsure about what that means in terms of rural Thailand and
villager behaviors. Indicators of social and political investment have
not been included in this study.
Third, and fundamental to the difference in the two approaches, the
article uses investment as a global measure of goal-directed activity by
the villager, whereas this study splits the indicators between private-
oriented behaviors (investment) and public-oriented behaviors (tithing).
In a technical sense, this means that the two "investment" scores in a
single village could be wildly different, even after allowing for measure-
ment error. More generally, it points to a difference in emphasis. As a
global measure, investment can be argued to signify health in the local
polity. As used in this study, investment is what happens when modernizing
influences reach the village, and it is inherently stressful to the village
as a political community. Tithing is the thermometer for checking whether
the polity is coping with the problems that investment brings.
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APPENDIX B
List of the Data Points in the Interview Schedule
I. THE VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT
1. Distance to the district town, by road type and total elapsed time.
2. Distance to the province town, by road type and total elapsed time.
3. No. of buses per day.
4. No. of households.
5. Population.
6. Year access road was built.
7. Time required to reach the district and province towns before
the access road was built.
8. Soil type.
9. Average rice production per rai.
10. Terrain characteristics.
11. Household water resources.
12. Characteristics of the water.
13. Agricultural water resources.
14. Percent of households with access to irrigation.
15. Highest grade at the local school.
16. No. of teachers.
17. No.of students.
18. No. of eligible students not attending school.
19. No. of students attending school outside the village.
20. Condition of the school and grounds.
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21. Distance to the nearest health center.
22. Health center staffing.
23. Other sources of local health care.
24. No. of households with privies.
25. No. of families practicing family planning.
26. No. of temples.
27. Condition of temple(s).
28. No. of priests and novices.
29. Local crops, with percent of households growing each.
30. For cash crops, year first introduced.
31. Cottage industries, with percent of households engaged in each.
32. Other employment opportunities, with percent of households for
each, and specification of full or part-time; seasonal or year-
round; daily wage; length of availability.
33. Distance to nearest police station or security unit.
34. Staffing of police station or security unit.
35. Length of time since adsigned to that location.
36. Crimes committed in the village, last year.
37. Insurgent incidents, last year.
38. No. of families inmigrating, last five years.
39. No. of families outmigrating, last five years.
40. Family structure (e.g., one dominant family in the village?).
41. Inter-family feuds.
42. Other long-standing quarrels.
43. Age of the village.
44. Ethnic characteristics.
45. Special traditions or sources of fame (or notoriety) of the village.
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46. Meeting hall?
47. Movie theatre?
48. No. of rice mills.
49. No. of shops.
50. No. of cars, trucks, or buses.
51. No. of motorcycles.
52. No. of bicycles.
53. No. of tractors, or availability for rent.
54. No. of sewing machines.
55. No. of radios.
II. SKILLS INVENTORY
1. No. of persons with seventh grade education.
2. No. of persons beyond seventh grade, with details for each.
3. No. of carpenters; no. full-time.
4. No. of masons. "
5. No. of blacksmiths. "
6. No. of mechanics. "
7. No. of drivers. t
8. Special training courses held in the village; details for each.
9. Other special agricultural skills among villagers.
10. Other special business skills among villagers.
11. No. of army veterans in village.
III. INCOME AND PROPERTY STRATIFICATION
1. No. of families without land.
2. Source of income for landless families.
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3. Reasons for losing land.
4. Local land rental system.
5. No. of families renting land.
6. No. of families in debt.
7. No. of families hiring labor; wages; how many years.
8. No. of families loaning money; interest rates.
IV. LEADER INTERVIEW FORM
1. Position; years in position.
2. Previous position(s); years in those positions.
3. Age.
4. Occupation.
5. No. of children.
6. No. of children educated beyond the grade available locally.
7. No. of children living outside the village; details.
8. No. of rai of land.
9. Crops grown.
10. Other sources of wealth (e.g., no. of water buffalo).
11. Education.
12. Training courses.
13. Perception of duties, in order of importance.
14. Perception of other leaders' duties.
15. Perception of problems and obstacles.
16. Perception of his status in the village.
17. Perception of his sources of authority as a leader.
18. Ranking of his nominations of leaders in the village.
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V. SPECIAL FORM FOR HEADMAN OR KAMAN CRITICAL INCIDENTS
1. Intra-village disputes, last year.
2. Inter-village disputes, last year.
3. Disputes with district officials, last year.
4. Disputes with other outsiders, last year.
5. Trips to district on official business, last year.
6. Trips to help others going to district on official businesslast year.
7. Trips to district on private business, last year.
8. Trips to province on private business, last year.
9. Village meetings, frequency last year.
10. Participation in development projects or public cerem6nies, last year.
11. Contacts with law enforcement authorities, last year.
12. Visits to village by RTG officials, last year.
VI. CRITICAL INCIDENT CATEGORIES, ALL LEADERS
1. Exchange of information about agricultural practices.
2. Exchange of information about news items.
3. Innovations in agriculture practiced by respondent.
4. Investment in other occupational innovations.
5. Last contact with an RTG official.
6. Last contact with other outsider.
7. Last village meeting.
8. Last village ceremonial.
9. Last law enforcement episode.
10. Role in last village development project.
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VII. FORM FOR RECONSTRUCTING ALL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
1. Purpose of project.
2. Who initiated the idea?
3. Motivation for project.
4. Circumstances which prompted action at that time.
5. Sources of popular support, and extent.
6. Sources of opposition, and extent.
7. Decision-making format.
8. Project design process.
9. Project financing process.
10. Project labor process.
11. Project equipment process.
12. Physical specifications of the outcome.
13. Match of the outcome with intentions.
14. Unintended outcomes, positive and negative.
15. Reasons for failure or errors, if any.
16. Overall effect on village life, if any.
VIII. DAT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
A POINTS ON THE HOUSE-BY-HOUSE OBSERVATION SURVEY
Size of house (nine-point scale).
Expense of materials (nine-point scale).
Condition of compound (nine-point scale).
Newness of house (three-point scale).
Occupant, or special function of the house (e.g., rice mill).
Inventory of goods on sale in village stores.
Map showing location of houses, streets, facilities.
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APPENDIX C
Scoring Procedures for the Variables
This appendix describes the scoring pro6edures used for variables
which either have no natural metric, or which posed special problems of
quantification.
Calculation of standardized scores for variables using ordinal measures.
The indexes for this study were constructed by summing standardized
scores on the separate indicators. This raises the question: how are
standardized scores to be obtained for variables measured at the ordinal
level? One possibility is to express the values of the variable in terms
of an arbitrarily chosen interval scale (unit increments is the obvious
choice), then proceed to calculate the mean, standard deviation, and stan-
dardized scores as if the data had been measured at the interval level in
the first place. A second possibility, and the one used for this study, is
to use a normalizing technique.
In effect, the normalizing technique assigns a z-score which repre-
sents the average distance of any given category of an ordinal variable
from the center of the distribution, under a normal curve. The procedure
is fully described in Truman Lee Kelley, Fundamentals of Statistics (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press), 1947, pp. 295-297. It boils down to
four steps: 1) calculate the percentage of the sample in each category,
array in order, and assume a normal curve; 2) look up the ordinates of the
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normal curve at the dividing points between the categories; 3) for any
given category, subtract the right-hand ordinate from the left-hand
ordinate; and 4) divide the difference by the proportion of the sample
in that category. The result is the mean deviation of a portion of a
unit normal distribution, and is the score to be assigned to all cases
that fall in the category in question. The procedure has the advantage
of allowing the calculation of a standardized score by using the single
assumption of normality; it does not require the analyst to impose ar-
bitrary metrics on the ordinal categories.
With this general procedure in mind, we will turn to explanations
of the variables starred in table 1.3, Chapter I.
COOPS: membership in agricultural credit cooperatives
The three-point scale is
1. No cooperative in the village
2. Less than 20 members (attrition in membership)
3. 20 members or more
The reason for not treating membership continuously is that co-ops
are established in 20-member groups. No fourth category for villages with
more than one group is given, because of substantial differences in policy
on more than one group per village among banks in the different districts
of the sample. Standardized scores on COOPS were obtained through the
normalizing procedure.
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ACCESS: accessibility to the outside world
The ACCESS variable is generated by scoring villages twice on each
of two four-valued dimensions, as follows:
"Accessibility to what"
1. Large province town (for the sample, Ubol, Chiang Rai,
Nakhon Phanom)
2. Large district town or small province town (Lomsak,
Mukdahan, That Phanom, Petchabun)
3. Average district town (Amnatcharoen)
4. Small district town (Thoeng, Tha Uthen)
"Difficulty of access for a villager"
1. A trip to town takes just a few minutes in addition
to the time spent on business, any time of day.
2. A trip to town usually means losing half of the work day.
3. A trip to town usually means losing most of the work day.
4. A trip to town means losing the entire work day.
Each village is scored on "difficulty of access" for both the
district and province towns nearest it. For this sample, the procedure
created no anomalies (e.g., a village in one district which is very close
to the town of a neighboring district).
It was assumed that "difficulty of access" is a more important
consideration than the gradations of the size of the towns. On the basis
of this assumption, a matrix scaling procedure was completed (refer to the
illustration on the following page) by entering each village twice, accord-
ing to its accessibility to the district and province towns. Thus, the
scorer starts at the top row of the matrix and works through every village
which is only "a few minutes" away from somewhere. All of those villages
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will be ranked higher on accessibility than villages which are no closer than
a few minutes
half-day
most of day
all day
large large average small
province district district district
The ordering: v 1 > v2 > (V3 5v' 4) > v5 in accessibility.
a half-day away from the district and province towns, no matter whether
they are larger than the equivalent towns for the higher-rated villages.
Some ties occur, when two or more villages are identically distant
from identical types of towns (e.g., v3 and v4 in the illustration). In
the case of the 41 villages of the sample, the result was a set of 20
ordered levels of ACCESS.
ECOPS: economic infrastructure near the village.
Economic infrastructure is assumed to consist of two types: agri-
cultural, meaning large-scale irrigation systems, flood control systems,
or other facilities beyond the village's capacity to build; and non-
agricultural, referring to factories or other employers near enough to be
a viable source of employment for villagers. In the case of agricultural
infrastructure, a negative value was also defined: some feature of the
topography or general environment (besides poor soil or lack of water)
which clearly constrained agricultural activity -- for example, frequent
flooding from a nearby river. Normalized scores were obtained for the
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v 1  V2  V3 V4
vi V5  V5
V2 V3 V4
three-valued agricultural infrastructure item and the two-valued nonagri-
cultural infrastructure item, and summed to form ECOPS.
SOCFAC: social infrastructure in the village.
The following facilities were counted: school beyond the fourth
grade, health center, movie theatre, community center, electricity, and
police post. A school to the fourth grade only and a temple were treated
as standard facilities, and not counted.
NATRES: natural resources of the village
Only rough estimates of soil fertility were possible. Available
data on land productivity are untrustworthy, and it was decided to assign
only "conspicuously fertile" or "conspicuously barren" to unusual cases,
based on a variety of estimates -- from the RTG agricultural agencies,
the villagers, and economic statistics in the archives. Water resources
were gradated equally simply, carefully excluding changes in water resources
that the village might have effected by its own efforts (in order to
make sure that NATRES was legitimately treated as an exogenous variable).
The negative value for water resources was "no nearby river." The neutral
value was "nearby wet-season river," and the positive value was "nearby
year-round river." Normalized standard scores for the two trichotomous items
were summed to form NATRES.
YARDS: upkeep of house compounds
The nine-point scale for grading house compounds is described in
Chapter I. The percent of houses with a rating of "5" (clean, but no
frills) or higher was chosen as the measure for YARDS in order to give
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extra weight to low variance within a village. Simply using the mean
on the compound ratings would give high scores to villages with extremes
of good and poor upkeep. %The object of the measure, as discussed in Chapter
IV, is to identify the degree to which a village as a whole exhibits evidence
of high morale and, for want of a better phrase, community spirit.
STREETS: extent and upkeep of internal village streets
The key factor is not whether village houses are directly on a
village street. Often a house will be within twenty or thirty meters
of a street and yet have as complete access as a house fronting on it.
Or in other cases, the streets are so poorly maintained that even the houses
directly on the street cannot use it except during the dry season. To
get around these problems, a village's street system was assessed on two
dimensions, as follows:
"Households cut off from access to a street of any kind"
1. None (0%)
2. "A small cluster" (1-10%)
3. "A major cluster" (11-50%)
4. "Most of the village" (+50%)
"Extent of village street building and maintenance effort"
1. Major system of village-built and maintained streets
2. Some village-built streets and/or well-maintained RTG
road through the village.
3. No evidence of village efforts to build and/or maintain
internal streets.
The two dimensions were combined on the assumption that the number of
people cut off from a road is more important than the extent of the village's
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effort, leading to a 12-point fully ordered scale. For purposes of
combining STREETS with the other indicators of tithing behavior, the nor-
malizing procedure was applied to the scale values.
WAT: upkeep of the village's temple
A simple three-point scale was used: conspicuously inferior mainten-
ance of the wat compound and building; average; conspicuously superior main-
tenance. It was assumed that the negative inferences to be drawn from an
unkempt wat are more reliable than the positive inferences from a good one
(which may be a product of initiatives taken by just a few people in the
village). So whereas the first two categories were rated from observation
alone, assignment to the "superior" category required corroborative evidence
from other sources of unusually high village-wide inputs. The normalizing
procedure was applied to the ratings.
NEWINC: Zeader income derived from non-crop sources
The figure was estimated from leader self-reports on assets and
income, plus evidence from observational sources and other interviews. Two
facilitating Thai-specific factors should be noted: personal income is
not the private matter in Thailand that it is in the United States. In
social conversation, asking someone what he makes is entirely acceptable.
And the villagers were not likely to avoid answering accurately out of fear
of taxes -- because taxes are not collected for the levels of income reached
by any but a few of the respondents, because taxes are not often collected
in villages for the handful of villagers who did have taxable levels, and
because of precautions on our part to be clearly identified as what we were:
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interviewers for a project sponsored by Accelerated Rural Development and
US-AID.
GAP: magnitude of the economic gap between leaders and non-leaders
A more complete discussion of the scoring for this variable is in-
cluded in the text and notes of Chapter V, because understanding how it
was scored is necessary to understanding what the variable means. Briefly,
GAP is a proxy z-score, whereby the mean landholdings of the leader group
are expressed in terms of distance from the mean of landholdings of a ran-
dom sample of villagers.
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